Related party transaction disclosure: compliance, determinants, value-relevance and real earnings management by Maigoshi, Zaharaddeen Salisu
The copyright © of this thesis belongs to its rightful author and/or other copyright 
owner.  Copies can be accessed and downloaded for non-commercial or learning 
purposes without any charge and permission.  The thesis cannot be reproduced or 
quoted as a whole without the permission from its rightful owner.  No alteration or 
changes in format is allowed without permission from its rightful owner. 
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTION DISCLOSURE: 
COMPLIANCE, DETERMINANTS, VALUE-RELEVANCE 
AND REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
ZAHARADDEEN SALISU MAIGOSHI 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA 
2017
 
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTION DISCLOSURE: COMPLIANCE, 
DETERMINANTS, VALUE-RELEVANCE AND REAL EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
ZAHARADDEEN SALISU MAIGOSHI 
 
Thesis submitted to  
Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of Accountancy 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
In Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 iv 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
from Universiti Utara Malaysia, I agree that the Universiti Library may make it freely 
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for the copying of this thesis 
in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purpose may be granted by my 
supervisors or, in their absence, by the Dean of Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of 
Accountancy where I did my thesis. It is understood that any copying or publication 
or use of this thesis or parts of it for financial gain shall not be allowed without my 
written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and 
to Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) for any scholarly use which may be made of any 
material from my thesis. 
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of materials in this thesis, in 
whole or in part, should be addressed to: 
 
Dean of Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of Accountancy 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
06010 UUM Sintok 




Expropriation through Related Party Transaction (RPT) has been identified as one of 
the key factors that led to the collapse of several firms globally. Hence, its regulation 
becomes necessary. This study examines the extent and the determinants of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs by Malaysian listed firms. It 
also investigates the value-relevance of Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard 
(MFRS) 124 adoption, real earnings management (REM) in RPTs and the moderating 
effect of compliance with MFRS 124 on the relationship between REM in RPTs and 
firm value. The study uses the data collected from the firms with significant RPTs 
from 2009 to 2015. Findings from the weighted disclosure index indicate a moderate 
level of compliance with MFRS 124. Furthermore, the regression results reveal that 
board independence, audit committee financial expertise, family ownership, 
managerial ownership and firm growth have significant positive relationships with the 
compliance of MFRS 124. Moreover, the study documents that RPTs disclosure is 
value-relevant. Findings of price model provide evidence that with the adoption of 
MFRS 124, capital market participants value the EPS of the RPT firms over its BVPS. 
The study documents that firms use RPTs to perpetrate REM. The results of the 
Roychowdhury models show that RPTs firms are characterized by low cash flow from 
operations, high production costs and low discretionary expenditures. It is also 
established that capital market discounts the stock price of firms that perpetrate REM 
in RPTs. Also, compliance with disclosure requirements on RPTs mitigates the 
negative relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. The study reveals the 
need for the relevant authorities to increase the level of enforcement to achieve full 
compliance which will result to increase transparency of financial reporting and 
investor protection. The results of this study contribute to the agency, resource 
dependency and capital market theories. 
 
Keywords: compliance, corporate governance mechanisms, firm financial 
characteristics, firm value, real earnings management, value-relevance. 
 




Pengambilalihan melalui Transaksi Pihak Berkaitan (RPT) telah dikenalpasti sebagai 
salah satu faktor utama yang menyebabkan keruntuhan beberapa firma di seluruh 
dunia. Oleh itu, peraturannya menjadi keperluan. Kajian ini mengkaji sejauh mana dan 
penentu kepatuhan terhadap keperluan pendedahan kepada RPT oleh firma yang 
disenaraikan di Malaysia. Ia juga mengkaji nilai-relevan Piawaian Pelaporan 
Kewangan Malaysia (MFRS) 124, pengurusan pendapatan sebenar (REM) dalam RPT 
dan kesan penyesuaian pematuhan dengan MFRS 124 mengenai hubungan antara 
REM dalam RPT dan nilai firma. Kajian ini menggunakan data yang dikumpulkan 
dari firma dengan RPT yang signifikan dari tahun 2009 hingga 2015. Penemuan dari 
indeks penzahiran berwajaran menunjukkan tahap pematuhan yang sederhana dengan 
MFRS 124. Tambahan pula, hasil regresi menunjukkan kebebasan lembaga, 
kepakaran kewangan jawatankuasa audit, pemilikan keluarga , pemilikan pengurus 
dan pertumbuhan firma mempunyai hubungan positif yang signifikan dengan 
pematuhan MFRS 124. Selain itu, kajian mendokumenkan pendedahan RPT adalah 
nilai yang relevan. Penemuan model harga menunjukkan bukti bahawa dengan 
penggunaan MFRS 124, peserta pasaran modal menilai EPS firma RPT ke atas 
BVPSnya (nilai buku sesaham). Dokumen kajian mendapati firma menggunakan RPT 
untuk melakukan REM. Hasil model Roychowdhury menunjukkan bahawa firma RPT 
dicirikan dengan aliran tunai yang rendah dari operasi, biaya pengeluaran yang tinggi 
dan perbelanjaan budi bicara yang rendah. Ia juga mendapati bahawa pasaran modal 
mendiskaun harga saham firma yang terlibat dalam REM melalui RPT. Selain itu, 
pematuhan terhadap keperluan pendedahan mengenai RPT mengurangkan hubungan 
negatif antara REM dalam RPT dan nilai firma. Kajian itu mendedahkan keperluan 
pihak berkuasa yang berkaitan untuk meningkatkan tahap penguatkuasaan untuk 
mencapai pematuhan penuh yang akan menyebabkan peningkatan ketelusan pelaporan 
kewangan dan perlindungan pelabur. Hasil kajian ini menyumbang kepada agensi, 
ketergantungan sumber dan teori pasaran modal. 
 
Kata kunci: pematuhan, mekanisma tadbir urus korporat, ciri-ciri kewangan firma, 
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This chapter highlights the contemporary issues pertaining related party transactions 
(RPTs), corporate disclosure and RPTs disclosure regulations across the world in the 
background of the study. The chapter explains the problem statements, research 
questions and objectives of the study. Other headings in the chapter are scope of the 
study, significance of the study and organization of the thesis. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Corporate monitoring, financial transparency and reporting quality have been among 
the major concerns of policymakers in many nations across the globe (Sierra García, 
Ruiz Barbadillo, & Orta Pérez, 2012). The collapse of giant corporations like 
WorldCom and Enron in the United State, Nortel in Canada, Equitable Life Assurance 
Society in the United Kingdom, Parmalat in Europe, China Aviation Oil in Singapore 
and alike have pushed political and business leaders to put much interest in regaining 
and sustaining public trust in capital market (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008). Since the 
collapse of these giant corporations, many studies were conducted to find the tool and 
incentives behind the earnings management practices by the firm and provide possible 
solution accordingly Xiao (2015). Abusive related party transactions are identified as 
the key issues that led to the collapse of many multinational corporations such as 
Adelphia, Enron and Tyco (Munir, Saleh, Jaffar, & Yatim, 2013). Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2009) claims that the biggest 
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corporate governance challenge facing Asian business landscape is the abusive RPTs 
which can take the form one- off material expropriations of wealth or the slow 
expropriation of wealth through continuous operational transactions. Abusive RPTs is 
defined as a situation where a party in control of a company enters into a transaction 
to the detriment of non-controlling shareholders (OECD, 2009). 
In response to this, corporate governance change and detailed disclosures were 
proposed and adopted by many countries to prevent possible reoccurrence of such 
transactions in the future (Carnegie & O’Connell, 2013). Related party transaction is 
one of the major areas in accounting that require strict monitoring and tight accounting 
regulations through accounting standard (Morris, Pham, & Gray, 2011). This is 
because of the dual roles it plays for both value-generating and value-destroying 
purposes, and its attendant effect on the value generation processes.  
The extent of literature has not to arrive at a clear-cut motive behind the RPTs. This 
leads researchers to have opposing views on the actual position of RPTs in the firm’s 
value generation chain. Proponents of the rationality of RPT believed that RPTs can 
be used to fast-track decision-making process and minimize transaction cost. It can 
also be used  as a vehicle  for the efficient resource allocation, effective coordination 
of divergent business activities, sustenance of marginally profitable business units and 
minimization of tax expenses; which in turn increase the value of the firm (Cheung, 
Rau, & Stouraitis, 2006; Downs, Ooi, Wong, & Ong, 2016; Jian & Wong, 2010; Loon 
& DeRamos, 2009; Pozzoli, Venuti, & Parthenope, 2014; Yeh, Shu, & Su, 2012).  
In contrast, some studies argue that RPTs are used for self-serving transactions, 
tunneling, transfer of profit from listed to unlisted firms and it often serves as a vehicle 
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used by unlisted firms to get capital market financing through related listed firm 
(Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2009; Di Carlo, 2014; Mustafa, Abdul Latif, & 
Taliyang, 2011; Wong & Kim, 2015). These practices are prevalent in countries with 
weak legal or investors’ protection (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2013). RPTs provide an avenue 
for controlling shareholder to expropriate the wealth of the firm at the expense of the 
outside shareholders (Munir et al., 2013). Tunneling is defined as the act of diverting 
resources from listed firm by the corporate insiders (controlling shareholders and 
management) (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000 p 22).  
The extent of literature provides many instances in which controlling shareholders 
expropriate corporate resources in various forms at the detriment of minority 
shareholders in RPTs (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; 
Jameson, Prevost, & Puthenpurackal, 2014; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2000). These necessitate the need for of RPTs regulation. The regulations will 
protect minority shareholders from the devious transactions that may lead to the 
expropriation of the firm and also let the firm enjoys the benefits attributable to the 
transactions.  
Disclosure regulation through accounting standards can be used to contain the 
tunneling activities. This is because accounting standards are promulgated to monitor 
the affairs of corporate bodies, improve business reporting, maintain a principal-agent 
fiduciary relationship and compel financial reporting system to disclose the actual 
economic reality of the reporting entity (Kantudu, 2008). Reporting entities are 
required to comply with reporting standards completely (Houqe, van Zijl, Dunstan & 
Karim 2012). Noncompliance leads to diversity in reporting, which affect the 
comparability and relevance of the information contained in the financial reports. 
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Information on RPTs is crucial to the users of the financial statement. Thus, it forms 
part of the important information that must be disclosed in the financial statements to 
allow for the rational decisions. 
It must be noted however, that sometimes controlling holder may engage in negative 
tunneling. This action is widely referred to as propping in many pieces of literature 
(Friedman, Friedman, & Johnson, 2003; Peng, Wei, & Yang, 2011; Ying & Wang, 
2013). Propping is an act of importing personal resources to the listed firm by the 
controlling shareholders to save the firm from financial crises, meet certain legal 
requirements or achieve other personal gains. Yet, some studies establish that 
propping is followed with excessive tunneling (Williams, 2014; Ying & Wang, 2013).  
RPT can be view as a strategy adopted by controlling holder to meet some legal 
requirements, market requirements or save the firm from major financial distress. In 
most cases, this is done with the intention of involving in expropriation when the 
situation permit (Friedman, Friedman, & Johnson, 2003). Concisely, any strategy 
adopted, whether tunneling, propping or a combination of both strategies brings 
distortion to accounting figures, affect the quality of the reported earnings and falsifies 
the reported financial position of the reporting entity. 
Several studies investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on RPTs 
(Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, & Wolfenzon, 2011; Cai, Hillier, Tian, & Wu, 2015; 
Chen, Wang, & Lin, 2014; Kang, Lee, Lee, & Park, 2014). Some of these studies relate 
prejudicial RPTs with corporate governance failure. Pizzo (2011) states that RPTs 
cannot be analyzed independently from corporate governance mechanisms. This is 
because in most cases RPTs have to be approved by the board of directors (Kohlbeck 
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& Mayhew, 2010). Malaysian code of corporate governance empowers the audit 
committee to scrutinize and approve all RPT. In doing so, the committee ensures that 
only the value-enhancing transactions are approved. 
Norwani, Mohamad and Chek (2011) present many practical corporate scandals in 
Malaysia with a direct link with corporate governance failure. Abdul Wahab et al. ( 
2011) and Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2015) document that RPTs are detrimental to 
firm performance. They also find that good corporate governance mitigates the 
negative effect of RPTs on the performance. Based on the above, both internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms such as board composition, audit 
committee characteristics, chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics, ownership 
structure can be seen to have explaining power in determining the level of compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements on RPTs in financial reports. 
The role of firm financial characteristics on voluntary disclosure has been thoroughly 
investigated in many studies (Chau & Gray, 2010; Gul & Leung, 2004; Heitzman, 
Wasley, & Zimmerman, 2010; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Sodikin, 2013).  Based 
on the findings of these studies, firm financial characteristics such as RPTs motives, 
firm performance can play an important role in explaining the level of compliance 
with RPTs disclosure requirements of a given accounting standards. 
In many countries in the world, RPTs are required to be disclosed in financial reports 
in accordance with the disclosure requirements of the relevant accounting standard. 
Accounting numbers reported in financial statements are the ultimate product of 
accounting system which is dictated by an accounting standard. Accordingly, most of 
the capital market participants used accounting information in decision making 
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(Elshandidy, 2014). The relationship between accounting numbers and firm value is 
interesting not only for capital providers but also for the managers saddled with the 
responsibility for the efficient handling of the firm’s resources. This can be seen as a 
result of increased awareness of the significance of connecting management to value 
creation (Gjerde, Knivsflå, & Sættem, 2011).  
Since accounting numbers are the product of accounting system, change in accounting 
standard may affect the decision usefulness of accounting information to the capital 
market participant and other interested parties. Accounting information is said to be 
value-relevant if it is capable of explaining the variability in stock price. Switching 
from one set of accounting standard to another would only be worthwhile if it increases 
the value relevance of the accounting numbers. Therefore, it is possible that changes 
in the disclosure requirements concerning RPTs affect the value-relevance of 
accounting numbers (for the pre and post change periods). This is because capital 
market participants value RPTs disclosed in financial reports (Lin, Liu, & Keng, 2010; 
Xiao & Zhao, 2014). Hwang, Chiou and Wang (2013) believe that extensive 
disclosures requirements avert the possibility of indulgent into any dubious RPTs by 
the controlling shareholders.  
Even though, there is no clear direction on the capital market reaction to the 
announcement of RPTs (Lin et al., 2010; Xiao & Zhao, 2014), information on RPTs 
must be disclosed in the financial reports to enable the stakeholders to assess the risk 
and return of RPTs (Ariff & Hashim, 2013). Peng et al. (2011) reveal that market 
reacts positively to the announcement of RPTs. This is more evident when the RPT 
involves the injection of resources to the reporting entity. In contrast, Gordon, Henry 
and Darius (2004) reveal that the industry adjusted return is low for the firms that 
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engage in RPTs, which in turn affect the firm value. Consistently. Ge, Drury, Fortin, 
Liu and Tsang (2010) document that the value coefficient of the firms that engaged in 
RPTs are lower compared to firms without RPTs. This could be seen as the possible 
effects of the studies that linked RPTs with the earnings management.  
Earnings management is the intentional manipulations of accounting numbers within 
the scope of accounting principles or structuring transaction by management to meet 
pre-set earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, 368). Management employs many 
techniques to manipulate the reported earnings. These techniques are categorized into 
accrual earnings management and real earnings management. Accrual earnings 
management is effected through the choice of accounting method, discretionary 
expenses as well as managerial estimates. Several studies investigate the relationship 
between RPTs and earnings management (Aharony, Wang, & Yuan, 2010; Beuselinck 
& Deloof, 2014; Cupertino, Martinez, & da Costa, 2015; Kuo, Ning, & Song, 2014). 
Munir et al., (2013) state that RPTs prompt management to engage in earnings 
management practices. Beuselinck and Deloof (2014) provide empirical evidence that 
RPTs are used for both earning management and tunneling purposes.  
Studies such as Zang (2012) and Kuo, Ning and Song (2014) document that tight 
regulations have forced the management to shift attention from accrual earnings 
management to real earnings management1. Real earnings management (REM) 
involves deliberate actions by the management to manipulate the real activities 
through techniques such as shares buyback, overproduction, lax credit policy, 
discounts and alike to achieve a pre-determined reported earnings.  Real earnings 
                                                     
1 This is because accruals earnings management can be detected by auditors, regulators and 
sophisticated investors.  
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management can be perpetrated conveniently in RPTs. This is because insiders 
determine and manipulate the terms and conditions of the transactions (Cheung, Qi, 
Rau, & Stouraitis, 2009; Hwang et al., 2013). Hwang et al. (2013) state that firms are 
prone to manage earnings in RPTs because of the low transparency and the 
complexities in such transactions. Gordon et al. (2004), Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) 
and Lei and Song (2011) provide evidence that earnings management in RPTs is 
detrimental to the firm value. 
In response to the above issues, governments of many countries in the world have 
promulgated laws, code of corporate governance and sound accounting standards. The 
laws serve as tools for monitoring the activities of corporate management and directors 
against the minority shareholders’ expropriation. In Malaysia, the Malaysian 
Accounting Standard Board (MASB) has issued a new Malaysian Financial Reporting 
Standard2 on related party transactions (MFRS 124) in 2012. MFRS 124 is designed 
to guide the preparers on what information need to be disclosed regarding RPTs and 
how to disclose such information in the financial reports. The aim of the MFRS 124 
is to provide users with relevant information on RPTs to enable informed decision and 
protect minority shareholders against the prejudicial use of RPTs by insiders. 
In a similar development, Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) was 
revised in the same 2012. The revised code focuses on the role of directors as 
fiduciaries in their relationship with the firm and strengthens the independence of 
                                                     
2 Throughout this thesis Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard (MFRS) and International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) are used interchangeably. This is based on the fact that the former is a direct 
replica of the later save for the name, numbering and effective dates. Similarly, Financial Reporting 
Standard (FRS) and MFRS are used interchangeably in the study. The former was the accounting 
standard in operation prior to the mandatory adoption of the later in 2012. So MFRS refers to the FRS 
in any firm-year prior to 2012. 
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independent directors. It also places more emphasis on the sustainability of the firm 
and empowers the audit committee to scrutinize all RPTs. This is to ensure that only 
value enhancing transactions are approved by the board. In addition to these, stringent 
capital market requirements were put in place to guarantee prompt disclosure of any 
material transaction with related parties to the whole market participants. Also, the 
Audit Oversight Board (AOB) was established and came into force on 1 April 2010 to 
promote and develop an effective audit oversight framework and to promote 
confidence in the quality and reliability of audited financial statements in Malaysia. 
These regulations have played important role in restraining the menace of accrual 
earnings management in Malaysian reporting environment (Ismail, Kamarudin, Zijl, 
& Dunstan, 2013; Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2005). 
Hence, this study evaluates the extent of compliance with disclosure requirements of 
MFRS 124 and documents the determinants of compliance with RPTs disclosure 
requirements. Also, the study reveals the value relevance of RPTs disclosure across 
the two accounting regimes (before and after the adoption of MFRS 124). 
Additionally, the study provides evidence of REM in RPTs and its negative effect on 
firm value. However, high level of compliance with the disclosure requirements on 
RPTs mitigates the negative effect of REM in RPTs on the firm value. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Recent studies on corporate governance shift attention from the initial agency problem 
(principal-agent) to new dimension of agency problem between controlling 
shareholder and minority holders (principal-principal or type II agency problem) (see 
for example Fraile & Fradejas, 2014; Jameson et al., 2014; Song, Wang, & Cavusgil, 
 
 10 
2015). Type II of agency problem arises as a result of concentrated ownership that is 
prevalent in emerging economies. In this economies most of the listed companies are 
significantly owned by an individual, group of family or the state (Claessens, Djankov, 
& Lang, 2000; Loon & DeRamos, 2009; Morris et al., 2011). In most of these types 
of business models, there is no separation between ownership and control. Therefore, 
RPTs can be infected with conflict of interest between controlling and minority 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders use RPTs to tunnel (Jiang, Lee, & Yue, 2010; 
Munir et al., 2013; Mustafa et al., 2011) or to prop resources to a firm (Cheng & Leung, 
2014; Williams & Taylor, 2013; Ying & Wang, 2013) depending on the motive that 
intend to be achieved.  
A listed subsidiary could deposit its excess cash with its unlisted parent for a long 
period instead of investing it in a fund that can generate interest income to both 
controlling and minority shareholders. In some instances, the parent company may 
take an interest-free loan from its subsidiary or associate entity. A typcal example of 
this was the case when Hanqi group and its affiliated companies took a loan of 198.6 
million RMB (31.1 million USD) from its listed associate company (Feng Hua Co. a 
Chinese listed company with stock code 600615). The total equity value of Hanqi’s 
shares in Feng Hua Co. was 116.21 RMB (18.2 million USD). The amount and the 
nature of the loan were not properly disclosed in the financial report as it was reported 
under other receivables. Later the debtor (Hanqi group ) went bankrupt and nowhere 
to find the money. This situation necessitates the lending firm (Feng Hua Co) to write 




For many decades, series of detrimental RPTs were reported within the Malaysian 
business circle. A typical example of these transactions is the case of United Engineers 
(Malaysia) Bhd (UEM). UEM acquires 32.6% interest of its financially distressed 
parent company (Renong) at an inflated cost of 2.34 billion Malaysian ringgits. This 
transaction was interpreted as a deliberate effort to bailout the parent company from 
its financial turmoil (Businessweek, 1998). Another example of detrimental RPT is 
the case of Genting Malaysia Bhd. The subsidiary (Genting Malaysia resort world) 
bought a property from its parent (Genting Bhd). The issues of concern were the 
appointment of the same valuer by the both parties and the position of the independent 
directors been members of the board of both companies. Analysts regarded the 
transaction as cash extraction by the parent company (Wahab et al., 2011).   
The problem of abusive RPTs is not restricted to private firms alone; some government 
link companies have involved in some RPTs that are detrimental to minority 
shareholders in particular and Malaysians in general. Even in the recent cases of 
financial mismanagement in 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB), anecdotal 
evidence of mismanagement presented by media and other stakeholders were 
allegedly conducted through (intergroup) RPTs (BBC, 2016; TNYT, 2017). 
The above cases justify the position of Morris et al., (2011). The authors believe that 
RPT is among the seven major areas of accounting that require extensive disclosures 
to avert the possibility of poor accounting and its attendant effects in transparency and 
quality of reported numbers. Many states in the world have redefined the related 
parties to avoid ambiguity and established stringent laws that regulate RPTs and its 
disclosure. This is because RPTs disclosure has been found to be instrumental to the 
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users of financial reports in making wise economic decisions and understanding the 
effect of such transactions on the firm value (Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010).  
It must be noted that total compliance with accounting standard is hard to achieve, as 
many entities may decide to ignore some disclosure requirements (Hogget, Edwards, 
Medlin, & Tilling, 2009). Hence, there is a need for the relevant authorities to enforce 
compliance with laid-down standards. The extent of compliance with the accounting 
standard is as important as the standard themselves (Hodgdon, Tondkar, Harless, & 
Adhikari, 2008). This is because corporate executives can manipulate and enrich 
themselves easily in the absence of higher quality and compliance with the disclosures 
requirements (Kalyta & Magnan, 2008).  
Previous studies document that some firms claim to be complying with accounting 
standard but have not been fully complying (Glaum, Schmidt, Street, & Vogel, 2013; 
Hodgdon et al., 2008; Street & Gray, 2002). Therefore, it is essential to document the 
actual level of compliance with each accounting standard in operation. By doing so, 
regulators can easily identify the areas of weak compliance and take appropriate 
actions therefrom. This view is supported by Ariff and Hashim, (2013) who propose 
for the development of disclosure index to investigate the breadth and depth of RPT 
disclosure in financial reports. Hence, this present study has filled in this gap by 
providing the extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting 
standard on RPTs. 
Relevant authority to review the RPTs regulations and come up with the new stringent 
laws to avert the expropriation activities. In Malaysia for example, new sets of MFRS, 
MCCG, Bursa Malaysia listing requirements (BMLR) were in operations since 2012.  
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However, since the inception of this new regime, no any known study that assesses 
their effect extensively. Moreover, despite the numerous problems and other critical 
issues related to RPTs, generally, there exist limited studies to address the type II 
agency issues (Williams, 2014).   
Given this, the need to conduct research to identify the factors that influence the level 
of compliance with mandatory disclosure of RPTs is paramount. Previous studies in 
this area were mostly on voluntary disclosure, while the aspect of determinants of 
mandatory disclosure was almost neglected by researchers (Glaum et al., 2013; Utama 
& Utama, 2014). The identification of the determinants of compliance with mandatory 
RPTs disclosure is essential to standard setters in the discharge of their routine duties 
of ensuring that financial reports contain all vital information that is pertinent to 
investors, capital market participants and other stakeholders’ need concerning RPTs. 
Corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial characteristics are generally 
believed to influence the firm transparency and compliance with the laid-down 
regulations. In view of this, this study investigated the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial characteristics on the level of compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting standard on RPTs. 
Hellström (2006) emphasize the importance of tracking the change in the accounting 
principles of a nation for the real understanding of their effect in the development of 
value relevance. This is based on the fact that a positive profit reported by a firm may 
turn to be negative if the financial statements are restated using a different (more 
qualitative) set of accounting standard (Chen, Gul, & Su, 1999). Based on this premise, 
the adoption of IFRS as reporting standard across the world has attracted a number of 
study to determine whether the new standard is more value-relevant (Alali & Foote, 
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2012; Gjerde, Knivsflå, & Sættem, 2008; Kim, 2013; Lin, Riccardi, & Wang, 2012; 
Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 2014). However, the findings of these studies on the impact 
of the change in accounting standard on the value-relevance of accounting numbers 
remain inconclusive.  
Some of these studies document an increase in value relevance of financial reports 
after IFRS adoption (Alali & Foote, 2012; Kim, 2013; Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 
2014). Others such as Gjerde, Knivsflå and Sættem (2008) and Lin, Riccardi and 
Wang (2012) arrived at otherwise. The inconsistencies in the findings might be 
connected to the methodology adopted in the studies. The nature of these studies does 
not allow for the identification of the real source of increase or decrease of the value-
relevance among the numerous accounting information reported in the financial 
reports under the new accounting regime. To address this issue, a new trend in the 
value-relevance studies begins to trace the changes in the value-relevance by focusing 
on single accounting standard. 
Hamberg and Beisland (2014) conduct a study on the changes in the value-relevance 
of goodwill accounting following the mandatory adoption of IFRS 3. Similar to this, 
Badenhorst, Brümmer, & de Wet (2015) investigates the value-relevance of the 
disclosed summarized financial information of the listed associates (IAS 28). Despite, 
the value-relevance of the other individual standards (such as IAS 24 for RPTs) remain 
unknown.  In light of this, this study investigates the value-relevance of the disclosed 
RPTs. Hence, this study has filled in this literature gaps by documenting the value-
relevance of the disclosed RPTs. Furthermore, this study identifies the changes in the 
value-relevance of the disclosed RPTs with the changes in the accounting regimes. 
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Change in regulatory regime and increase disclosure requirements may push some 
firms to switch from accruals to REM (Cohen et al., 2008; Kuo et al., 2014). Another 
incentive for the switch may be the revelation that market fails to evaluate the effect 
of earnings management through real activities manipulations (Cupertino et al. 2015; 
Cheung et al., 2009; Hwang et al., 2013). These reasons, coupled with the ample 
opportunities available to controlling shareholders in determining the terms and 
conditions of RPTs provide incentives for them to embark on REM in RPTs. In view 
of this, the tendencies of using the RPTs to perpetrate REM is alarming.  
Nonetheless, studies on the earnings management in RPTs have concentrated on the 
accrual method (see for example Aharony et al., 2010; Beuselinck & Deloof, 2014). 
However, most of the RPTs are real activities with the consequential effect on the cash 
flow and firm value. Hence accrual earnings management models are not suitable for 
studies of this nature. To address the issue, many studies developed and used some 
models to capture the REM in RPTs (Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2007; Liu & Lu, 2003; 
Lo, Wong, & Firth, 2010). Nevertheless, the measures fail to capture the REM in RPTs 
appropriately and produced conflicting results. For example, Jian and Wong (2010), 
Wong and Kim (2015) and Ying and Wang (2013) used abnormal related party sales 
to measure the effect of RPTs on the firm value generation process and arrived at 
inconclusive results. 
Roychowdhury (2006) developed powerful models for capturing the REM through the 
estimation of the abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production cost and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. Subsequent studies on REM have used the 
prominent models with firms with small profits (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cupertino et 
al. 2015), target beating (Gunny, 2010), reverse merger (Zhu et al., 2015) season 
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equity offering (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010) as suspects firms. Roychowdhury (2006) 
models fit the researches of this nature as they capture manipulations in the cash flow 
from operations (CFO) and production costs which are the most important components 
of RPTs. Nonetheless, to the best knowledge of the researcher, there is limited study 
that used RPTs firms as suspect firms in the models to investigate the REM practices 
in RPTs. Hence, this study has filled in this literature gaps by using the RPT firms as 
suspect firms in the model. 
In addition, several studies document negative relationship between earnings 
management and firm value. Cheng, (2012) provide evidence that the earnings of 
banks with lower discretionary loan loss provisions and higher discretionary gains 
from loan sales and securitizations are priced more negatively, suggesting that 
investors impose incremental penalties on the joint use of loan loss provisions and 
gains from loan sales and securitization to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. 
Similarly, de Jong, Mertens, van der Poel, and van Dijk, (2014) find that analysts 
perceive meeting earnings benchmarks, smoothing earnings to enhance investor 
perception of firm value and all earnings management actions to reach a benchmark 
are value destroying. 
In addition, studies such as Gordon et al., (2004), Jian and Wong, (2004), Kohlbeck 
and Mayhew, (2010) and Lei and Song, (2011) provide ample evidence on the negative 
relationship between earnings management in RPTs and firm value. However, studies 
on how this menace can be mitigated are scarce. Recently, some studies proved that 
strong corporate government mechanisms moderates the negative effect of RPTs on 
firm value. Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell, (2008) document that board 
independence improves the value of the firms with dominance shareholders. Similarly, 
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Black, Kim, Jang, and Park, (2015) also show that better governance moderates the 
negative effect of related-party transactions on value and increases the sensitivity of 
firm profitability to industry profitability.  
Despite, the means through which the corporate government mechanisms mitigates 
the REM in RPTs remain unknown. This study proposed compliance with accounting 
standard on RPTs to moderate the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. 
A moderator variable is used to alter the direction or strength of the relation between 
an independent and the dependent variables. (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Frazier, Tix, & 
Barron, 2004). This is because accounting standards are meant to be complied with in 
entirety, hence extent of compliance with these standards is important in defining the 
relationships. This study has filled in this gap by assessing the mitigating role of the 
compliance with the disclosure requirement on RPTs and firm value. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The following research questions are developed to serve as a compass during the 
operationalization process of the study. This study provides answers to the research 
questions, which automatically resulted in achieving the ultimate goal of the study.  
i. To what extent do companies listed in Bursa Malaysia comply with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on related party disclosure 
standard? 
ii. What are the determinants of compliance with the RPT disclosure in the 
financial reports of the companies listed in Bursa Malaysia? 
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iii. Does MFRS 124 adoption increase the value relevance of financial reports of 
companies listed in Bursa Malaysia?3 
iv. Does real earnings management in RPTs has a relationship with the firm value? 
v. Does compliance with MFRS 124 moderates the relationship between real 
earnings management in RPTs and firm value? 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The aim of this study is to identify the factors that explain the firms’ compliance 
behavior with the RPTs disclosure requirements which can be used to mitigate the 
multiple problems associated with RPTs. Hence, the following are proposed as 
objectives of the study: 
i. To examine the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs by companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
ii. To find out factors that determine the level of compliance with the RPTs 
disclosure requirement by the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
iii. To measure the value-relevance of the disclosed RPT information in the 
financial reports of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for both pre and 
post mandatory adoption periods. 
iv. To assess the relationship between real earnings management in RPTs and firm 
value. 
                                                     
3 This thesis determines whether RPT disclosure is value-relevant first, then it assesses the effect of the 
change in accounting standard on the value-relevance of accounting numbers. 
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v. To investigate the moderating role of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of MFRS 124 on the relationship between real earnings 
management in RPTs and firm value. 
1.5 Scope of the study 
The study concentrates on assessing the extent of compliance with disclosure 
requirements of the of accounting standard on RPTs and examining the factors that 
determine the compliance with the standards by non-financial companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia for the period of 2009 until 2015. The study also measures the value-
relevance of the disclosed RPT information within the above stated period and 
evaluates whether the disclosed RPTs are associated with the REM. 
The year 2012, been the year of the compulsory adoption of MFRS and MCCG is 
excluded from the study in the value-relevance analyses to enable the study to capture 
the real effect of changes in the regulations. The exclusion of financial services firms 
is justified by the fact that there are other regulations and laws (such as Insurance Act 
1963, Financial Service Act 2013) and other supervisory agencies (such as Bank 
Negara Malaysia, Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation) that regulate and 
influence their disclosure behavior apart from MFRS and its custodians as used by 
(Chua, Cheong, & Gould, 2012; Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, Kousenidis, & Leventis, 
2013). 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) state that the implementation of high quality reporting 
standard may not necessarily translate to high quality financial reports. This is 
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because, firms do not comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements (Glaum et 
al., 2013; Hodgdon et al., 2008; Street & Gray, 2002), even with the existence of 
enforcement bodies (Yeoh, 2005). This study addresses the issue of mandatory 
compliance with the disclosure requirement of a single accounting standard (FRS and 
MFRS 124) in Malaysia. This is to overcome the problems attached to multiple 
accounting standards approach as highlighted earlier. The results reveal moderate 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. To 
the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study that documents the extent 
of compliance with disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. This 
contribution is useful to the standard setting bodies, regulatory agencies and academics 
with the interest to extend the literature in the area of firms disclosure behavior. 
Second, previous studies on the determinants of firm transparency were on the whole 
set of accounting standard or governance code (Alsaeed, 2006; Robb, Single, & 
Zarzeski, 2001; Sharif & Ming Lai, 2015) and mostly during voluntary regime (Babío 
Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Chen, DeFond, & Park, 2002; Wang, O, & Claiborne, 
2008). The aspect of determinants of mandatory disclosure was almost neglected by 
researchers despite its irresistible need (Glaum et al., 2013; Utama & Utama, 2014). 
Recently, efforts have been put in place to identify the factors that influence 
compliance with certain disclosure requirements (see for example Lopes & Rodrigues, 
2007; Wan-Hussin, 2009; Zango, Kamardin, & Ishak, 2016).  
The present study has filled in the knowledge gap that existed in the field of factors 
that determine the mandatory compliance with accounting standard on RPTs. The 
study tests the influence of the board composition, audit committee characteristics, 
CEO characteristics, ownership structure, RPT motives and firm performance on the 
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firm's compliance with the RPTs disclosure requirements. The outcome of the 
regression of these factors as presented in chapter six of the thesis is useful to the 
investors. Institutional and individual investors will find the outcome of the study 
important because it will help them to identify the firms that disclose more information 
on RPTs. Equally, regulatory agencies can benefit from this findings by identifying 
the characteristics of firms with tendencies for low compliance with disclosure 
requirements of the accounting standard. Also among the beneficiaries of this 
contribution are academics with the interest to extend the literature in the area of 
determinants of compliance behavior. 
Third, this study extends the existing literature on value-relevance by documenting the 
value-relevance of RPT disclosure. The study provides empirical evidence that 
disclosure of the RPTs is value-relevant. It is also evident that BVPS and EPS of firms 
with significant RPTs exhibit varying valuation pattern based on the quality of 
information attached to them. That is to say where there is sufficient information on 
EPS, the EPS of firms with significant RPTs is more value-relevant than the BVPS of 
such firms. Besides, the study extends the understanding on the importance of the 
reporting standard to the market participants.  
The study provides empirical evidence that accounting numbers prepared under higher 
quality accounting standard are more value-relevant in the firm valuation. It is also 
documented that with the adoption of MFRS 124, both the level and changes in net 
income of RPT firms become value relevant. This study contributes to the debate that 
whether IFRS are more value-relevant than national generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAPs). Previous studies established that value-relevance of accounting 
information increases when IFRS is of higher quality than former national GAAP and 
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decreases if otherwise (Clarkson, Hanna, Richardson, & Thompson, 2011; Devalle, 
Onali, & Magarini, 2010; Van der Meulen, Gaeremynck, & Willekens, 2007).  
Hence, this contribution is interesting to MASB in particular and IASB in general that 
convergence to IFRS-based accounting standard has increased the value-relevance of 
the Malaysian reporting environment. Also, foreign investors that wish to invest in 
countries with high quality reporting system can benefit from the findings of this 
study. Equally, academics and future researchers can use these findings as reference 
material in their quest of learning and expand existing knowledge 
Also, this study contributes to the existing literature on the earnings management. 
Most of the previous studies on earnings management in RPTs have concentrated on 
the accrual earnings management. This study extends the level of understanding the 
earnings management in RPT by considering the REM practices in the RPTs. The 
study provides empirical evidence that firms use the RPTs for REM purposes. More 
so, to the knowledge of the researcher the present study is the first of its kind that uses 
firms with significant RPTs as sample (suspect) for REM in the Roychowdhury (2006) 
models. Hence, this study extends the list of the firms suspected of REM practices.  
In addition, the study contributes to the extant literature on earnings management and 
firm value. The relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value has been assessed 
in this study. Although, some studies document that capital market does not recognize 
earnings management perpetrated through the manipulation of real activities 
(Cupertino et al., 2015; Kothari, Mizik, & Roychowdhury, 2015). This study 
document that capital market captures and discounts the stock price of firms that 
engage in REM in RPTs. Lastly, this study documents that compliance with the 
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disclosure requirements on RPTs mitigates the negative relationship between REM in 
RPTs and firm value. Hence, extends the literature on the internal governance control 
mechanisms on firm value. 
These contributions are timely because of the changes in regulations in Malaysian 
reporting environment might have made some firms to shift attention from the 
traditional accrual earnings management to the REM. Therefore, identifying the tricks 
that could be adopted to perpetrate the REM is paramount. This finding is important 
to the Security Commission Malaysia and Bursa Malaysia (the custodians of MCCG 
and Listing requirement respectively) in their quest to curb out the menace of earnings 
management among the Malaysian listed firms. Institutional and individual investors 
will find this finding handy as it will make them be vigilant with the RPTs and assesses 
if RPTs are associated with REM in making economic decisions. Auditors will also 
find this outcome useful as it will enable them to incorporate the risk of REM in audit 
planning and extend the scrutiny to REM in RPTs which REM in RPTs. Equally, 
academics and future researchers can use these findings as reference material in their 
quest of learning and expand existing knowledge on REM. 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter One introduces the thesis by 
discussing the practical and theoretical issues regarding RPTs and RPTs disclosure. It 
also contains the research questions, objectives of the study among others. Chapter 
Two presents the Malaysian reporting environment in particular and global 
environment in general. The chapter discusses the emergence and the roles of 
regulations such as MASB, MFRS, MCCG, IFRS, Company Act excetra. The issues 
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of the disclosure quality, measurement of disclosure and global compliance with the 
IFRS were highlighted in the chapter. 
Chapter Three reviews the literature on the concept, types, perspectives and the 
disclosure of RPTs. The chapter also discusses the corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm financial characteristics that influence the compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the of accounting standard on RPTs. Like in the previous chapter, 
Chapter Four reviews the literature on the concept of value-relevance, the value-
relevance of accounting information and that of the disclosed RPTs. The chapter also 
covers the literature on both accrual and REM, the effect of accounting standard on 
earnings management, earnings management practices in RPTs and the mitigating role 
of the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs on the 
relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. The chapter concludes with the 
research underpinning theories.  
Chapter Five presents the methodological approach adopted in the conduct of this 
research. Research hypotheses and frameworks are developed in this chapter for the 
determinants, value-relevance and REM in RPTs. The chapter proceeds to the research 
philosophy where the research paradigm and research design for this study are 
presented. Also, the chapter covers the measurement of the research variables. The 
chapter concludes with the sample selection procedure for the determinants, value-
relevance and REM. 
Chapter Six presents the results and discussion of the extent of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of accounting standard on RPTs. The results and coefficients 
of the regressions conducted for the determinants of the compliance with the 
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disclosure requirements of the of accounting standard on RPTs are discussed in the 
chapter. Chapter Seven contains the coefficients and the results on the value-relevance 
of the disclosed RPTs for both the price and return models. The coefficients and the 
results from the regressions for the investigation of REM in RPTs, its effect on firm 
value and the moderating effect of compliance with MFRS 124 are presented and 
discussed in the chapter. Lastly, Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by providing the 
overview of the thesis, summary of findings, the contribution of the study, practical 
implications of findings, limitation of the study and suggestions for future studies. 
1.8 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter introduces the study by warming up the issues in RPTs and highlighting 
the issues on RPTs disclosure in the background of the study. It also covers the 
theoretical gaps in the determinants, value-relevance and REM associated with the 
RPTs disclosure. The chapter dwells on the research questions and objectives of the 
study. Also, the chapter discusses the significance and contribution of the study and 




INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND OF 
FINANCIAL REPORTING IN MALAYSIA 
2.0 Introduction 
 This chapter presents a brief overview of the Malaysian political and economic 
environments. It also discusses the emergence of international accounting standard, a 
brief history of Malaysian Accounting Standard Board and the role it plays in 
designing, adoption and enforcement of the Malaysian financial reporting standard 
124 in particular and all other MFRSs in general. The chapter reviews the Malaysian 
codes corporate governance, Bursa Malaysia listing requirements, Company Act 1965 
and minority shareholder watchdog group with an emphasis on the provisions 
pertaining the RPTs. Also, the chapter considers the issue of disclosure measurement. 
The chapter concludes with the review of empirical studies on the compliance with 
IFRS across the world. 
2.1 Overview of Malaysian Environment 
Malaysia is a country located in Southeast Asia, consists of 149 local governments 
within its fourteen states. It is described as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country 
and also categorized among the most vibrant Southeast Asian economies (BBC, 2015). 
Malaysian ethnic and cultural diversity play significant roles in its national politics, 
which by extension affect the common and financial laws of the country (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002). According to the department of statistics Malaysia, the population of 
the country is estimated to be around 31.7 million as at 2016, of which majority 
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(51.8%) are classified as upper-middle-income earners (Chi, 2015; World Bank, 
2013). The gross domestic product (GDP) of the country stood at USD313.2 billion 
and average growth rate of 7% (Bank Negara, 2015). As in any emerging economy, 
informal activities (shadow economy) was estimated to be around 25% of the reported 
GDP as at 2008 (Elgin & Oztunali, 2012), which is consistent with the recent estimate 
by world bank 25% to 40% of the GDP of developing economies. 
Although, some economic experts have projected significant economic downturn 
(termed as a dark cloud) in the economy for 2015 fiscal year following the three 
consecutive years’ robust economic growth (CNBC, 2015; MIER, 2015). The 
economic deterioration is not because of the crashing oil price alone but for other 
factors such as prolong budget deficit for almost 17 years, currency depreciation to its 
weakest position since the Asian financial crises, political pressure from the growing 
opposition parties and rising contingent liabilities (CNBC, 2015; Malaysian Insider, 
2015; MIER, 2015). However, the prime minister Najib Razak believes that the 
economy is in a stronger position than it was during Asian financial crises 1997 
(Reuters, 2015), and confident that the country will meet its target of becoming a high-
income economy by 2020 (Malaysiakini, 2015). 
Malaysian capital market is among the emerging capital market, with the dominance 
of concentrated and family ownership, which reflects the socio-political connections 
nature of the economy. These features of the market prone it to many relationship-
based economic transactions (Wahab et al., 2011). Like many other capital markets in 
the world, multiple laws regulate the activities and operations of companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia (formerly Kuala-Lumpur Stock Exchange) with many regulatory 
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agencies such Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB), Securities 
Commission (SE) and MCCG supplementing the oversight role. 
RPT is one of the primary concerns of many capital market operators in the world 
(Djankov et al., 2008) and highly regulated activities among the firm operations. Many 
countries promulgate several reporting standards, Act and market requirements 
(identical and some counter another) all target at improving transparency and 
efficiency in dealing with related parties (Nekhili & Cherif, 2011). Companies listed 
on Bursa Malaysia are required to comply with the provisions of MFRS, Bursa 
Malaysia listing requirement, MCCG, provisions of company Act 1965 and alike 
when conducting or reporting RPTs. These requirements are set to ensure 
transparency, protect ordinary market players, enhance investors’ confidence and 
maintain smooth operation of the market. These various laws and institutions which 
are established to provide maximum disclosure of RPTs and protect the ordinary 
investor in Malaysia are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
2.2 International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC), a predecessor to International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB) was established in 1973 to improve the 
comparability of financial statement across the globe (Ball, 2006). IASC in its early 
years has reduced accounting diversity globally through the elimination of some 
accounting choices (alternatives). Since its inception, IASC has undergone a number 
of reconstructions, which lastly repositioned and rebranded the body as International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB). The objectives of IASB are to promulgate high 
quality internationally acceptable reporting standard that can meet the needs of all 
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stakeholders in financial reports, promote compliance with the set standard and 
facilitates the process of adoption/convergence with the set standard globally.  
On this note, several studies document that IFRS are capable of improving 
transparency, comparability and relevance of financial reports. IFRS are capable of 
displaying the actual economic reality of the reporting entity (Ball, 2006; Barth, 
Landsman, & Lang, 2008; Callao, Jarne, & Laínez, 2007; Dimitropoulos et al., 2013) 
and have been adopted by many countries across the globe. It is worthy to note that 
apart from the detail requirement of IAS 2 (presentation of the financial statement), 
IASB has issued separate accounting standards to deal with peculiar accounting 
concerns. These concerns include but not limited to goodwill, business combination, 
segment reporting, consolidation, financial instrument, foreign exchange and related 
party transaction. Corrospondingly, Morris et al. (2011) states the above concerns as 
seven major accounting areas that required high transparency in reporting processes. 
2.3 Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) 
Prior to the establishment of MASB in 1997, the task of promulgation and issuance of 
accounting standards were under the control of professional bodies. The standards in 
the then period are enforceable under the codes of ethics of the professional bodies. 
With the establishment of Financial Reporting Act in 1997, an independent body 
(MASB) was established and saddle with the responsibility for the development and 
issuance of the financial reporting standard within the Malaysian territory. The Act 
confers a legislative backing to MASB to enforce compliance with the issued 
standards on all relevant entities. The first sets of financial reporting standards issued 
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by MASB are IASB-based taking into consideration local laws and business 
requirements.  
The MASB initiates a strategic move in 2004 to align its reporting standards with those 
of IASB to catch-up with the global trend. The move was done through rebranding its 
standards to Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) and modifying their numbering to 
match with those of IASB to ease referral by investors and professionals. This trend 
continues until 2007 when FRSs were revised and become similar to IFRS in all 
ramifications save for some transitional provisions and effective dates.  In 2008, 
MASB declared its intention to converge fully with IFRS effective from 1st January 
2012, and Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard (MFRS) framework was issued 
effective from 1st January 2011 to facilitate a smooth transition by 2012. 
After the convergence in 2012, MASB continues to serve as a body that keeps 
contributing, echo the voice of Malaysia and protect the peculiar needs of Malaysian 
entities while promulgating new standard in IASB. It also continues to participate in 
the regional accounting activities with the aim of achieving stronger voice of Asian-
Oceanian in the IASB decisions. The MASB continues to manage the financial 
reporting of SMEs to allow for fair play and efficient competition among Malaysian 
SMEs with the aim of fostering their growth and ease access to both domestic and 
international finance.  
2.4 Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard (MFRS) 124 
MFRS 124 is an accounting standard that regulates what, and the manner in which 
reporting entities should disclose the related party (RP) relationship and RPTs in their 
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financial reports. MFRS 124 is synonymous to IAS 24 in all respect. It aims to ensure 
that annual reports contain the necessary information that can highlight the likelihood 
that financial position or operating performance of the reporting entity may have been 
tempered with by the presence of RP relationship or transactions with such parties. 
The standard provides extensive and explicit criteria for the identification of RP 
relationships and transactions, outstanding balances with RP, situations and the 
manner in which relationship and transactions need to be disclosed. 
MFRS 124 defined RP from both natural and legal person viewpoints. Paragraph 9 (a) 
of the standard provides that any person including his surrogates is related to reporting 
entity if he has control, joint control, significant influence or occupies a key 
management position in the reporting entity or its parent company. Similarly, 
paragraph 9 (b) provides that an entity is said to be related to reporting entity if: (a) it 
belonged to the same business group with reporting entity. (b) is associate or in a joint 
venture with parent, subsidiary or sister companies of the reporting entity. (c) both are 
in joint venture with, or one is in the joint venture while the other is an associate of 
the same third party. (d) is a post-employment plan set-up for the employees of either 
entity. and (e) is controlled by the related person identified above. 
Paragraph 13 of MFRS 124 requires the disclosure of the relationship between group 
members regardless whether there was transaction among them or not. The name of 
the parent and ultimate controlling party (if are not the same) should be disclosed. In 
a situation where neither the parent company nor the ultimate controlling party 
produces publicly consolidated financial report, the reporting entity should then 
disclose the name of the most senior parent that does so. According to paragraph 14 
of the standard, where control exists in the relationship, the reporting entity should 
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disclose the nature of the control regardless of the existence of transaction with RP. 
The reporting entities are required by paragraph 17 to disclose all categories of key 
management emolument including their retirement benefits in their financial reports. 
Where an entity has had RPTs during the reporting period, the nature of the RPT and 
any other information necessary for the proper understanding of potential impact of 
such transaction should be disclosed in the financial report. Information to be disclosed 
should, at least, cover the total value of the transaction, outstanding balances including 
commitments, terms and conditions of the transaction, provision of doubtful debt on 
outstanding balances and bad debt expensed during the reporting period. This 
information should be disclosed based on the category of RP to which the party belong. 
As an extension of the disclosure requirements of the MFRS 101, Paragraph 20 of 
MFRS 124 requires the separate disclosure of the amount receivable from, and payable 
to each category of the RPs. The examples of common RPTs include sales or purchases 
of goods/assets of whatever type, receiving/rendering services, finance arrangement, 
research and development transfer, licenses arrangement, leases and many more 
transactions. A disclosure of arm’s length equivalent amount of each RPT is required 
under paragraph 23, subject to the availability of open market system where such 
amount can be substantiated. Paragraph 24 provides for the disclosure of similar items 
in aggregate, save when separate disclosure is required for the understanding of the 
actual economic effect of the transaction. 
Government-related entities are exempted from the requirements of paragraph 18 of 
the standard. However, they are required by paragraph 26 to disclose in their financial 
reports the name and nature of the government interest in the reporting entity. Other 
 
 33 
items to be disclosed include amount and nature of each significant RPT, amount and 
nature of RPTs that are not individually but collectively significant. Paragraph 27 
permits management to use its judgment in the determination of the economic level 
that can be collectively significant. However, the paragraph proposes some criteria 
that need be applied before arriving at such economic level. 
2.5 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
Weak corporate governance and inadequate financial disclosure have frequently been 
identified as the genesis of Asian financial crises of 1997 (Mitton, 2002; Wahab et al., 
2011). The crisis exposed a number of corporate governance weaknesses in many 
South-East Asian corporations, and Malaysian listed companies are not the exception. 
Most of the then Malaysian companies have been identified with lack of transparency, 
poor minority shareholders’ protection and allegations of cronyism (Che-Haat, 
Rahman, & Mahenthiran, 2008; Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2007).  
The finance committee on corporate governance (FCCG) identifies the importance of 
corporate transparency through improved financial disclosure and the increasing role 
of institutional investors’ activisms. FCCG believes that for Malaysia to catch-up with 
emerging global competition, corporate governance problems has to be resolved 
amicably (MCCG, 2000). Based on this, FCCG recommends for the establishment of 
the MCCG together with Minority shareholder watchdog group (to be discussed later). 
These recommendations are made to install corporate governance best practice in 




2.5.1  Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000 (MCCG 2000) 
The FCCG’s recommendations of 1999 lead to the establishment of the first set of 
MCCG in 2000. The MCCG 2000 has been substantially clued from Cadbury and 
Greenburg codes, but more inclined to Hampel corporate governance disclosure 
approach. Hampel Committee recommends for a hybrid approach to disclosure of 
corporate governance codes. This approach takes some elements of both prescriptive 
and non-prescriptive approaches to corporate governance disclosure.  
The prescriptive approach requires reporting entities to disclose their compliance with 
the stated desirable governance practice principles in their financial reports. On the 
other hand, non-prescriptive approach preferred narrative disclosure of the corporate 
governance practice adopted by reporting entity. This approach takes into cognisant 
the peculiarities of some companies and believes that directors should design the 
appropriate governance best practice that best suit their entity. 
To overcome the shortcomings of both approaches, Hampel committee re-emphasizes 
the need for principles that firms have to comply with and disclose in their financial 
reports. However, the committee recommends the directors to make some narrative 
disclosure in the financial reports on how relevant principles are applied in their 
respective companies. This approach is aimed at securing sufficient information 
disclosure that will enable investors and other stakeholders to assess the performance 
and corporate governance practices of reporting entity, and take informed economic 
decisions accordingly.  FCCG has recommended that MCCG 2000 be categorized into 
four parts.  
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The first part of the MCCG 2000 set out governance principles for all Malaysian 
registered firms. The recommendation permits listed firms to apply these principles 
flexibly and taking into account their varying nature. Narrative disclosures are 
required in the financial report on how each listed company applies principles that are 
relevant to their business circumstances. Part 1 Section (A) of the principle required 
firms to establish the board of directors that should effectively lead and control the 
affairs of the entity. Board composition (e.g. the proportion of outside directors 
including independent directors), access to confidential information, appointment and 
re-election procedures were all spelled out in the section.  
Section (B) provides that directors’ remuneration to be designed in a manner that will 
be able to attract and retain the best brain in the company’s board. The remunerations 
of executive directors should be linked to the performance. Experience and quantum 
of responsibilities should serve as the basis for determining the remuneration of non-
executive directors. Section (B II) required for the establishment of formal and 
transparent policy for the setting executives and directors remunerations. Details on 
emolument of each category of directors are required to be disclosed in the financial 
report. 
Section (C) recommends for the discourse between firms and institutional 
shareholders where the need arise based on mutual understanding. Annual general 
meeting (AGM) should be used as an avenue for communication between the firm and 
private investors. The firm should use it as a means to encourage private investors’ 
participation in its affairs. Section (D) of the principles recommends for the provision 
of multi-purpose and understandable financial report that permits the assessment of 
the present financial position and future prospects of the firm.  The board should 
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course to establish a functional and sound internal control system to safeguard the 
assets of the company. Also, the board should establish and maintain a cordial and 
transparent relationship with firm’s auditor. 
The second part of MCCG 2000 set out best practices for Malaysian companies. Best 
practices are designed to help businesses in developing their governance. Compliance 
with this section is voluntary. However, companies are required to disclose the extent 
of compliance with best practices in their financial reports and justify or explain the 
cause of their departure from it if so exists. Section (AA) of Part 2 describes the duties 
and responsibilities of the company’s board of directors. It also provides for the 
balance of power and authority within the board such that no any individual or small 
group that can dominate the decision of the board. The section requires the reporting 
entity to publicly explain the absence of CEO duality if so existed. The qualities of 
independent non-executive directors were enumerated in the section. Section (AA III) 
recommends that independent directors should constitute at least one-third of the total 
board membership and the compliance with this should be disclosed in the financial 
reports.  
Where controlling or significant shareholder exists, the board should explain the 
mechanisms taken to ensure balance and fair representation of other shareholders in 
the board structure and firm’s decisions. A committee of exclusively non-executive 
directors, with independent directors as the majority of the members is to be saddled 
with the duty of reviewing the board from every aspect, scrutinizing and proposing 
new directors to the board whenever such need arise. The board should meet on regular 
basis and properly documents the minutes of each meeting. They should also disclose 
in an annual report the number of meetings held in a year together with its attendance 
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by each director. The board, together with CEO should design or approve the schedule 
of responsibilities for the board and the CEO. They should design and approve the 
corporate objectives, which CEO and management team should meet. Members of the 
board should have access to any information that will enable them to discharge their 
duties effectively. 
Section (BB) of Part 2 provides for the establishment of the audit committee with not 
less three directors as members, of whom the majority shall be independent. An 
independent non-executive director should head the committee, with the terms and 
references of the committee clearly written and given to the committee. The duties of 
the committee should include among others, the appointment of and review of 
management letters from the external auditor.  
The committee should consider any RPTs with the firm or its group and should meet 
with the external auditor at least once in a year. The committee should disclose in an 
annual report the number of meetings held in a year together with its attendance by 
each director. Section (CC) requires the board to maintain efficient communication 
strategy that will allow both the board and management to communicate with all 
parties concern. The system should be able to receive feedback from company’s 
shareholders, which should later be incorporated into business decisions of the 
company. 
The third part of the MCCG 2000 is addressed to investors and auditors of the listed 
firms, not the companies themselves. This part is to enable them to participate and 
play a substantial role in achieving good corporate governance in their respective 
companies. Compliance with this section is purely voluntary and it advises 
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institutional shareholders to discharge their voting right and engage the company 
through direct communication on any matter affecting their interest. External auditors 
are advised to maintain their independence and reports directly to the shareholders as 
provided in the relevant professional guidelines. The last part of the MCCG 2000 
provides explanatory notes to the three parts discussed above. The section spelled out 
some practices that are tagged best practices. They are developed for listed companies 
that need not disclose the situation that forces them to depart from the corporate 
governance best practice. 
2.5.2 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2007 (MCCG 2007) 
The introduction MCCG in 2000 has improved corporate governance mechanisms in 
Malaysian corporations (Wahab et al., 2007). However, in 2007, MCCG have been 
reviewed by the securities commission and approved by high-level FCCG effective 
from 1st October 2007. The primary aim of the MCCG review is to improve the quality 
of the listed companies’ board and maintain the existing investors’ confidence in the 
Malaysian capital market (Badawi, 2007). The eligibility for appointment as director, 
the role of the nominating committee, qualification for appointment as a member of 
audit committee, composition of audit committees, frequency of meeting of the audit 
committee, internal audit unit and their reporting chain are the major areas affected by 
the amendment. The review did not affect the first part of the MCCG 2000, rather, are 
more on the second part of it that is the best practice.  
The revised code provides clear direction on the areas that nominating committee 
should take into account while assessing the candidate’s eligibility for directorship. 
This is done to improve the competency and efficiency of the board members in the 
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discharge of their corporate oversight and control. The reviewed code also requires the 
nominating committee to document the assessment and evaluation process undergone 
properly while recommending any candidate for directorship including independent 
non-executive directors. Minutes of the board meetings should cover, not only the 
decisions arrived at, but also the issues discussed before arriving at such decision.   
On the audit committee, MCCG 2007 provides that membership of the audit 
committee should be exclusively for financially expert non-executive directors. The 
frequency of meeting with the external auditor without the present of executives has 
been increased to at least twice in a year. Moreover, the finance director, the head of 
the internal audit unit and representative of the external auditor should attend the 
meetings of the committee.  
The committee can invite any other board member to attend its meetings where the 
situation warrants. The Chairman of the committee should engage with the 
management on all relevant issues affecting the company. The activities of the audit 
committee should form part of the corporate governance disclosure in the annual 
report of the company. The revised code mandates for the establishment of an internal 
audit unit in all public listed companies. The unit should be independent of the 
management and reports directly to the audit committee. 
2.5.3 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012) 
Securities Commission Malaysia had issued a newly revised code of corporate 
governance in 2012. MCCG 2012 focuses on the roles of corporate directors, been 
responsible fiduciaries through strengthening the composition and structure of 
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corporate boards. Directors have the duty to direct their efforts and resources to 
achieve the best for the company and its shareholders without compromising the 
interest of other stakeholders.  
They should be effective custodians and stewards of the company in setting strategic 
direction, effective risk management strategies, putting strong internal control in 
operations, compliance with relevant laws and ethical values and the rest. MCCG 2012 
provides recommendations and commentary to each recommendation for a better 
understanding of its contents. In summary, MCCG 2012 places a sound basis for 
corporate boards and their committees to discharge their fiduciary duties efficiently. 
It also encourages balanced and timely disclosure, improves reporting quality, stresses 
the importance internal control as well as risk management in the corporations. 
The first principle of the MCCG 2012 requires the board to set and ensure compliance 
with the code of conduct and ensure sustainability in corporate operations. It also 
requires the board charter to be public and periodically reviewed. Annual assessment 
of independent directors, restriction of their tenure and justification for the extension 
of tenure as non-executive as the case may be, becomes part of the new code. Principle 
3 (recommendation 3.5) of MCCG 2012 provides that majority of board members 
should be independent directors if the chairperson happens to be a non-independent 
director, and the board should set a time expectation that each member must commit 
to the company. Corporate transparency through the efficient use of information 
technology where possible should be part of the corporate policies. The code promotes 
the use of poll while voting on any matter at general meetings. 
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2.6 Other Statutory Regulation 
Apart from MFRS and MCCG, there are some other regulations that regulate the 
corporate activities and reporting in Malaysia. They include the followings: 
2.6.1 Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement 
Bursa Malaysia listing requirement spelled out the requirements that existing or 
potential listed companies must comply with while operating in the market. Failure to 
comply with any part of the listing requirement can be penalized, depending on the 
magnitude of the breach. Bursa Malaysia has been authorized to enforce compliance 
with the MFRS, MCCG and other relevant financial laws by the listed companies 
through its listing requirements.  
Section 2.03 (2) of the listing requirement provides that all listed companies should 
keep its investors and the general public fully informed of all facts or information that 
might have a material effect on their respective interests. Sub-section (5) requires 
directors to act in the interest of all shareholders, particularly in companies with a 
dominant shareholder in the event of transacting with the dominant shareholder. These 
requirements are aimed to achieve fairness among the market players, adequate, timely 
and balanced disclosure.  
Section 10.08 requires for the announcement of any RPTs with the percentage ratio of 
0.25% of the relevant item, and above as quick as possible after the terms of the 
transaction have been agreed on. The section also requires the listed company to send 
a circular to the shareholders and seek their approval at the general meeting for any 
RPTs with the percentage ratio of 5% of the relevant item or more. The circular should 
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contain a detail information on the terms and conditions of the transaction. 
Furthermore, the company must assign an independent adviser to vet whether the 
transaction is fair and reasonable, assess if it is detrimental to minority shareholders 
and advise them accordingly. 
Section 10.08(4) requires the appointment of independent principal adviser (a 
competent corporate finance adviser) where the RPTs is up to 25% of the item 
concerned. The adviser is to advise the company on the appropriateness of the terms 
of the transaction, its effect on minority shareholders, compliance with operational 
laws, magnitude of disclosure required in the circular and its announcement. The 
circular should contain information on the parties involved, the relationship, nature 
and transaction type, the amount transacted, outstanding balance if any, announcement 
date and alike. The adviser should also confirm to Bursa Malaysia that the due process 
has been observed throughout the conduct of the transaction. Sub-section (6) refrains 
interested party from attending or voting at the meeting in which the affected 
transaction will be deliberated. The section also provides that the shareholders’ 
approval should only be sort of at the general meeting through poll voting. 
Section 15.25 sub-sections 1 and 2 require listed firms to provide narrative disclosure 
on their compliance with MCCG, detailing on how corporate governance principles 
have been applied in their ordinary or peculiar circumstances.  Listed companies are 
required to take into consideration the recommendations provided in the MCCG while 
making corporate governance disclosure in the annual report. Recommendations in 
which the reporting company fails to comply with should also be disclosed together 
with the reason for non-compliance. The alternatives adopted (if any) are also required 
to be disclosed in the annual report of the listed company. 
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2.6.2 Companies Act 1965 
Countries differ regarding outsider (minority shareholders and creditors) protection 
and this affects the nature, growth and development of their capital market (Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silane, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). Common law countries are regarded best 
in terms of investors’ protection than civil law countries (Djankov et al., 2008; Porta 
et al., 1996). Like several other Commonwealth countries, Companies Act (the Act) 
in Malaysia is similar with that of the United Kingdom (the UK) in many respects. 
The Act (as amended) makes some provisions that protect investors from insider 
dealings and compel directors to disclose their interest in the company.  
 Section 131 (1) requires the director to as soon as possible inform the board the nature 
of his interest in transacting with the company. Section 131(A) restrains the director 
from deliberation in the issue in which he has an interest. The section does not require 
the interested director to be physically absent at such meeting, but it restrains him from 
taking part in the decision-making process. Though, some commentators are of the 
view that his presence can affect the outcome of the process (Chan, 2010).  
Section 131(7A) requests the disclosure to include the interest of the immediate family 
of the director as well. Section 132 E requests for the approval of shareholders in the 
general meeting for any material transaction with directors, substantial shareholder, or 
any other person in charge of operations or management position in the company. 
Sections 134 prohibit the company from giving or guaranteeing a loan to its director 
or substantial shareholder except with prior approval of shareholders. The prohibition 




2.6.3 Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
In 1999, the finance committee on corporate governance (FCCG) recommended for 
the establishment of the independent body that will monitor and combat corporate 
abuses by insiders against the interest of minority shareholders (Wahab et al., 2007). 
This recommendation leads to the establishment of MSWG in 2000. The body serves 
as an integral part of the capital market framework responsible for the protection of 
minorities against the selfish interest of the major stakeholders via shareholders 
activism.  
MSWG influences the decision process of listed companies, monitors their 
compliance with the laid-down corporate governance principles and raises an alarm to 
the relevant authority on the breach or any action against the minority shareholders. 
Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2006) state that even though MSWG yet to make 
any significant impact in minority shareholder protection, the group has a bright 
potential to engage more in shareholder activism in the future.  
2.6.4 International Standard on Auditing 550 (ISA 550) 
International standard on auditing 550 requires the corporate external auditors to 
perform appropriate audit procedures that will enable them to identify, assess and 
respond to the risk of material misstatement that may arise as a result of the reporting 
entity’s failure to appropriately disclose the RP relationship, RPTs, outstanding 
balances or any other relevant information in accordance with relevant regulatory and 
statutory requirements that are in operations within the client accounting environment. 
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The fourth paragraph of the standard provides that regardless of the existence of other 
reporting regulations, the auditors are required to understand the client’s RP 
relationships and RPTs. This is to enable the auditor to obtain sufficient evidence that 
will assist him to conclude whether the result of the operation and the financial 
position of the client are affected the RP relationship or RPTs.  Paragraph 5 of the 
standard requires the auditor to exercise extra efforts to identify one or more fraud risk 
factors. This is because fraud can easily be committed in RPTs.  
The auditors are also required to review the information given to them by those in 
charge of the affairs of the company on all categories of RP and the nature of the 
relationship. This is to enable the auditor to form an opinion on the scope of the work 
required to be conducted on the RPTs. The auditor is also required to assess the level 
of compliance with relevant disclosure requirements and form an opinion on whether 
such disclosure is adequate.  
2.7 Disclosure Measurement Literature  
There is no consensus about the process that must be followed to establish disclosure 
quality indices or model (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Botosan, 2004; Urquiza, Abad 
Navarro, & Trombetta, 2009). The issue of narrative or non-quantitative information 
that has gained more prominence in recent times has compounded the long-standing 
disagreement as to whether the quantity of disclosed information represents the quality 
of disclosure. In most of the disclosure studies, measures of the disclosure are 
classified into two broad categories: namely subjective analysts’ rating and semi-
objective studies (Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Urquiza et al., 2009).  
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2.7.1 Subjective Analysts’ Rating 
The history of the Association of Investment Management And Research (AIMR) the 
body in charge for the issuance of subjective analysts rating, can be traced to the US-
based association, the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) established in 1947. The 
management of FAF established another independent body, the Institute of Chartered 
Financial Analysts (ICFA) in 1959 for the credentialing program. Later, the two bodies 
merged to become AIMR. AIMR has been rebranded as Certified Financial Analysts 
(CFA Institute) with same mandates as that of the former body. 
AIMR rank the quality of information disclosed by companies based on the 
information released in their corporate reporting. This type of ranking is referred to as 
subjective analysts’ rating. AIMR collects all corporate information released to 
investors (ranging from annual, quarterly reports, direct communication with investors 
and analysts, press releases, and other corporate reports) from an average of twenty 
seven industries every year. On average, AIMR requests thirteen analysts to evaluate 
an average of seventeen companies from each industry. AIMR analysts use the list of 
predefined factors that are weighted according to their relative importance to 
determine the score obtained by each company.  
Despite its widespread acceptance (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Lang & Lundholm, 
1993, 1996), the approach has been criticized by Healy and Palepu (2001). The major 
drawback of the approach is that it considers US companies only, external users are 
not familiar with the scoring method and how the companies are selected for the 
inclusion in the ranking process. Similarly, Lang and Lundholm (1993) describe the 
approach as the one that is based on analysts view on disclosure, not on the actual 
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direct measures of disclosure. Moreover, the number of companies selected for the 
ranking are too small to represent the population (Urquiza et al., 2009).  
2.7.2 Semi-Objective Studies 
Semi-objective studies are disclosure studies that use self-constructed indices in the 
measurement of the extent and quality of disclosure. In these studies, self-constructed 
indices are developed to overcome the shortcomings of subjective ratings. Semi-
objective studies are divided into two broad categories viz: textual analysis studies and 
disclosure index studies (Beattie et al., 2004; Urquiza et al., 2009). 
2.7.2.1 Textual Analysis Studies 
The use of thematic content analysis, which usually assesses the number of times that 
a word or sentence appear in the released information is common method under textual 
analysis. It is conducted without considering whether the quantitative value is assigned 
to those words or sentences or not. Several studies in accounting literature have 
adopted the approach in measuring narrative disclosure (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; 
Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; ku Ismail, 2003; Williams, 1999). However, the approach 
has been challenged by some researchers. Urquiza et al. (2009) opine that the 
increasing number of words or sentences disclosed cannot be taken as an increase in 
transparency or increase in quality of information. Therefore, readability studies were 
proposed to address the limitations of thematic content studies.  
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Readability studies are designed in such a way that narrative disclosure are quantified 
through readability formula such as flesch index4. The score obtained from the index 
will then be compared with the established benchmark to assess the difficulties in 
reading the information disclosed in an annual report. The essence of studies of this 
nature is to detect the difficulty level of reading annual reports (Linsley & Lawrence, 
2007).  
The findings of all twenty six readability studies reviewed by Jones and Shoemaker 
(1994) document reading level as difficult or highly difficult. Like the previous 
method, this method has also been criticized that it pays attention to word or sentences 
while ignoring the real aspect of the text as a whole. Another problem associated with 
readability studies is that it does not consider the motivations or interest of the reader 
and there may exist variations in children or adult-based writings compared to 
technical accounting narrative writings (Beattie et al., 2004). 
The last aspect of textual analysis studies is linguistic analysis. Sydserff and Weetman 
(1999) in their seminal paper demonstrate how an applied linguistic method can be 
deployed to the field of accountancy to redress the shortcomings of readability studies. 
Sydserff and Weetman designed a new index called “texture index” which was based 
on six criteria for scoring narrative disclosures. The six criteria are termed as 
indexicals and the total narrative score from each indexical will make up the overall 
score for the texture. The method is proved to be powerful in analyzing operation and 
financial reports. However, the authors caution against concluding that the higher the 
                                                     
4 An index constructed based on both words syllable and sentence length count. 
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textual index, the better the quality of the disclosure as there exist low correlation 
among the individual indexicals. 
2.7.2.2 Disclosure Index Studies 
Under disclosure index studies, researchers construct disclosure indices with the 
assumption that a certain amount of disclosure stands as a proxy for disclosure quality. 
Disclosure index studies are categorized into un-weighted and weighted disclosure 
indices. In most of the unweighted index studies, disclosures are scored using dummy 
variable in which one represents the disclosure of an item while zero for otherwise. 
Therefore, it measures only the quantity of disclosure (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; 
Yeoh, 2005).  
Although un-weighted index studies have gained widespread acceptance in disclosure 
studies (see Tsalavoutas, 2011), the approach is criticized by many researchers. The 
approach may contain some items of disclosure that are not applicable to some 
companies. Additionally, the assumption that more disclosure represents more quality 
may not stand (Yeoh, 2005) and variation in the requirements of standards can make 
one standard to dominate other (Tsalavoutas, 2011). 
Conversely, weighted index studies have gone beyond the quantity of disclosure and 
covered the aspect of disclosure quality. This approach takes an ordinal coding 
(typically three levels) in the measurement of disclosure quality. Based on Botosan 
(1997), quantitative disclosures are to be given more weight in the disclosure index 
because of their clarity, precision, usefulness and may even go further to improve 
credibility and reputation of management reporting.  
 
 50 
In a somewhat extension to the work of Botosan (1997), non-financial information 
disclosed in annual reports are scored by Robb, Single, and Zarzeski (2001) using 
ordinal ranking. Three points were assigned to extensive disclosure, two points for 
some disclosures while one point was given to non-disclosure for each item of their 
disclosure index. Shenzhen stock exchange has developed information evaluation 
index in 2001, which measures both quantity and quality of disclosed information. 
Gao and Kling (2012) used this index and categorize information disclosure as 
excellent, good, sufficient and insufficient.  
However, both weighted and un-weighted score give a nearly similar result if a lot of 
items are inserted in the index (Beattie et al., 2004; Sharma, 2014). In an effort to 
address the problems associated with the index based disclosure quality measurement, 
Beattie et al. (2004) developed a new disclosure quality framework. This framework 
incorporates many aspects of disclosure quality to deal with the problematic and 
complex nature of the disclosure quality issue. Nonetheless, their framework was 
criticized by Botosan (2004) as it failed to incorporate essential qualitative 
characteristics of quality information developed by IASB and FASB. 
2.8 Compliance with International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
Tower, Hancock and Taplin (1999) define compliance with IAS/IFRS as the degree to 
which reporting entity comply with vast issues stated in the IAS/IFRS issued by 
IASC/IASB. There are many factors that influence country’s adoption of IFRS as 
reporting standards. Hassan, Rankin and Lu (2014) find that coercive, normative and 
mimetic institutional isomorphisms are among the major factors that motivate 
countries in adopting IFRS as reporting standards.  
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IFRS like many other accounting standards spelled out a guideline on the minimum 
relevant and high-quality information that a firm must disclose in the financial reports. 
This is because firms that fail to comply with the disclosure requirement withhold 
some vital information that can affect capital market operations. Intentional non-
compliance with the standard can render the financial report to be biased and 
misleading (Glaum et al., 2013). However, some of the companies that voluntarily or 
are mandated to adopt IFRS as their reporting standard claim to comply with the 
standard but in actual sense are not (Street & Bryant, 2000).  
Findings of the studies on the level of compliance with IFRS are inconclusive across 
the globe. Several studies document an increase in compliance with IAS/IFRS (Al-
Akra, Eddie, & Ali, 2010; Al-Shammari, Brown, & Tarca, 2008; Street & Bryant, 
2000; Taplin, Tower, & Hancock, 2002). Adenola (2011) documents decrease in the 
level of compliance with the accounting standard. Similarly, Dang-Duc (2011) 
assesses the level of compliance of SMEs with IFRS for SME and finds limited 
compliance with the standard by SMEs. Misirlioǧlu, Tucker and Yükseltürk (2013) 
state that although there is some improvement in general compliance, most of the items 
required to be disclosed by IFRS are not made available to the public.  
Glaum and Street (2003) examine the level of compliance with IAS and US-GAAP by 
100 German firms that used IAS and US-GAAP as reporting standard respectively for 
the financial year 2000. The authors find that the average compliance level is 
considerably high, and average compliance level is significantly lower for IAS firms 
compared to their US-GAAP counterpart. Hodgdon et al. (2008) use the sample of the 
financial statements of 89 firms for 1999 and 2000 financial years. They examine the 
level of compliance of the companies that claim to be complying with IFRS. The 
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authors find that firms disclose most, if not all, of the items required to be disclosed in 
a financial statement by IFRS.  
Misirlioǧlu et al. (2013) examine the level of compliance with IFRS by the Turkish 
firm in their first year of mandatory adoption (2005). They document modest 
improvement in disclosure compliance with respect to most of the standard been 
reviewed even though a high level of compliance was expected. Misirlioǧlu et al. 
attribute the low level of compliance with the lack of proper preparation for adoption 
of the new standard by the Turkish companies. Dang-Duc (2011) document limited 
compliance with accounting standard by SMEs. The author provides evidence for the 
dominance of legal issue in accounting compliance on which SMEs stand little chance 
of benefiting from.  
Dang-Duc (2011) finds that limited compliance with accounting standard by SMEs is 
associated with the low level of accounting and management knowledge on the cost-
benefit relationship of the compliance with the standard. A study conducted by Glaum 
et al. (2013) examined the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of 
IFRS 3 across seventeen European countries. The authors document substantial non-
compliance with the standard and report uneven implementation of IFRS across the 
reviewed countries. 
2.9 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter overviews the geographical, social and economic environments of the 
Malaysia. It also discusses the trend in the emergence of the financial reporting 
standards in Malaysia. It started with the IFRS issued by the IASB. The objectives of 
 
 53 
IASB are stated as to promulgate high quality internationally acceptable reporting 
standard that can meet the needs of all stakeholders in financial reports, promote 
compliance with the set standard and facilitates the process of adoption/convergence 
with the set standard globally.  It was established that the establishment of MASB has 
marked a significant landmark in the Malaysian reporting environment. The Financial 
Reporting Act of 1997 transferred role of issuance and enforcement of the compliance 
with Malaysian accounting standard to MASB. The board has issued a number of FRS 
before switching to MFRS in 2012. 
Series of Malaysian codes of corporate governance together with other reporting 
regulations are presented in the chapter. The first code was issued in 2000 and revised 
in 2007 and 2012. Other supporting regulations includes Bursa Malaysia listing 
requirements, company Act of 1965 and minority shareholders watchdog group. 
Recently, international auditing standard becomes into operation. Disclosure 
measurement issues were also highlighted in the chapter. The chapter concludes with 




DETERMINANTS OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 
DISCLOSURE 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the concept of related party and RPTs from the academics and 
regulators points of view. The chapter discusses the types and perspectives of RPTs 
as postulated or discovered in related literature. RPTs disclosure and RPTs disclosure 
approaches are also presented in the chapter. Also, the chapter considers the issue of 
RPTs regulations across the globe and went further to discuss the issues of general 
disclosure, disclosure quality. The chapter ends with the review of the factors that 
determine the level of compliance with the the of accounting standard on RPTs. 
3.1 The Concept of Related Party Transaction (RPT) 
MFRS 124 defines RPT as any transfer of resources, services or obligations between 
reporting entity and a related party, regardless of whether the price is charged. Section 
9 of the standard defines related party as any person (including his proxies) that 
controls, has a significant influence or occupies a key management position in the 
reporting entity or its parent company. Sub-section 2 provides that an entity is said to 
be related to reporting entity if:  
1. It belonged to the same business group with reporting entity.  
2. It is an associate or in a joint venture with parent, subsidiary or sister 
companies of the reporting entity.  
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3. Both entities are in joint venture with the same third party.  
4. One of the entities is in the joint venture while the other is an associate of the 
same third party. 
5. The entity is a post-employment plan set-up for the employees of either entity. 
and  
6. Controlled by the related person identified above. 
Several studies discuss and elaborate RPTs definition based on the context given to it 
by IASB. In the words of Pozzoli et al. (2014) IASB definition extensively includes a 
transaction with major shareholders, board members and any other group with a power 
to influence the decisions of the company. Kang, Lee, Lee and Park (2014) define 
related party transactions as any transaction entered into with related entity such as 
board members, shareholders, managers and affiliated organizations. RPTs involves 
transactions between a company and another entity that are related such as managers, 
directors, controlling holders; or firms under their control and other affiliated 
companies (Nekhili & Cherif, 2011). Similarly, Di Carlo (2014) describe RPTs as a 
form of transaction that the entity engages with its holding company, subsidiary, 
associates, majority shareholders, directors, managers, or their immediate relative.  
A proper understanding of related party is necessary for better understanding and 
identification of RPTs. In many countries, firms are believed to have an automatic 
relationship with their major shareholders, members of the board, managers, 
companies under their control, affiliated and associate entities and alike depending on 
the legal provisions that are in operation within the firm domain. Related Party 
relationship extends its frontiers to cover the persons or companies that have a direct 
connection with the persons or entities mentioned above. In Malaysia, section 9 of 
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MFRS 124 provides a concise definition of related party and an extensive list of 
individuals and entities that are seen by the law as related parties. Nowadays, some 
events have proved that firm can relate to herself. This usually takes place in a 
transaction as a share buyback, where the firm acquires her shares with the 
management or directors serving as her proxy. 
RPTs are prevalent all over the world. Lin, Liu and Keng (2010) states that 96% of the 
Taiwanese listed companies reported RPT in 2006. Similarly, 90% of Chinese listed 
companies have engaged in different kinds of RPTs at varying degree (Jian & Wong, 
2010), while more than 77% US firms have disclosed at least one form of RPT in 2004 
financial year (Young, 2005). Excessive use of RPTs might warrant minority 
shareholders expropriation even if the transactions were not initiated for that purpose. 
This is because it is not all RPTs that are detrimental to outsiders (Yeh et al., 2012). 
Generally, if the motive of RPTs is not made public, the transaction leads to the 
tunneling of firm’s resources by controlling holders, directors, managers or 
administrators (Nekhili & Cherif, 2011).  
3.2 Types of Related Party Transactions 
Several studies on RPTs have used divergent criteria to classify RPTs depending on 
the research objectives (Cheng & Leung, 2014; Ge et al., 2010; Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 
2010). However, the most prominent classification is the one given by Cheung et al. 
in (2006). The authors classified RPTs into transactions that may result in 
expropriation, transactions that can lead to propping and transactions that are aimed at 
enhancing the strategic position of the firm. Recently, Williams, (2014) opines that all 
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forms of RPTs can be used for expropriation or propping purposes. Therefore, the 
primary concern should be on the terms of the transaction not on the transaction itself.   
3.2.1 Tunneling Related Party Transactions 
Tunneling RPTs are the dominant form of RPTs in the literature. The term tunneling 
has been defined as the prejudicial actions that are aimed at extracting undue resources 
from the firm. Several studies believe that most of RPTs are conducted with the 
intention of extracting private benefits. Based on this premise, many studies use RPTs 
to represent tunneling (Lou, Wang, & Yuan, 2014; Mustafa, et al., 2011).  
Typical examples of expropriation RPTs include asset acquisition and disposal, 
trading relationships, equity sales and cash payment (Cheung et al., 2006; Lin et al., 
2010), non-operational fund occupancy (Jiang et al., 2014), loan guarantee (Lin et al., 
2010) and alike. Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello (2008) believe that insiders can use 
any form of RPT for expropriation purpose. They unbundle tunneling into four main 
categories namely cash flow tunneling, asset tunneling out, asset tunneling in and 
equity tunneling. These four transactions are further decomposed into fifteen sub-
categories. 
Recently, Williams (2014) decomposes expropriation in RPTs into operating, 
investing and financing transactions. Operating RPTs that can be used to tunnel 
resources include sales of goods or rendering services at the price below their fair 
value, purchases of goods or services at the price above the fair market value. Private 
offering of shares, convertible by company or sales of assets at the price below the fair 
value, acquisition of assets at the price above the open market price are some of the 
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common examples of tunneling investing activities. While financing tunneling in 
RPTs are usually executed through loans, donations, loan guarantee, leasing or 
borrowing at the terms that are unfavorable to the firm. 
Controlling shareholders use several forms of RPTs such as favorable transfer pricing 
to their surrogates, advantageous lending terms, unjust assets transfer/exchange and 
many more to siphon corporate wealth (Djankov et al., 2008; Jameson et al., 2014; La 
Porta et al., 2000; Liu & Tian, 2012; Munir et al., 2013). In these environments, 
controlling shareholders are capable of shifting corporate resources to their personal 
advantage without shouldering the complete financial consequences (Lin, Ma, 
Malatesta, & Xuan, 2012). Jiang et al. (2014) find that tunneling is detrimental to the 
future prospect of firms and suggest that regulators should strengthen the minority 
shareholders’ protection that is beneficial to the long-run survival of firms. 
Peng et al. (2011) argue that when a firm is financially sound, controlling shareholder 
tend to use RPTs to tunnel the resources of that firm to benefit other firms within the 
group. Similarly, Cheung, Qi, et al. (2009) find that business group members engage 
in transactions at unfavorable prices compared to comparable arms’ length 
transactions. Firms acquire assets through the RPTs at a higher price compared to 
prevailing market price. In contrast, when they dispose of assets to the group member, 
they dispose of at a lower price compared to the similar transaction based on the 
prevailing market price.  
Lou et al. (2014) supported the position of Peng et al. (2011) with empirical evidence. 
They find that financially sound firms exchange their high-quality assets to group 
member firm with low-quality assets, which is a clear case of tunneling incentive.   Du, 
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He and Yuen (2013) find that controlling shareholder in a firm with free cash flow 
undertakes many self-dealing transactions that lead to firm’s value losses. When the 
firm becomes no longer attractive to the public, they delist the firm from the market 
(going private) through payment of small premium to minority shareholders.  
To consolidate these findings, Su, Fung, Huang and Shen (2014) examine the 
relationship between payments of the cash dividend and RPTs. They find a negative 
relationship between payments of the cash dividend and RPTs. That is to say, firms 
with low cash dividend payments are associated with high RPTs, a clear sign of 
corporate wealth expropriation. Tunneling has also been identified as the factor that 
affects executive pay-performance sensitivity negatively (Wang & Xiao, 2011). In 
most cases, tunneling involves collusion between controlling shareholder and 
executives. It will make controlling shareholder to be less curious about the 
performance-based executive plan, which will in turn affect the future performance of 
the firm. 
3.2.2 Propping Related Party Transactions 
Friedman et al. (2003) define propping as an act of injecting personal resources to the 
listed firm. Propping RPTs involve the transfer of resources from a related party to the 
interested firm through related party activities. In this situation, a controlling 
shareholder uses his personal resources to bailout a listed firm (Jian & Wong, 2010). 
Propping RPTs covers cash receipts, loans, and donations from related parties.  
Going by Williams, (2014) classification, sales of goods or rendering services at the 
price above their fair value, purchases of goods or services at the price below the fair 
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market price are good examples of propping through operating activities. Private 
offering of shares, securities, convertible by company or sales of assets at the price 
above the fair value, acquisition of assets at the price below their arm’s length value 
are common examples of propping investing activities. Lastly, propping through 
financing RPTs can be performed using loans, donations, loan guarantee, leasing or 
borrowing at the terms that are favorable to the firm. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) theory of market for corporate control provides a theoretical 
rationale for the propping behavior. Controlling shareholders have to commit their 
personal resources in a bid to bail out their firms, protection against takeover bid or 
been delisted by regulators. Unlike in the case of corporate tunneling, minority 
shareholders benefit from propping by controlling shareholder (Bai, Liu, & Song, 
2004). The possibility of propping by a controlling shareholder in a firm or group with 
pyramidal ownership structure provides minority shareholders with an intercorporate 
insurance in the event of financial distress (Dow & McGuire, 2009; Riyanto & 
Toolsema, 2008).  
RPTs are used in many instances to prop up underperforming firms and save them 
from reporting loss (Yeh et al., 2012).  The financial position of the firm has been 
found to be a major determinant for the period in which controlling shareholders 
decide to prop-up their listed firms or not. Peng et al. (2011) find that when listed firms 
are in financial distress, RPTs are used by controlling shareholders to prop-up their 
distress firms. Controlling shareholders use listed firms to guarantee the debt of other 
distress group members, leaving the securing firm at a risk of default (Johnson, La 
Porta, et al., 2000). Williams and Taylor (2013) investigate the factors that instigate 
Chinese listed firms to prop up their reported earnings via the use of abnormal RP 
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sales. They find that the firms’ risk of been categorized as special treatment firm (and 
subsequently been delisted) and the proportion of non-tradable shares in the firms’ 
capital structure are the primary factors that induce firms to involve into propping 
activities. 
3.2.3 Strategic Rationale Related Party Transactions 
According to Cheung et al. (2006) firms engage in these forms of transactions, not for 
the sake of minority expropriation. They are transactions meant to improve the firm’s 
strategic position and increase its competitive advantage. Typical examples of this 
class of RPTs include a takeover of associate listed company, acquisition or sale of 
joint venture stake from/to remaining ventures and acquisition or divesting from 
foreign listed firm.  
Table 3.1 summarises the different types of RPTs based on the classification given by 




Table 3.1  










Transactions that involve the acquisition of tangible or intangible assets by 
the listed company from a connected entity or from a private company 
majority-controlled by that entity. 
Asset sales Transactions that involve the sale of tangible or intangible assets by the listed 
company to a connected entity or to a private company majority-controlled 
by that entity.  
Equity sales Transactions that involve the sale of an equity stake in the listed company to 
a connected entity or a private company controlled by that entity. 
Trading 
relationship 
Transactions that involve the trade of goods and services between the listed 
company and a private company majority-controlled by a connected entity. 
They include purchases by the listed company or sales or both. 
Cash 
payments 
Transactions that involve direct cash payments by the listed company to a 
connected entity or to a company controlled by that entity or to a subsidiary 
(including loans and cash assistance), and or provision of cash guarantees by 
the listed company for debts owed by the connected entity or by the 
companies controlled by the connected entity. 
  
Transactions likely to benefit the listed firm’s minority shareholders 
Cash receipts Transactions that involve direct cash assistance or loans provided by the 
connected person to the listed company. 
Subsidiary 
relationship 
Transactions between a listed company and one of its subsidiaries. They 
could involve acquisitions or sales of equity stakes or assets and trading 
relationships. 
  




Cases in which the listed company receives a takeover offer by another 
publicly listed company that holds a toehold, and cases in which the listed 
company forms a joint venture or strategic alliance with another company 




Transactions that involve acquisitions by the listed company from a third 
party of a stake in a joint venture in which the company participates as a joint 
venture partner. The connected person is the third party in his or her capacity 
as a subsidiary shareholder. 
Joint venture 
stake sales 
Transactions that involve the sale by the listed company to a third party of a 
stake in a joint venture in which the company participates as a joint venture 
partner. The connected person is the third party in his or her capacity as a 
subsidiary shareholder. 
Source: Adopted from (Cheung et al., 2006). 
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3.3 Related Party Transaction Perspectives 
Based on existing literature, RPTs can be interpreted using three available perspectives 
viz: conflict of interest perspective, efficient transaction perspective and recent 
contingencies perspective.  
3.3.1 Conflict of Interest Perspective 
Under the conflict of interest perspective, RPTs are considered potentially harmful to 
minority holders and value destroying. This perspective is based on agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) which view RPTs as an instrument used by controlling 
shareholders, directors or managers to expropriate firm resources at the expense of 
minority shareholders (Di Carlo, 2014). In certain situation, RPTs can be used by 
corporate executives and controlling shareholders of listed firm to earn private benefit 
(Wong & Kim, 2015).  
Private benefits of control are those benefits that are exclusively enjoyed by insiders 
ranging from exorbitant emolument package, empire-building power, perquisites, 
tunneling and many others5 (Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, & Stulz, 2009; Dyck & 
Zingales, 2004). RPTs can be used also to move profit from listed firm to the non-
listed firm thereby depriving minority shareholders access to their fair portion of return 
(Wong & Kim, 2015). Cheung et al. (2006) opine that RPTs such as assets sales or 
acquisition, trading relationship, equity sales and cash payment to related parties can 
likely be used to tunnel the firm’s resources at the detriment of minority shareholders. 
                                                     
5 See Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) for managerial benefits of keeping family firms. 
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Mustafa et al. (2011) support this position; they describe RPTs as prejudicial to 
minority shareholders.  
Listed firms with free cash flow are found to be used by insiders to offer generous 
trade credit and other forms of loan to their related parties (Jian & Wong, 2004). In 
light of these results, investors are likely to be skeptical about the real reason behind 
the RPTs. They tend to be doubtful on the motives of the company that engaged in 
such dealings even if is stated in the disclosure that the transactions are based on the 
arms’ length principle (Di Carlo, 2014). Consequently, RPTs disclosures that are used 
as a technique for handling conflict of interest attributed to this kind of transactions 
may not offer a full solution to RPTs problems, leaving the conflict of interest 
perspective problems unsolved. 
3.3.2 Efficient Transaction Perspective 
Efficient transaction perspective relates RPTs to the internal market hypothesis that is 
coined from the transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). The 
principal assumption of these theories is that RPTs can serve as a tool for minimizing 
or even complete removal of both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. This 
perspective considers RPTs as economically viable especially in many emerging 
economies’ institutional contexts, where there are no efficient factors of production 
and product markets (Pozzoli et al., 2014).  Cheung et al. (2006), and Jian and Wong 
(2004) consider RPTs as routine business transactions aimed at enhancing the 
efficiency of the operation by minimizing transaction lag time and cost through the 
business link. One of the reasons behind the establishment of the business group is the 
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removal of transaction costs (Claessens, Fan, & Lang, 2002). There are several costs 
and benefits associated with internal market hypotheses.  
Some of the benefits include better resource allocation and utilization, deeper 
reciprocal knowledge, efficient coordination of divergent activities (Yeh et al., 2012). 
RPTs have also been linked to quick decision making and response as well as 
eliminating delays or obstacles in contract negotiation with a third party (Loon & 
DeRamos, 2009). Several studies prove that RPTs saved some financially distressed 
firm from collapse. Some loss making (but marginally profitable) companies may be 
operating at an economic efficiency within the boundary of the group. These 
companies lack independent durability; they are bound to collapse if not supported by 
the group, yet, their contribution to the overall group is positive. RPTs can be used to 
retain these firms for the achievement of the overall goal of the group through system 
effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Jian & Wong, 2010; Williamson, 1985).  
Djankov et al. (2008) observe that there is no legislation across the globe that forbid 
RPTs entirely because of its economic rationality. In fact, many countries in the world 
have promulgated relevant laws that permit appropriate regulatory bodies to regulate 
RPTs within their domain. These scenarios justify the superiority of the benefits of 
RPTs against its related costs. Only RPTs that portrayed the real risk of prejudicial use 




3.3.3 Contingency Perspective 
Recently, contingency perspective emerges based on the critical analyses of the 
theories and empirical studies of above two perspectives by Pizzo in 2011. Both 
conflicts of interest and efficient transaction theories have their pros and cons. 
Empirical studies on each of the theories have resulted in inconclusive results and 
established direct opposite view with each other; making it difficult to make any 
practical policy concerning RPTs. Contingency theory assumes organizational context 
and institutional environment to play a significant role in the interpretation and critical 
analysis of the economic implication of RPTs. Pizzo (2011) proposes that both 
conflicts of interest and efficient transaction theories can exist concurrently in any 
given business setting and that RPTs cannot be analyzed independently from 
governance variables. 
To put the above position into practical view, in firms with disperse ownership where 
the type I agency problem is likely to exist, potentially abusive RPTs are those 
transactions between firms and their managers. In this case, contingency theory 
proposes that more monitoring mechanisms should be placed on all transactions that 
involve firms’ managers. On the other hand, the problem in a firm with concentrated 
ownership is likely to exist in RPTs with controlling shareholders. Therefore, stringent 
monitoring mechanisms should be placed on all transactions that involve controlling 
shareholders and their connected parties. The risk of prejudicial RPTs is even higher 
in a group with pyramidal structure (Di Carlo, 2014). Therefore, it requires more 
scrutiny from both within and outside firm.  
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3.4 Related Party Transactions Disclosure 
As mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, RPTs are required to be disclosed in 
financial reports by several financial regulations and enactments globally. These 
requirements are due to the importance attached to RPTs by the users of financial 
statements in making their economic decisions and its potential effect on the firm value 
(Ariff & Hashim, 2013). Capital market regulators in many countries have required 
listed companies to disclose RPTs in line with IFRS disclosure requirements 
(Williams, 2014).  
In addition to IFRS disclosure requirements, RPTs have now turned out to be subject 
to vigorous scrutiny by many regulators (Gallery, Gallery, & Supranowicz, 2008). The 
aim is to avoid the possibility of siphoning firms’ assets by insiders at the detriment 
of outsiders.  In view of this, detail disclosure of RPTs can be said to be crucial for 
users of the financial report to understand, analyze the implications of those 
transactions on the firm and make appropriate economic decisions therefrom 
(Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010).  
Ariff and Hashim (2003) recommend the consolidation of qualitative information 
(such as nature of the relationship and motive behind the transaction) in measuring the 
extent of RPTs disclosure. The authors realized that even non-monetary information 
such as the nature of the relationship can influence the decision of stakeholders and 
may affect the future operations or value of the firm. Qualitative information can also 
be used to detect the actual motive behind the transaction as different managerial 
incentives in RPTs may amount to various types of RPTs disclosure.  
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Regulators across the globe use RPTs disclosure as a mechanism for minority 
shareholders’ protection, ensuring transparency as well as maintaining objectivity in 
transactions with related parties (Ge et al., 2010; Kang et al., 2014; Utama & Utama, 
2014). The value of all RPTs, other non-financial information associated with such 
transactions and terms of the transaction are expected to be disclosed in financial 
reports and should be clear to all parties concern. RPTs should be based on market 
price principle as any RPT with conflict of interest can result in minority shareholders’ 
expropriation (Gordon et al. 2004).  
In an effort to protect minority shareholders against expropriation and intimate them 
with affairs of their company, countries like the UK, Malaysia and Australia requires 
both disclosure and approval of shareholders for any substantial transaction in which 
firm’s director or any persons connected with him are parties to the transaction; and 
stand the chance of deriving some financial benefit from it. Other countries like the 
US and New Zealand requires only disclosure of those transactions to shareholders, 
not approval. 
According to Lo and Wong (2011) and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2006) RPTs regulation mitigate the prejudicial transactions within insiders of the 
firm. It also constrains major parties from transferring company’s asset to their 
personal domain secretly (Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010). RPTs disclosure regulation 
has also impacted on the level of earnings management. Hwang et al. (2013) find that 
RPT disclosure regulation has reduced the overall discretionary accruals of Taiwanese 
companies that engage in RPTs with their Chinese associates.  
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3.5 Related Party Transaction Regulation across the World 
RPTs are regarded as healthy and beneficial transactions to firms all over the world. 
Nevertheless, they can be used as a tool to expropriate if not siphons the firms’ 
resources. Given this two-sided effect of RPTs, many countries in the world resort to 
regulating the transactions and ensure that only beneficial RPTs are allowed. The 
adoption of IFRS (IAS 24) as financial reporting standard by many countries in the 
world leads to some level of uniformity in RPTs regulation across the globe. However, 
countries vary in terms of degree of compliance, and some countries have additional 
laws apart from accounting standard that regulates the RPTs within their territory.  
Accounting standards serve as a backbone of PRTs disclosure regulation globally. In 
China, the Chinese ministry of finance is in charge of the issuance of Accounting 
Standard in the country. In 2007, a new set of Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) 
was released to regulate presentation and disclosure of financial information. The new 
standards are substantially in line with IFRS requirements including those for RPTs 
disclosure (Williams, 2014). All firms listed on the Chinese capital markets are 
required to use IAS or HK SSAPs in their financial reporting to check the instances of 
minority abuse (Fung, Su, & Gul, 2013).  
In Indonesia, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 7 regulates the conduct 
and disclosure of RPTs in the country. The RPTs disclosure requirements of 
Indonesian standard are identical to those of IFRS. Accounting standards play an 
important role in improving investors’ protection in Hong Kong stock exchange. 
European nations and other countries that adopted IFRS as their financial reporting 
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standard utilize the requirements of IAS 24 in RPTs disclosure regulation in their 
respective countries. 
Also, corporate governance codes supplement the requirements of accounting standard 
on RPTs disclosure regulations in many countries in the world. In countries like 
Nigeria, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the audit committee handles perusal of the 
effectiveness of all RPTs and ensures the appropriate disclosure in the annual reports. 
United States (the US)’ corporate governance rules prohibit related party loans to 
directors after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. This 
practice is similar in countries like Nigeria, Malaysia, France and China where both 
the loan and loan guarantee to the related parties are banned in the corporate 
governance codes. Conversely, Australian best practice does not prohibit the loan to 
directors and executives if is approved by the shareholders (Chan, 2010). 
Capital market listing requirements have also been used in many countries as 
mechanisms to uplift corporate transparency and improve shareholders’ protection. In 
Indonesia, the market-listing rule for the presentation and disclosure of financial 
statement VIII.G.7 stipulates additional disclosures concerning RPTs for any company 
listed on Indonesia stock exchange. Chinese security regulatory commission has set 
strict listing requirements on RPTs and their disclosure such as the prohibition of non-
operational fund occupancy in Chinese capital markets (Jiang, Rao, & Yue, 2014). 
France and Malaysia require the appointment of independent adviser for RPTs that are 
up to 5% of the percentage ratios. In an effort to strengthen investors’ protection, Hong 
Kong stock exchange imposes additional listing rules on Chinese-based firms (Fung 
et al., 2013).  
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On the issue of minority shareholders group, many countries have established a forum 
that can be used to echo the voice of minorities. In Australia for example, Australian 
shareholder Association (ASA) has been in existence since 1960 with the sole aim of 
advancing the interest of all shareholders within the country. The activities of ASA 
are similar to that of Malaysian MSWG though differs regarding the means of funding 
(Satkunasingam & Shanmugam, 2006). In the U.S. if the company take importance 
decision such as merger and acquisition or make a significant change in its article of 
association against the wish of minority shareholders, the minority group can compel 
that company to buyback the shares of any shareholder who oppose the decision. 
3.6 Disclosure Quality 
Quality is a relative, complex, multi-faced term which is associated with many 
measurement issues. The problem of quality measurement cut across many social 
science disciplines. Several studies have used some disclosure indices to compute 
proxy for disclosure quality (Beattie et al., 2004). Although, there is no universal 
agreement on the index that best describes or measures disclosure quality among those 
indices. Issues on disclosure measurement are yet to be resolved and still require the 
attention of researchers (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008).  
Hussainey and Mouselli (2010) define disclosure quality as the ability of the reporting 
entity to provide information in such a way that users can easily comprehend and 
interpret the intended message. It must be noted, however, that it is possible to arrive 
at different results if the index in one study is applied in other studies. Urquiza et al. 
(2009) empirically explore the use of various indices on a single set of data. The 
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findings reveal that different indices provide statistically significant different rankings 
of firms with regards to their disclosure level. 
IASC Framework (1989) describes relevance, reliability, understandability and 
comparability as basic attributes that financial information must contain to quench the 
information needs of the users of financial reports. These qualities are termed as 
essential ingredients for any disclosure quality model (Botosan, 2004). According to 
IASB (2010) as cited by Palea (2012) the two main features of good accounting 
information are relevance and reliability. Relevancy of accounting information refers 
to the ability of accounting information to influence the decision of the users.  
On the other hand, reliability stands for a faithful representation of the economic 
reality of the reporting entity. The framework provides that financial information must 
be presented in such a way that an average user can easily grasp non-complex part of 
it. Comparability of accounting information is described as presenting similar things 
in a similar manner to look more alike without making heterogeneous things look less 
different (Yip & Young, 2012). In most of the compliance studies, disclosure indices 
were designed on the assumptions that it best apprehend the transparency or quality of 
the disclosures. However, the increasing importance of narrative disclosure in 
corporate reporting has posed a new challenge to disclosure quality measurement. The 
quality of the information disclosed in the narrative disclosure cannot be viewed to be 
the same with that of the financial statement (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008).  
This inequality leads to the shift from the idea that disclosure quality cannot be 
separated from quantity, or the two terms are synonymous. Similarly, Beattie et al. 
(2004) are of the view that even if the quantity of information impact its quality, an 
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evaluation of disclosure quality cannot be based on that relationship. They portend 
that, quality of disclosure reflects in its ability to cover all business activities and 
balance among different headings and sub-headings.  
3.7 Determinants of Compliance with the RPT Disclosure Requirements 
Prior researchers justify the benefits of information disclosure over and above its 
related costs. However, Core (2001) states that perfectly credible disclosure is not 
ideal because it is too costly. Disclosure costs can be categorized into direct and 
indirect costs (Glaum et al., 2013). Direct costs include the cost of generating, 
processing, publishing and distributing information.  Indirect costs, on the other hand, 
include proprietary cost (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Glaum et al., 2013; Verrecchia, 
1990), incentive costs (Core, 2001) and alike.  
Nonetheless, sometimes firms may decide to extend the volume of information 
disclosure beyond the mandatory requirement. This decision can be traced to the 
benefits derivable from information disclosure by the firm such as reduced contracting 
cost, minimized litigation risk, low cost of capital (Core, 2001; Heitzman et al., 2010) 
and reduced agency costs (Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012). Based 
on the above, variation in the volume of firms’ disclosure during the voluntary 
disclosure regime can be attributed to the analysis of information disclosure costs vis-
à-vis the benefits derivable from it. Several studies identified many factors that 
influence firms behavior towards voluntary information disclosure (El-Gazzar, Finn, 
& Jacob, 1999; Street & Bryant, 2000; Street & Gray, 2002). In contrast, studies on 
the determinants of mandatory disclosure received little attention or were almost 
neglected by researchers (Glaum et al., 2013; Utama & Utama, 2014).  
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Similar to the voluntary regime, the following factors influence the level of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. The 
factors are divided into corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
characteristics. Corporate governance mechanisms consisting board independence, 
board size, audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, CEO 
expertise, family CEO, CEO ownership, family ownership, managerial ownership and 
foreign ownership. Firm financial characteristics include tunneling, propping, 
profitability, firm growth and firm dividend policy. 
3.7.1 Corporate Governance 
Chen (2014) defined corporate governance as the mechanisms put in place to 
harmonize and direct the managers to act in the best interest of the shareholders. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997)  corporate governance is the process in which 
providers of finance to firms guarantee themselves maximum return on their 
investment.  In summary, corporate governance can be described as the relationship 
between firm’s capital suppliers and its management, with the board of directors 
serving as a link between the two parties. 
Corporate governance mechanisms strengthen the fiduciary relationship that existed 
in the agency contract between the agent (management) and the principals (equity 
holders, debt holders, suppliers and groups with the stake in the business of the 
firm)(Goergen, Manjon, & Renneboog, 2008). Black et al. (2015) document that good 
corporate governance moderates the negative effect of RPTs on the firm value and 
increase the association between firm profitability with that of the industry. Corporate 
governance mechanisms can either be internal or external. Internal mechanisms 
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comprise the corporate board, board committees, CEO characteristics and other related 
mechanisms, while external mechanisms consist of external auditors, stock exchange 
listing requirements, the regulatory framework of the country, foreign shareholding 
and enlistment and alike. 
3.7.1.1 Board Characteristics 
Board characteristics refer to the attributes of the boardrooms that influence the 
process and manner in which the board discharges its responsibilities. These 
characteristics include board independence (Machuga & Teitel, 2009; Wagner, 2011), 
board size (Mak & Roush, 2000; Zona, 2014) among others. 
3.7.1.1.1 Board Independence 
Independent directors serve as one of the major internal governance mechanisms that 
reduce the potential opportunistic behaviors of managers in a well disperse 
organizational setting, or to minimize potential self-dealing by controlling shareholder 
in a firm with concentrated ownership structure (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 
2008; Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2014). Independent directors monitor, advise 
and resolve internal disagreement among the management on behalf of the common 
stockholders of the company (Fama & Jensen, 1983). MCCG (2012) requires 
independent directors to constitute the majority of the board membership if the 
chairman of the board happens to be a non-independent director. 
The presence of adequate number of independent directors on a board has been seen 
as solution for preserving the interest of all categories of shareholders (Mallin, Melis, 
& Gaia, 2015) and certify that corporate decision are made in a manner that protects 
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the interest of all stakeholders (Lo, Wong, & Firth, 2010). Hence, the appointment of 
an independent director on the corporate boards reduces the owner-principal agency 
problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. MCCG (2007) 
requires that independent directors should make at least one-third of the board 
members. 
The presence of independent directors is expected to improve general business 
operations. This can be achieved through the expertise that a firm can derive from its 
outside directors in the areas of business strategy, marketing, finance, operations and 
more importantly high objectivity in monitoring executive management (Armstrong, 
Guay, & Weber, 2010). Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) opine that independent 
directors provide two separate roles to a firm. These roles are advising the executive 
management as well as monitoring the executive performance.  
Independence of directors from the management helps in ensuring objective 
monitoring, through which advising role can be effectively discharged (Kim, Mauldin, 
& Patro, 2014). It must be noted however that, proper investigation on the genuine 
independence of outside directors is must, more especially in a market dominated by 
concentrated ownership. This assessment is necessary because the term outside 
directors and independent directors are interchangeably used in Anglo-Saxon context 
to mean independent directors.  
Nevertheless, the situation is not the same in continental and emerging economies 
where concentrated ownership is dominant. Under this situation, outside directors may 
be nominated by controlling shareholder to supervise management on his behalf, 
whereas independent directors will be there to protect the interest of minority 
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shareholders or on the free float. So in the event of a conflict of interest between 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, the distinction between the two 
categories is crucial (Fraile & Fradejas, 2014).  
Several studies document a positive relationship between a number of independent 
directors and firms disclosure practices (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Ferreira, Ferreira, & 
Raposo, 2011; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). Firms tend to increase their disclosure level 
to protect and intimate their minority shareholders with its internal affairs and increase 
the level of their protection (Gisbert & Navallas, 2013). Tang, Du and Hou (2013) 
document that independent directors play an important role in protecting the outsiders 
(minority shareholders and creditors).  
On this note, a higher proportion of independent directors on the board guarantees 
maximum disclosure of information, thus, ensuring efficient operation of the firm in 
the best interest of all the parties concern. Armstrong, Core and Guay (2014) provide 
empirical evidence that the number of independent directors on the board influences 
the level of corporate transparency, against some insinuations that independent 
directors are willing to serve on the board of a firm with high corporate transparency. 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007) examine the possibility of combining internal governance 
mechanism (independent directors) and external mechanism (voluntary information 
disclosure) in a firm with the dominant shareholder. The authors find a positive 
relationship between a number of independent directors and the volume of voluntary 
information disclosed in the financial reports of firms with the dominant shareholder.  
Similarly, Wahab et al. (2011) reveal that the level of independence of the board is 
crucial to mitigate the negative effect of RPTs.  
 
 78 
Furthermore, Cheung et al. (2009) show that most of the firms that engage in RPTs 
have no independent directors. Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) prove that 
presence of independent directors on a board minimizes the tendency of controlling 
shareholder to expropriate minority shareholders most especially in the countries with 
weak investors’ protection. This is consistent with the finding of Lo et al. (2010) that 
firms with a high proportion of independent directors and a small proportion of parent 
directors on the board have less tendencies for maneuvering transfer price. Firms with 
a higher percentage of independent directors disclosed more voluntary information on 
the pricing policy regarding RPTs. Therefore, the presence of more independent 
directors in the firm board can control the managers’ disclosure behavior with regards 
to RPTs’ pricing policy (Lo & Wong, 2011). 
3.7.1.1.2 Board Size 
Board size represents the number of persons that sit on the firm board of directors. The 
board, been a supreme policy formulation body for a firm, decides on the strategies 
and process that should be adopted by the management (Akhtaruddin & Abdur Rauf, 
2012). It plays a vital role in ensuring proper corporate governance and financial 
transparency in a firm (Samaha, Khlif, & Hussainey, 2015). The results of the studies 
on the optimal board size remain inconclusive. As a result, some stock markets 
stipulates a certain range of number that the board size must dwell within (Akhtaruddin 
& Abdur Rauf, 2012; Cheung et al., 2006).  
Large boards are believed to be effective and beneficial to the firm because as the 
number of members increases, the firm will also benefit from their diverse and 
accumulated experiences (Hidalgo, García-Meca, & Martínez, 2011).  According to 
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Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) large boards discharge their monitoring and advising 
roles more efficiently. On the contrary, Sengupta and Zhang (2015) state that 
effectiveness of board depends on the power of the board relative to that of CEO. 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) report that board size for large US corporations fall in 
the 90s and rise again after the SOX mandatory disclosure reforms, while the size of 
the small and medium-term firms remain stable for long period of time. Board size 
influences the firm corporate decisions and other characteristics including its cost of 
capital (Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004).  
Firms with complex business model need to have a large board to perform better 
(Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). Recent studies document a positive relationship 
between board size and performance (Black & Kim, 2012; Upadhyay, Bhargava, & 
Faircloth, 2013). However, this result is more pronounced in large firms (Lappalainen, 
2012), because the size of the board in most cases increases as the firm grow bigger 
(Chen, 2014; Jameson, Prevost, & Puthenpurackal, 2014). Michelon and Parbonetti 
(2012) argue that disclosure policy spring from the decisions of the board. Therefore, 
the number of the members that constitute the board plays important role in its decision 
making process.  
Several studies report the positive association between board size and corporate 
disclosure behavior (Grigoris, 2014; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Samaha et al., 2015; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Nekhili and Cherif (2011) postulate that RPTs can be 
affected by the size of the board. However, many studies established that the impact 
of board begin to decrease if the board continues to increase after reaching its optimal 
size (Bozzolan & Beretta, 2015;  Choi, Choi, Hogan, & Lee, 2013). 
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Some studies document a negative association between board size and firm stock value 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996). Consistently, Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) analyses the stock value of the firms that uses different corporate 
governance codes and report that large board size reduces the firm value in both 
Malaysia and Singapore. Henry (2010) realize that large board is associated with an 
increase in discretionary expenditure, hence increasing the firm agency cost.  
Similarly, Truong and Heaney (2013) argue that large board size is detrimental to a 
firm as it consumes more of the firm scarce resources and may lead to free-rider 
problems among the members. Many government reforms are found to encourage 
smaller boards (Chen, 2014). Nonetheless, Wahab et al. (2011) find that large boards 
are more effective in mitigating the negative effect of RPTs.  
3.7.1.2 Audit Committee Characteristics 
The listed firms are required to have an audit committee in many countries in the 
world. This position is based on the fact that existence of audit committee reinforces 
board’s oversight of auditing and accounting practices in a firm (Lo et al., 2010). Audit 
committee members are saddled with the responsibilities for reviewing and monitoring 
compliance with all financial reporting disclosure requirements (Al-Akra et al., 2010). 
Brochet and Srinivasan (2014) argue that audit committee members are required to 
exhibit a high degree of oversight function on accounting and disclosure issues.  
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004), Benkel, Mather, and Ramsay (2006) and Black 
and Kim (2012) provide empirical evidence on how composition and quality of board 
and audit committee affect the quality of financial reports and stock price. Cai, Hillier, 
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Tian and Wu (2015) find that audit committee plays an important role in mitigating 
agency cost and serve as a substitute for external regulations in an economy with weak 
legal institutions. Audit committee performs its duty effectively when the members 
are independent, expert and well resourced (Li, Mangena, & Pike, 2012). 
The roles and powers of an audit committee are provided in the code of corporate 
governance of the territory in which the firm domicile. Mintz (2006) reports that in an 
American model, for example, audit committee members are expected to recommend 
for the appointment, review compensation and independence of an external auditor 
and serve as intermediary between the board and external auditor. They should review 
the financial statements of the firm, auditors’ reports, auditors’ inquiries and 
recommendations as well as management responses to those inquiries and 
recommendations.  
Assessment of the appropriateness of internal control, major auditing and accounting 
practices should also form part of their routine duties. There is no much difference 
between U.S., the UK, and many other common law countries models of audit 
committee’s functions, considering the source of their legal system (Mintz, 2006). 
MCCG (2000) provide for the mandatory establishment of audit committee in 
Malaysia. The committee structure, independence and financial expertise have been 
reinforced by the latest version of the code (MCCG, 2012). 
Al-Akra et al. (2010) identify mandatory establishment of audit committee to be the 
major determinant of compliance with mandatory requirements. Likewise, Ho and 
Wong (2001) document a positive association between audit committee and voluntary 
information disclosure. Similarly, Gao and Kling (2012) link the increased financial 
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transparency and disclosure oversight by audit committee to the increased 
responsibility accorded to them in many governance regulations and the tendency of 
been named among the dependent in case of financial lawsuits. Al-Najjar and Abed 
(2014), and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find a positive association between audit 
committee and forward-looking and earnings forecast information disclosure 
It has been established that the main reason behind the positive relationship between 
good corporate governance and firm performance was as a result of the ability of 
former to curtail tunneling activities. Cheung et al. (2009) report that presence of audit 
committee mitigates tunneling practices in asset acquisition and disposal. However, 
Samaha et al. (2012) fail to establish any association between presence of audit 
committee and corporate governance disclosure practice in Egypt. 
3.7.1.2.1 Audit Committee Independence:  
The need for audit committee independence can be linked to the widespread literature 
on the importance of board independence  (Carcello & Neal, 2003; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). In order to strengthen the independence of audit committees, many countries 
in the world required that the committee should be chaired by independent directors 
and independent directors should compose the majority of the committee membership 
(Black & Kim, 2012; Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2014).  
Bédard and Gendron (2010) review the studies on audit committee for the period of 
1994 until 2008. The authors reveal that most of the studies document a positive 
relationship between the audit committee independence and the effectiveness in their 
financial reporting oversight role. This position is consistent with the requirement of 
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many governance codes across the globe. The majority of the members of audit 
committee are required to be independent (Wan-Hussin, 2009). MCCG (2012) 
requires that executive director should not be appointed as a member of the audit 
committee and independent directors should constitute majority of its membership. 
Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) document an adverse relationship between 
independence of audit committee and restatement of the financial reports. This 
highlight the importance of the monitoring role plays by the independent of audit 
committee members in the financial reporting process. Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, 
McNamara and Nagel (2012) document that audit committee independence improves 
the firm financial performance. Related to this, Be´dard, Chtourou and  Courteau 
(2004), and Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal (2009) find that the possibility 
of audit committee members to reduce the likelihood of earnings management is 
significant only if the committee is constituted by purely independent directors.  
Independent audit committee members who have much concern for their reputation 
and potential legal liability support the external auditor while conducting their 
assurance services (Lee, Mande, & Ortman, 2004). They discharge their monitoring 
role free from the dictate of management (Carcello & Neal, 2003; Li et al., 2012). 
Consistently, Nekhili and Cherif (2011) show that audit committee independence has 
a positive impact in curtailing prejudicial RPTs. Therefore, independence of audit 




3.7.1.2.2 Audit Committee Financial Expertise  
Many corporate governance codes have mandated the inclusion of financial expert in 
the audit committee (Li et al., 2012; MCCG, 2007). Defining what constitutes 
financial expertise have been a subject of controversy in the extant literature. Bédard 
and Gendron (2010) reveal that most of the audit committee studies describe financial 
expert to include professional accountants and auditors, accounting academics, chief 
financial officers, investment advisors, and bankers. Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal 
(2006) document a significant level of compliance with SOX on the disclosure of 
financial expert on audit committee in the annual report.  
Capital market reacts favorably to the announcement of the appointment of a financial 
expert as a member of the audit committee (Defond, Hann, & Hu, 2005). Carcello and 
Neal (2003) document a positive association between audit committee expertise and 
its ability to prevent auditor from dismissal after the release of the qualified audit 
report. BMLR (2015), and MCCG (2012) require for the inclusion of financial expert 
in the board audit committees. 
Be´dard et al. (2004) document that board with more expert are more effective in 
curtailing earnings management practices. Carcello and Neal (2003) posit that audit 
committee financial expertise helps in interpreting and explaining the implications of 
auditors reports to the board for proper actions. Firm internal control system can be 
affected by the richness of its audit committee. Firms with less financial experts in its 
audit committee have a large tendency of having a weak system of internal control 
(Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007). Similarly, Goh (2009) reveals that audit committee 
financial expert can easily identify internal control material weaknesses and force 
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management to rectify it within the shortest possible time. Cohen, Hoitash, 
Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2013) are of the view that audit committee with combine 
accounting and industry knowledge will perform better. This is because most of the 
accounting principles and estimations can be directly linked to particular industry. So 
having an industry expert on the committee will help immensely in exercising 
effective monitoring role.  
Audit committee expertise has a significant negative association with the occurrence 
of restatement (Abbott et al., 2004). Moreover, Cohen et al. (2013) reveal that audit 
committee with a mixture of both financial and industry expert perform better than 
those committees with only financial expert. Related to this, Aldamen et al. (2012) 
find that presence of a financial expert in audit committee improves the firm financial 
performance. Firms with a high number of financial experts in their audit committees 
are found to be less engaged in transfer price manipulations (Davidson III, Xie, & Xu, 
2004). 
3.7.1.3 CEO Characteristics 
Chief executive officers (CEOs) possess great power to influence the choice of the 
strategies and processes, and, therefore, the firm performance (Miller, Minichilli, & 
Corbetta, 2013). It is widely reported that some powerful CEOs use their power to 
influence the director nomination process to maintain a pliable board (Baldenius, 
Melumad, & Meng, 2014). Kalyta and Magnan (2008) report that powerful CEO 
engages into rent extracting activities in a low quality disclosure environment. 
Therefore, proper understanding of CEOs characteristics is necessary for explaining 
corporate disclosure behavior. 
 
 86 
3.7.1.3.1 CEO Expertise 
A CEO is expected to possess some generic skills and talent to deal with varying 
organizational activities and many external environments such as capital market, 
media, and stakeholders. CEO’s ability to acquire these expertise has been identified 
as one of the factors that determine the success of decisions and programs. Custódio, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2013) find that CEOs with general managerial skills accumulated 
over years of experience receive higher pay package than others. This finding can be 
justified with the fact that CEOs with financial expertise are financially sophisticated 
and more likely to manage actively firm's financial policies (Custódio & Metzger, 
2013a).  
According to Haislip and Richardson (2015) CEOs with IT expertise make more 
accurate estimation and analysts that follow those firms make more accurate earnings 
forecast. They also find that firms with IT expert CEOs announce earning earlier than 
other firms. In the event of acquisitions, firms with experienced and expert CEO in the 
target’s industry records higher abnormal return compared to non-experienced CEO 
firms (Custódio & Metzger, 2013b). Venture capitalist usually retains the founder 
CEOs in order to keep their managerial experience and their scientific skills 
(Dubocage & Galindo, 2013). CEOs talent has been found to influence the firm 
performance (Falato, Kadyrzhanova, & Lel, 2014).  
Custódio and Metzger (2013b) demonstrate how CEO expertise affect the market 
value of the firm while taking business strategy decisions. Accordingly, Custódio and 
Metzger (2013a), and Huang (2014) find that firms that focus on the industry in which 
they possess managerial expertise achieved significant improvement in performance. 
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The improvement is higher for the firms with CEO with much experience in that 
industry. Haislip and Richardson (2015) find that IT expert CEOs make more accurate 
estimations that lead to more accurate earnings forecast. Despite the recorded 
importance of CEO expertise, previous studies have paid little attention to the effect 
of CEO financial expertise on firms disclosure practice.  
3.7.1.3.2 Family CEO 
Family members continue to maintain significant ownership, control and management 
of their firm, even after the retirement of the founding member (Bertrand & Schoar, 
2006). Anderson and Reeb (2003) document that family firms outperformed non-
family counterpart regardless of the family background of the CEO.  However, Miller, 
Minichilli and Corbetta (2013) argue that family CEOs outperform only in small firms 
with concentrated ownership structure. Though family members may not be the best 
candidate, it is usual for the family firm to have a CEO from among the family 
members (Barnett, 1960). Hillier and McColgan (2009) report that family CEOs are 
less likely to be replaced even after the successive poor performance, and CEO 
turnover is lower for family firms (Chen, Cheng, & Dai, 2013).  
McConaughy (2000) states that family CEOs have many incentives to work hard and 
maximize the firm value. Therefore, they required less compensation-based 
incentives. On the contrary, Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Minichilli, Corbetta and Pittino 
(2014) believe that family CEOs are more motivated by socio-emotional-incentives 
such as retaining the family control even if it is at the detriment of firm profitability. 
Family CEOs undertake decisions that will benefit the family firms such as long-term 
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R&D, thus, capable of increasing the financial performance of their firms (Minichilli, 
Corbetta, & MacMillan, 2010).  
However, once it comes to professionalism and experience, non-family CEOs are 
found to be more experienced and educated than their family counterpart and family 
CEOs underperform more especially in past growing industry that requires special 
skills (Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2007). All of these 
findings provide empirical evidence on the how CEO family lineage affect the 
decision-making process. 
3.7.1.3.3 CEO Ownership 
CEO ownership is described as the proportion of all classes of shares held by the CEO 
of the firm out of the total outstanding shares of the firm (Schiehll & Bellavance, 
2009). Griffith (1999) reports the positive U-shape relationship between the 
proportion of CEO ownership and the firm value. Consistently, Lu, Xu, & Liu (2009) 
document that an increase in the level of CEO ownership decreases the principal-agent 
conflict in export decisions. Similarly, Kim and Lu (2011), and Ting, Azizan and 
Kweh (2015) document the CEO ownership has a strong influence on the firm value.  
Firms with higher CEO ownership are characterized by the presence of dual role. This 
enables the CEO excess power to dictate the process and the direction of the firm 
(Chen, Lin, & Yi, 2008). Schiehll and Bellavance (2009) posit that firms with higher 
CEO ownership will integrate some costly non-financial measures into the CEO bonus 
plan to sustain the long-term profitability of the firm. The stock-option plan is found 
to improve the CEOs boldness towards risk-taking (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).  
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Consistently, Musteen, Datta and Herrmann (2008) reveals that CEOs with bonus plan 
tied to long-term performance are more inclined to full-control international market 
entry mode, which benefits the long-term firm performance. Kim and Lu (2011) state 
that CEO ownership serves as a substitute for external governance in mitigating the 
effect of conflict of interest. In contrast, Xie (2014) reveals that CEO ownership 
reduces the CEO risk-taking behavior. Consistent with this, Kim and Lu (2011) 
caution against the excessive CEO ownership because it will deter him from taking 
the risk.  
3.7.1.4 Ownership Structure 
Corporate ownership structure differs across the firms and across the world. The 
ownership structure affects many of the firm decisions (Bekiris, 2013; Samaha et al., 
2012). Disperse ownership structure delegate the decisions and management of the 
firms to the managers. Conversely, concentrated ownership is required to implement 
the desired level of monitoring (Burkart & Panunzi, 2006). Some of the ownership 
structures including family, management or foreign ownership can influence the firm 
disclosure behavior.  
3.7.1.4.1 Family Ownership 
A firm in which the founders or offspring of the founding families remain the block 
holders and continue to appear on the board or hold some top management position 
are regarded as family firm (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Cheng, 2014).  Family 
ownership is described as the proportion of all classes of shares held by the family 
members in a firm (Ansari, Goergen, & Mira, 2014). Family ownership is frequent in 
developed and predominant in emerging markets (Siregar & Utama, 2008). It is 
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associated with less agency cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003). The family 
usually accumulate power over a firm through family ownership and family wedge 
(Ansari et al., 2014).  
Corporate disclosures are used to reduce the information gap between management 
and owners (type I agency problem). This kind of problem is less dominant in family 
firms due to the nature of their ownership structure. The second type of agency 
problem (type II agency problem) is severe and more visible in family firms. This 
agency problem exists because of the concentrated ownership that characterized most 
of the family firms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Wan-Hussin, 2009).  
Family firms are found to be more efficient in terms of management and performance 
compared to non-family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that performance of 
family firms in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q are higher than that of non-family firms. 
This finding is substantiated by other studies in terms of organizational structure and 
concerning financial indicators (Andres, 2008; Maury, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). Similarly, Al-Dubai, Ku-Ismail and Amran (2015) provide evidence of non-
linear relationship between family ownership and firm value. As the family ownership 
increases, the behavior of family members changes from expropriation to monitoring 
role. 
In contrast, Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) document an inverse relationship 
between corporate governance index and family firm performance. The negative 
relationship can be attributed to other specific characteristics of family firms that may 
restrain corporate governance mechanisms from working properly in a family-
controlled firms. Similarly, firm performance decline after the demise of the founder 
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due to the dilution of ownership among the descendants, which may lead to the 
tunneling of resources out of the firm (Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, & Schoar, 
2008). Alipour (2013) reveals that family ownership militates the level of performance 
of the firm that can be related to lack of control mechanism is most of the family firms.  
Munir et al., (2013) report a U-shape relationship between family ownership and 
quality of reported earnings. Family firms have unique characteristics that 
distinguished them from other firms. These characteristics affect their level of 
information disclosure and general disclosure practice. According to Chau and Gray 
(2002) firms with concentrated ownership are characterized by less voluntary 
information disclosure, but the problem is more visible in family-controlled firms.  
Family-controlled firms are associated with less voluntary disclosure on forward-
looking information, earning forecast and are characterized by high opaque 
information environment than disperse firms (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009; Chen 
et al., 2008). Chau and Gray (2010) report that the level of family firms’ voluntary 
disclosure practice depends on the extent of the family ownership.  
Nowland (2008) document an improvement in the general disclosure practice of 
family-controlled firms after the introduction of national governance codes across 
Asian countries. Consistent with this, Wan-Hussin (2009) find that family-controlled 
firms tend to make greater compliance with the segment reporting standard. Stressing 
on the need for and importance of RPTs disclosure regulation, Fernando, Schneible 
and Suh (2013) argue that putting rigorous financial reporting disclosure on family-
controlled firm will restrain the founders or heirs from engaging into RPTs that will 
amount to wealth expropriation. Similarly, Di Carlo (2014) conducts case studies on 
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some selected Italian family-controlled business groups and recommends for 
increased disclosure from family-controlled firms based on the findings of the study.  
3.7.1.4.2 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership is the proportion of all types of shares held by the managers, 
directors and supervisors in a firm (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). It is used as a 
mechanism for minimizing the agency problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that 
as management ownership increases, the value of the firm will also rise because of 
reduction in agency cost. Similarly, Mustapha and Ahmad (2011) documents that 
managerial ownership decreases the total monitoring costs in the countries 
characterized by the dominant shareholders. According to Niemi (2005) manager-
owned firms are characterized by lower information asymmetry. This is because the 
owners pilot the day-to-day affairs of the firms, hence have the first-hand information 
about the state of affairs of the firm. Managerial ownership aligns the goal and 
financial incentives of the management with those of the outside shareholders (Arcay 
& Vázquez, 2005). 
Nevertheless, managerial ownership creates owner opportunism—a situation where 
owner-managers resort to self-enrichment transactions at the detriment of the minority 
shareholders. These make managers be reluctant to release additional information to 
the market. In view of this, Warfieid et al. (1995) state that managers have some 
obligations to their environment including the selection and application of accounting 
procedures. Managerial ownership encourages selective reporting. This is because, 
managers are conscious of setting disclosure precedent that may be costly to retain and 
fearful of releasing valuable business information to competitors (Li et al., 2012). On 
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the contrary, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) postulate a positive relationship managerial 
ownership and extent of voluntary information disclosure. Warfieid et al. (1995) 
document that managerial ownership is associated with the high earnings explanatory 
power and reduced discretionary manipulations. Similarly, Al-Najjar and Abed (2014) 
state that managerial ownership provides incentives for managers to release more 
information in order to increase the stock market price, minimize overall monitoring 
costs and enhance the firm value 
3.7.1.4.3 Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership is described as the proportion of firm equity capital held by non-
domestic investors. Firth, Fung and Rui (2007), and Desender, Aguilera, 
Lópezpuertas-Lamy and Crespi (2014) state that economic restructuring by many 
economies coupled with foreign ownership have prompted the need for high quality 
information by the market participant. Foreign ownership serves as one of the external 
corporate governance monitoring mechanisms (Jeon, Lee, & Moffett, 2011; Munisi, 
Hermes, & Randøy, 2014). The positive association between corporate governance 
and firm performance was identified to be the result of the debt monitoring and foreign 
ownership (Che-Haat et al., 2008).      
Foreign investors survive in countries with weak legal investor protection through 
substantial equity ownership and change in the governance-orientation logic 
(Desender et al., 2014; Lskavyan & Spatareanu, 2011). This is facilitated by the 
transfer of managerial skills as well as strong monitoring roles plays by the foreign 
parent firm. Li, Nguyen, Pham and Wei (2011) document the effectiveness of the 
monitoring role and strong commitment of the large foreign shareholder. Chari, Chen 
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and Dominguez (2012) using difference-in-differences empirical approach document 
that foreign acquisition come with the better restructuring schemes that improve the 
firm performance.  
Presence of foreign shareholders has been found to have an effect on the coefficients 
of earnings response and discretionary accruals (Firth et al., 2007). Moreover, 
Greenaway, Guariglia and Yu (2012) document that firms with mixed domestic and 
foreign ownership perform better than wholly domestic or foreign-owned firms. 
Cerrato and Piva (2012) provide evidence on the positive influence of foreign 
ownership on the small and medium enterprises internationalization process. 
Multinational subsidiaries with strong production and financial linkages with their 
foreign parent firms are found to be less affected by the global financial crisis 
compared to the local firm with similar characteristics (Alfaro & Chen, 2011). This 
has shown that firms with foreign ownership possess some managerial and governance 
qualities that are not available to their local counterpart.  
Foreign institutional ownership has improved the firm transparency level through 
increased conference calls, which serve as a medium for communicating the firm 
private information to the market participants in emerging markets (Liang, Lin, & 
Chin, 2012). It is also believed that presence of foreign ownership increases the firm 
desirability for high quality audit (He, Rui, Zheng, & Zhu, 2014). Bova and Pereira 
(2012), and Misirlioǧlu et al. (2013) show that foreign ownership is among the factors 
that are associated with increased information disclosure.  
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3.7.2 Firm Financial Characteristics  
Firm characteristics represent the endogenous features that can be attributed to 
individual firms. Several studies define firm characteristics based on the researchers’ 
objectives (Dechow et al., 2011; Kogan & Papanikolaou, 2012; Whiting & Woodcock, 
2011). Firm characteristics constitute firm’s important features that are believed to 
cross influence its activities or outcomes (Bessembinder & Zhang, 2013). In this study, 
these characteristics are divided into RPT motives and firm performance. 
3.7.2.1 RPT Motives 
According to Cheung et al (2006) managers can engage into RPTs with the intention 
for self-enrichment and minority shareholders’ expropriations. In some instances, the 
RPTs are initiated to inject personal resources to a listed firm in order to achieve a pre-
set target. 
3.7.2.1.1 Tunneling 
Johnson et al.  (2000) was the first to describe the act of diverting resources from listed 
firm by its controlling shareholders as ‘tunneling’. Several studies document that 
concentrated ownership is prevalent in countries other than U.S. and Japan (Claessens 
et al., 2000; Djankov et al., 2008; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009; 
Wan-Hussin, 2009). Tunneling comes into play as a result of type II agency problem 
that exists between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Numerous 
studies provide empirical evidence that controlling shareholders use RPTs to 
expropriate minority shareholders especially in emerging market where enforcement 
and investors’ protection is weak.  
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Empirical evidence has proved that capital market reacts to the announcement of 
RPTs, though the results are inconclusive. Lou et al. (2014) find that capital market 
reacts indifferently to the announcement of any form of RPTs. Contrary to this, Lei 
and Song (2011) report that the Tobin’s Q and market to book value of firms that 
engage in prejudicial RPTs are significantly lower than those with no such form of 
transactions. This is consistent with the findings that investors cannot foresee 
tunneling, but they discount firms if it occurs (Cheung et al., 2006). Cheung et al. 
(2009) find that RPTs representing tunneling hardly been public compared to those 
representing propping.  
Lei and Song (2011) find that Chinese listed companies use RPTs with disclosure 
exemption in tunneling, signaling the significance of disclosure requirement in 
curtailing prejudicial RPTs. Similarly, Black et al. (2015) document that public listed 
chaebols in Korea hardly disclose the pricing policies used in the complicated RPTs 
with privately held firms—a clear sign of minority shareholders’ expropriation or 
RPTs that are not based on arm’s length principles. Xiao and Zhao (2014) argue that 
even though Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission has required all listed 
companies to disclose all RPTs in their financial reports, in practice, most of these 
firms do not comply with those requirements. 
3.7.2.1.2 Propping 
The term propping was first used by Friedman et al. (2003) to describe the act of 
transferring personal wealth by entrepreneurs or controlling shareholders to the listed 
firm that have minority shareholders as well within their business group. Propping can 
be seen as a phenomenon by which controlling shareholder initiates advantageous 
 
 97 
RPTs to improve the firm performance, induce potential investors or meets certain 
target required by regulatory bodies. Controlling shareholders have involved into 
propping activities after Asian financial crises of 1997 and beyond to save their firms 
from liquidation and maintain their normal operations (see for example Friedman et 
al., 2003; Peng et al., 2011; Ying & Wang, 2013).  
Propping activities provide an avenue by which profitable firms transferred some 
funds to the financially distressed related firm (Gonenc & Hermes, 2008). Jian and 
Wong (2010) document that controlling shareholders use abnormal related sales to 
prop up the earnings of their Chinese listed firms. Controlling shareholders usually 
engage into propping to meet the capital market target for the right issue, initial public 
offer or to attain certain performance threshold to avoid been delisted. Ying and Wang 
(2013) document that propping by controlling shareholders improves operating 
performance of the firm only in the short period. This finding proved that the sole 
intention for propping the firms was maintenance of shell resources, not for value 
added reason. 
Bai et al. (2004) portend that small piece of bad news by a listed firm attract 
overwhelming market reactions and may even lead to undue regulatory surveillance. 
These kinds of reactions motivate some controlling shareholders to engage in propping 
in order to overcome the possible damages that may result from the release of bad 
news to the market. Cheung et al. (2009) find that RPTs related to propping activities 
are accompanied with significant information disclosure compared to that of tunneling 
activities. Accordingly, Peng et al. (2011) find that capital market reacts favorably to 
the announcement of propping transactions.  
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3.7.2.2 Firm Performance 
Several studies document that firm performance affects its level of information 
disclosure. Information on the firm business opportunities, competitive advantage, 
propriety information and dividend policy are some of the factors that shape the firms’ 
disclosure behavior (Samaha et al., 2012; Wan-Hussin, 2009). In this study, factors 
such as profitability, firm growth and dividend payments are believed to affect the 
firm disclosure pattern. 
3.7.2.2.1 Profitability 
The term profitability refers to the ability of a firm to generated revenue in excess of 
its overall total costs. Maintenance of sustainable profit has been the ultimate goal of 
any business establishment (Mosebach & Simko, 2010). Profitability has been 
commonly used to measure the economic performance of a firm (Maziotis, Saal, 
Thanassoulis, & Molinos-Senante, 2014). Firm’s profitability is widely used to assess 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the executive's decisions (Pugliese, Minichilli, & 
Zattoni, 2014). Profitability is multi-facet and multi-dimension in nature with 
numerous proxies depending on the researcher’s objective. Some studies measured 
profitability from the overall business performance (return on asset, return on equity) 
viewpoint (Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2014; Flamini, Schumacher, & McDonald, 2009; 
Pugliese et al., 2014). Other studies went further to analyze the profitability right from 
the initial stage in the production process (Diewert, 2014; O’Donnell, 2010). Recently, 
Maziotis et al. (2014) introduce the use of index number technique to measure the 
profitability of a firm.  
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Profitability measures such as Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) are 
commonly used to measure both financial and operating results of an entity (Brick & 
Chidambaran, 2010; Ganz, Gonce, & Nedell, 2014). Consolidating on these trends, 
Novy-Marx (2013) use gross profit scaled by total assets to measure firm’s 
profitability. He argues that the new method is cleaner and almost provide the same 
power as book-to-market method in determining the stock expected returns. Novy-
Marx documents that the new method is superior to the methods used by previous 
researchers such as net income, dividend, and cashflow.  
However, Ball, Gerakos, Linnainmaa and Nikolaev (2015) provide empirical 
justification for the perceived superiority of Novy-Marx (2013). They argued that the 
differences in explaining power were as a result of the different deflators used in his 
analyses. Ball et al. document that predictive power of both gross profit and net profit 
are highest, intermediate and lowest if deflated with book value of asset, book value 
of equity and market value of equity respectively. 
Profitability has been used and found to predict positively future stock performance 
and profitability premium (Lam, Wang, & Wei, 2014).  Hou and Van Dijk (2014) find 
that firms that are more profitable have a higher market-to-book ratio and pay more 
dividends than what counterpart firms pay. All things been equal, productivity has 
been identified to have a positive relationship with profitability, even though in most 
cases the relationship is not linear (Islam, Xayavong, & Kingwell, 2014). Similarly, 
Ganz et al. (2014) find that profitability differs across industries. However, it is 
possible for high-profit firms in lower-profit industries to outperform lower-profit 
firms in higher-profitable industries.  
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Profitability has been identified as one of the major determinants of corporate 
disclosure (Al-Akra et al., 2010; Bokpin, 2013; Hussainey, Elsayed, & Razik, 2011; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Profitable firms have many incentives to disclose their 
favorable performance to numerous stakeholders. This is consistent with the signaling 
theory, which suggests that information disclosure signals good business position to 
market participants.  
Nonetheless, studies on the association between firms’ profitability and corporate 
disclosure behavior produce inconsistent results. Samaha et al. (2012) and Sodikin 
(2013) arrive at the negative association between profitability and corporate disclosure 
practice. Another trend of studies finds no association between the profitability and 
firm disclosure behavior (Grigoris, 2014; Sharma, 2014).  
Alsaeed (2006) examines three proxies of profitability (return on equity, profit margin, 
and liquidity) and finds that none of them explain the variability of firms disclosure 
behavior. This is consistent with the insignificant association arrived at by (Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006). Tsalavoutas (2011) is of the opinion that the increase in the reported 
profit as a result of migration to IFRS is among the major incentives that motivate 
firms to adopt and disclose much information in their annual report. 
3.7.2.2.2 Firm Growth 
Growth has been defined as percentage changes in sales, total assets or operating profit 
(Belkaoui, 2004). Some studies defined firm growth in terms of increases in a number 
of employees in the firm (Nichter & Goldmark, 2009; Rahaman, 2011). Although, 
some researchers argued that employees growth cannot serve as an effective proxy for 
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firm growth because it may fail to capture the growth of capital extensive firms 
(Huynh & Petrunia, 2010). Huynh and Petrunia argue that the negative relationship 
between size, age and firm growth continue to hold.  
Bei and Wijewardana (2012) argue that availability of internal fund should better serve 
as a proxy for growth. They assert that if a firm operates well and generates profit, 
there should be enough internal funds to finance their expansion, which will later 
translate to increase in sales, total assets and operating profit.  Delmar and Wiklund 
(2008) state that there are multiple numbers of decisions and activities that affect 
firm’s growth process. Firms with experienced, educated founders and access to 
finance are found to grow more quickly than their counterpart (Nichter & Goldmark, 
2009).  
Firms differ across countries in financing their growth. In some countries, firms 
consider the effect of the short-term or long-term source in financing their growth 
while, in other countries, the source of finance has no impact in financing business 
expansion (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). Small firms are found to grow 
faster than average industry rate (Aghion, Akcigit, & Howitt, 2015; Park & Jang, 
2010). Similarly, high growth firms are associated with high profitability and better 
cashflow (Anderson & Eshima, 2013). 
Firms with growth potential have many incentives to disclose detail information to 
inform and justify some of their corporate decisions and minimize information 
asymmetric between managers and owners (Chau & Gray, 2010). Gul and Leung 
(2004) argue that firms with high potential growth signs have to disclose more 
information to justified that their stocks are not overvalued. Similarly, Hassan, 
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Romilly, Giorgioni and Power (2009), and Hussainey and Mouselli (2010) portend 
that firms with high sales and asset growth disclosed information to signal future 
increase in production capacity and dividend respectively.  
In the same vein, Soon Yau, Sin Chun and Balaraman (2009) provide empirical 
support for the above assertions. The authors find that among the sample of small 
firms, high growing firms make more disclosure on the information regarding their 
intellectual capital. Also, Iatridis (2012) documents that high growth firms provide 
detail disclosure in accordance with the provisions of IFRS. 
In contrast to the above, Liu and Sun (2010) and Lo and Wong (2011) document a 
negative association between growth and corporate disclosure practice. This is in line 
with the finding of Bamber and Cheon (1998) that the higher the growth potential, the 
low the managers intend to release information to public because of proprietary 
information cost. Similarly, Gisbert and Navallas (2013) find that high potential 
growth firms shelve away from unnecessary disclosure to deny competitors access to 
their strategic information. 
3.7.2.2.3 Dividend 
Dividend policies have been studies under both signaling and agency theories’ 
perspectives. Each of these perspectives has its proponents with multiple empirical 
studies that support or against their view. Signaling theory perceived that dividend 
payment is used to convey private information to stakeholders on the firm operations 
and its future prospects (Manos, Murinde, & Green, 2012; Nissim & Ziv, 2001). On 
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the other hand, Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2003), and Sharma and 
Pandey (2014) arrive at a contrary view.  
Agency theory perceived that investors request for dividend payment to wipe out 
excess cash from the firm to minimize managers opportunistic behavior (Brockman & 
Unlu, 2011; La Porta et al., 2000). Conversly, Lin, Kuo and Wang (2014) use the same 
theory and prove the otherwise. Recent studies prove the emergence of new dividend 
ideology (catering theory). This theory state that capital market reaction to dividend 
payment depend on the investors demand and the decision of managers to meet the 
needs of the investors (Baker & Wurgler, 2004; Li & Lie, 2006) 
La Porta et al. (2000) argue that managers tend to engage in high earning retention and 
pay fewer dividends until minority shareholders force them to pay. Therefore, 
dividend payment signals the presence of good corporate governance. On similar note, 
Ramalingegowda, Wang and Yu (2013) document that high quality financial reporting 
system reduces the negative effect of a dividend payment on investment. That is to 
say, shareholders press for the payment of a dividend in a firm with weak corporate 
governance or in countries with weak investor protection.  
Consistently, Setiawan and Phua (2013) empirically reaffirm this position that weak 
corporate governance is compensated with higher dividend payment. Furthermore, 
foreign investors are found to be more interested in firms with higher dividend payout 
policy to minimize the agency conflict (Jeon et al., 2011). Aggarwal and Dow (2012) 
discover that strong affiliation with the business group has a negative effect on 
dividend payout.  
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Building on this, Wang (2014) reports that firms with large wedge pay large 
employees bonus than shareholder dividend. These findings support the prior studies 
that large dividend payment portrays that controlling shareholder is not willing to 
expropriate corporate resources (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003; Su et al., 2014). Similarly, 
Williams (2014) reports that low dividend payout encourage controlling shareholders 
to involve into tunneling behavior in RPTs. Van Overfelt, Deloof and Vanstraelen 
(2010) document that dividends were used as a substitute for financial reporting 
transparency during unregulated disclosure period. In contrast, Lin et al. (2014) 
validate the complimentary view that better disclosure leads to high payout ratio.  
3.8 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter reviews the relevant studies on the concept and various definitions of 
RPTs. The types of RPTs which include the tunneling, propping and strategic rationale 
RPTs are discussed in this chapter. Similarly, the perspectives of RPTs ranging from 
conflict of interest, efficient transaction and contingency perspectives are highlighted. 
The chapter dwells also on RPTs disclosure studies globally. The issues of RPTs 
regulations across the world is highlighted in the chapter. Both developed and 
emerging economies have formulated a number of regulations to protect the investors 
from the prejudicial use of RPTs to siphon resources from the firms. Also, issues 
related to disclosure quality were highlighted in the chapter. 
The determinants of compliance with the RPTs disclosure requirements are divided 
into corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial characteristics in the 
chapter. Under corporate governance characteristics, relevant conceptual and 
empirical studies on the board independence, board size, audit committee 
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independence, audit committee financial expertise, CEO expertise, CEO family 
lineage, CEO ownership, family ownership, managerial ownership and foreign 
ownership are reviewed and appropriate positions are synthesized. Similarly, studies 
related to tunneling, propping, profitability, growth and dividend policies are reviewed 




VALUE-RELEVANCE AND REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the concept of value-relevance in general and value-relevance 
of financial information disclosure. It reviews relevant literature on the value-
relevance of disclosed RPTs.  The chapter also presents the concept of earnings 
management, taking into consideration both accrual and real activity earnings 
management. The impact of accounting standard on earnings management and 
earnings management in RPTs are also highlighted. The chapter discusses the 
relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value and proceeds with the mitigating 
role of the compliance with MFRS 124 on the relationship between REM in RPTs and 
firm value. The chapter then concludes with the underpinning theories of the study. 
4.1 The Concept of Value-Relevance 
Value-relevance is defined as the ability of annual reports to contain information 
capable of influencing stock price (Al-Akra & Ali, 2012). Studies that examine the 
association between accounting numbers and capital market activities are termed as 
value-relevance studies. This is based on the notion that financial statements should 
disclose information that reflects the actual economic position of the reporting entity, 
manifested in the stock price. Therefore, value-relevance can be viewed as a way in 
which line items in the financial statements affect the process of stock valuation or 
return in the capital market, tested through statistical process.  
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Value-relevance has been taken as a surrogate of decision usefulness, which is the 
fundamental objective of standard setters (Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 2001; Veith 
& Werner, 2014). This view conforms to the definition of relevant information given 
by Framework IASC (1989). It states that information is relevant only if it is capable 
of influencing the economic decisions of users while evaluating the past, present or 
future events, confirming or correcting their previous evaluations.  
Over decades, the issue of whether value-relevance of accounting numbers has 
declined remains unresolved. Francis and Schipper (1999) report a decline in the 
value-relevance of earning information over time. Hellström (2006) contends this 
position; he finds an improvement in the value-relevance of accounting information in 
transitional economies, using the Czech Republic as a testing ground. Sami and Zhou 
(2004) document a cyclical fluctuation of value-relevance of accounting information 
in the A-share market of Shanghai stock exchange. A recent study by Lam, Sami and 
Zhou (2013)  using Chinese capital market as a laboratory, reveals that accounting 
information plays a significant role in explaining the stock pricing process in emerging 
market. However, the increase in the value-relevance is more pronounced in firms with 
some specific characteristics such as ownership structure, size over others.  
Previous studies identified two major sources of the changes in value-relevance of 
accounting numbers in any given country (Dimitropoulos et al., 2013; Gjerde et al., 
2008; Samarasekera, Chang, & Tarca, 2012). The first source of the change in value-
relevance emanates from the change in accounting standard. Barth et al. (2008), Gjerde 
et al. (2008), and Dimitropoulos et al. (2013) document inconclusive results on the 
change in value-relevance of accounting numbers after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS. The mixed result as explained in other studies was because of the uneven quality 
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of previous national GAAPs. Value-relevance of accounting information increases 
when IFRS is of higher quality than former national GAAP and decreases if otherwise 
(Clarkson et al., 2011; Devalle et al., 2010; Van der Meulen et al., 2007). 
The second source of the change in value-relevance of accounting numbers originates 
from the change in enforcement regime. Samarasekera et al. (2012) argue that the 
increase in the value-relevance of financial statement after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS was because of the increased oversight of external auditors. Similarly, 
Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013) find that the capital market effect after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in European nations was because of the change in 
reporting enforcement. The effects are witnessed in the countries that made a 
substantive change in their reporting enforcement concurrently with the adoption of 
new set of reporting standard. Similar changes have been observed by the countries 
that made significant changes in their reporting enforcement without switching to new 
reporting standard (Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013; Garcia Osma & Pope, 2011).  
4.1.1 Value-relevance of Financial Information Disclosure 
Several studies have established the usefulness and value-relevance for individual 
accounting statements in particular and the whole set in general. Some of these studies 
cover the whole financial statements (Anderson, 1981; Maigoshi, 2014), individual 
statements such as balance sheet (Chen et al., 2002), cash flow statement (Hung, Chan, 
& Yhi, 1995; Jones & Ratnatunga, 1997), statement of profit and loss and other 
comprehensive income (Huang, Ye, & Du, 2014). Studies on individual component of 
some statement include operating cash flow (Ahmed, Nainar, & Zhang, 2006), other 
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accounting information (Hassan & Power, 2009), summarized financial information 
of listed associates (Badenhorst et al., 2015) among others.  
On the value-relevance of individual line items, Alali and Foote (2012) find a positive 
and significant association between earning per share and book value per share with 
the stock price. They also document similar result between reported earnings per share 
and cumulative stock return. Darrough and Ye (2007) designed a special model to 
examine the value relevance of loss-making firms. The authors provide empirical 
evidence on the value-relevance of disclosure of information in the financial statement 
other than the book value of equity and earnings. They proved that research and 
development expenditure, sales growth ratio, nonrecurring charges or write-ups and 
business sustainability strategies disclosure are equally value-relevant, most especially 
for loss-making firms.  
Similarly, Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009) find that disclosure of research and 
development expenditure is useful and value-relevance not only for loss-making firms 
but also profitable firms. Jiang and Stark (2013) used the methodology of Darrough 
and Ye, and find that book values are less value-relevance for high research and 
development-intensive and zero-dividend firms.  
The above studies demonstrate the importance of financial statement information by 
users in making their economic decisions. Shah, Stark and Akbar (2009) find a positive 
association between media advertising expenses and firm market value of non-
manufacturing firms. This is consistent with the finding of Oliveira, Rodrigues and 
Craig (2010) that intangible assets are strongly and positively associated with the 
market value of the firm. Wang and Hussainey (2013) find that disclosure of forward-
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looking statements improves the stock market’s ability in anticipating future returns. 
Recently, Moumen, Ben Othman and Hussainey (2015) reveal that market participants 
use risk information disclosure to forecast subsequent years earnings change.  
Ball (2006) and Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) find an increase in the value-
relevance of accounting numbers after the mandatory adoption of IFRS as a reporting 
standard. The increased value-relevance results from useful information disclosed to 
investors during the post-adoption period compared to national GAAP period. 
Elshandidy (2014) find an increase in the value-relevance of accounting information 
of B-share market after the adoption of the converged IFRS, which requires more 
information disclosure to the users of the financial statements.  
4.1.2 Value Relevance of Disclosed RPT 
The famous case of Enron and many other North American corporate scandals in RPTs 
have made the market participants be skeptical about the quality of the reported 
earnings (Gordon et al. 2004). Cheung et al. (2006) find that firm that announces RPT 
earns significant negative and lower abnormal returns compared to the firm that 
announces similar transaction on arm’s length basis. Similarly, Lin et al. (2010) used 
Tobin’s Q and EPS as measures of firm value to examine the effect of RPTs on firm 
valuation. They provide empirical evidence that presence of RPTs has a significant 
negative relationship with the firm value.  
Ge et al. (2010) find that investors value firms differently based on their engagement 
in RPTs. They document that earnings by the firms that engage in RPTs are less value-
relevant compared to those reported by firms without RPTs. Kohlbeck and Mayhew 
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(2010) find that firms with RPTs have a significantly lower valuation and subsequent 
returns than their non-RPTs counterpart. They provide additional evidence that market 
participant partitioned firms based on the RPT type and the category of the parties 
involved. Moreover, Xiao and Zhao (2014) find a significant reduction in the stock 
value because of the announcement of the related party loan guarantee. This finding 
is consistent with Nekhili and Cherif (2011) that only transactions engage directly with 
shareholders, directors or managers are having an adverse effect on the firm value. 
Buysschaert, Deloof and Jegers (2004) document that intergroup equity sales create 
value and are beneficial to minority shareholders. Confirming this finding, Wong and 
Kim (2015) find that related party sales within the business group increase the firm 
value. However, they further find that those values disappear for the firms with high 
parent directors, large government ownership or many incentives for tax avoidance. 
4.2 The Concept of Earnings Management 
Several studies have viewed earnings management from many perspectives. Earnings 
management can be seen as deliberate actions within the edges of GAAPs to meet the 
targeted reported earnings. Johari et al. (2008) describe earnings management as an 
unethical practice even if accounting principles are not violated. Earnings 
management erodes the quality of earnings reported in financial statements (Dechow, 
Ge, & Schrand, 2010) and hinder financial statements from meeting the qualitative 




Chen, Chen, Loboand Wang (2011) identify several incentives that motivate managers 
to engage in earnings management such as seasoned equity offerings and initial public 
offerings. Shu and Chiang (2014) find that large firms manage earnings (proxy by 
discretionary accruals) during equity offering to portray a good performance, thereby 
increase their proceeds from the equity. Other incentives include a tax-minimizing 
incentive, expropriation, performance, debt covenants, bonuses capital market 
expectation and valuation, contracts ties with the accounting numbers, regulations 
among others (Beuselinck & Deloof, 2014; Dechow et al., 2010; Johari et al., 2008). 
Miko and Kamardin (2015) potent that managers still manage reported earnings to 
achieve their target despite the number of checks amid the reporting process. 
Corporate governance has been identified as one of the mechanisms that mitigate 
management opportunistic behavior and increase earnings quality. Faleye, Hoitash 
and Hoitash (2011) and Jaggi et al. (2009) emphasize the importance of board 
independence in effective monitoring of earnings management and ensuring high 
quality financial reporting. Ye (2014) documents that compensating independent 
directors with cash impairs their independence and decreases their monitoring activity.   
The role of accounting standard in curbing earnings management has been a point of 
discussion for decades (Demerjian, 2011; Goncharov & Zimmermann, 2006; Hope, 
2003). Recently, the gale of mandatory adoption of IFRS has attracted the attention of 
professionals and academics. Several studies are conducted on the effect of mandatory 
accounting standard in limiting earnings management practice. The results of these 
studies revealed an inconclusive result (Ahmed et al., 2013; Dimitropoulos et al., 
2013; Ismail, Kamarudin, Zijl, & Dunstan, 2013). 
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Researchers such as Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) and Daske et al. (2008) 
associate earnings management with the level of investors protection in the country. 
They document high earnings management in countries with low level of investor 
protection. In contrast, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) document that there are so many 
discrepancies in earnings management practice between common law countries 
(presumed to have high investors protection) and code law countries. They attributed 
the differences in earnings management to preparers’ incentives and other institutional 
factors. Zéghal, Chtourou and Sellami (2011) find that existence of block shareholders 
in a firm reduces the magnitude of earnings management. Chen et al. (2011) find that 
non-state-owned firms have less incentive to manage earnings over the state-owned 
firms.  
4.2.1 Accrual versus Real Activities Earnings Management 
There are two broad categories of earnings management mechanisms namely; accrual 
earnings management and REM. Accrual earnings management occurs when 
managers use accounting methods and estimates to manipulate the reported earnings 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Real earnings management is defined as an intentional 
deviation from the normal operational process with a view to mislead stakeholders to 
believe that key performance goals have been achieved through normal operations. 
Real earnings management affect both reported earnings and cash flow (Burnett, 
Cripe, Martin, & McAllister, 2012). It focuses on the short-term profitability of the 
firm rather than the long-term value of the firm (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Accrual earnings management cannot be done through the operating activities with a 
direct effect on cash flow, but rather through the managers’ discretion with regards to 
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judgment in estimations and accounting choice (Gunny, 2010). Prior studies have 
identified numerous incentives that motivate firms to engage in accrual earnings 
management. These incentives include meeting regulatory thresholds and or analysts’ 
forecast, managerial compensation, meeting contractual agreement (Burgstahler, Hail, 
& Leuz, 2006; Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Kuo et al., 2014; Lo, 2008). However, Chang 
and Sun (2009) and Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata, (2012) find that board 
independence and strong audit committee constrain the accrual-based earnings 
management practice.  
Looking at the REM, some studies document that managers cut down research and 
development expenditure in their last year in office or when it threatens the ability to 
report the targeted earnings (Baber, Fairfield, & Haggard, 1991; Cheng, 2004). Cohen 
et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) provide empirical evidence that managers 
manipulate the timing and extent of research and development expenditure to inflate 
the reported earnings. These practices affect the firms’ competitive advantage 
(innovation, customer loyalty and alike) and are detrimental to the future value of the 
firm. The practice validates the findings of Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) that 
managers indicated their willingness to partake in REM even if it will affect the long-
term value of the firm.  It is generally believed in financial reporting that profits from 
the disposal of profitable assets form part of the current earnings. Bartov (1993) and 
Herrmann et al. (2003) document that managers dispose of some fixed assets and 
marketable securities to inflate the reported earnings for the purpose of meeting the 
pre-set benchmark. Similarly, Cheng (2012) document that managers complement the 
manipulation of loan loss provisions with the structured loan sales and securitizations 
to meet the earnings target. 
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Recent studies highlight the increased need for the understanding how firms use real 
activities manipulations to manage reported earnings (Burnett et al., 2012; Chi, Lisic, 
& Pevzner, 2011; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). According to Gunny (2010), REM is 
conducted through the timing of financing or investment decisions and changing the 
magnitude or frequency of operating activities to manipulate the reported earnings or 
some part of it. Graham et al. (2005) find that financial executives prefer the use of 
REM than accrual earnings management method. This can be connected to the fact 
that regulators and knowledgeable investors can easily expose accrual management 
and accrual management takes place at the year-end or quarter, so the manager is not 
certain on the accounting treatment that can be allowed by auditors at that time 
(Gunny, 2010). 
Additionally, accrual manipulations are more likely to draw the attention of auditors 
and regulators than production or price manipulations. This position has been 
empirically proved by Chi et al. (2011) that REM have not been detected by Big audit 
firms. Similarly, Cupertino et al. (2015) document that capital market has failed to 
detect the effect of earnings management accomplished through manipulation of 
certain types of real activities. Second, the risk associated with accrual manipulation. 
In the event of the shortfall between the desired thresholds and manipulated earnings, 
activity-based manipulation cannot be done at the year-end, while the reverse is 
possible (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Firms can manipulate reported earnings via decrease in discretionary expenses 
(Research and Development, Selling and Administrative Expenses) to decrease 
operating costs, timing fixed asset disposal to report high gain, increase production to 
lower unit cost, reduce price (including exceptional discount) to boost sales, stock 
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repurchase to alter earnings per share and a lot. Real earnings management can also 
be used for tunneling or propping purposes (Xiao Chen, Lee, & Li, 2008; Hribar, 
Jenkins, & Johnson, 2006; Jian & Wong, 2010). However, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
find that the negative consequences of REM on the firm performance are more severe 
than that of accrual earnings management.  
Contrary to the finding of Chi et al. (2011), Zhu, Lu, Shan, & Zhang (2015) find that 
Big 4 audit firms constrained the attempted moves by firms to use REM during the 
conduct of reverse mergers within the Chinese firms. Moreover, Kuo et al., (2014) 
provide empirical evidence that firms can engage in both accrual earnings 
management and REM concurrently as against the findings of Zang (2012) that 
managers use accrual earnings management and REM as a substitute. 
4.2.2 Impact of Accounting Standard on Earnings Management  
Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that managers use personal judgment in financial 
reporting to choose accounting methods and estimate that may not portray the actual 
economic reality of the firm to mislead stakeholders or influence the outcome of some 
contractual agreements. Accounting standards with limited alternative accounting 
methods produce high quality earnings because it minimizes manager’s opportunistic 
behavior. Similarly, accounting standards that require more information disclosure are 
seen as high quality standard (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) demonstrate that IFRS has ruled out the possibility 
of creating hidden reserves, the action that makes earnings management more difficult. 
Similarly, Griffin, Hirschey and Kelly (2011) find that earnings announcements are 
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more informative in countries with stronger accounting standards (IFRS or US 
GAAP). Consistent with this, Landsman, Maydew and Thornock (2012) document an 
increase in abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume in sixteen 
countries that adopted IFRS compared to eleven countries that maintain their domestic 
standards. Houqe et al. (2012), Ismail et al. (2013) and Guindy (2014) report an 
improvement in reported earnings quality across the globe after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS as reporting standard. 
Ball et al. (2003) state that high quality accounting standards are necessary for 
curtailing earnings management, even though it may not necessarily be sufficient one. 
In contrast, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) examine the level of earnings 
management practice by German firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS, which assume to 
be of high quality against the firms that use German GAAP. They find that IFRS firms 
do not present different earnings management practice compared to German GAAP 
firms. This finding stresses the fact that earnings management cannot be constrained 
by mere adoption of a high quality accounting standard. Furthermore, Burgstahler, 
Hail and Leuz (2006) discover that within the EU nation, private firms exhibit high 
earnings management behavior than public firms, even though they use the same 
accounting standard. This highlight the existence of other incentives that motivate 
firms to exhibit a high or low level of earnings management. 
4.2.3 Earning Management and RPTs 
Cheung et al. (2009) identify three motivations behind RPTs, which are tunneling, 
propping and earnings management. However, the incentives that make firms 
perpetrate earnings management in RPTs remains unexhausted. Johnson et al. (2000) 
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show that even in developed capital market insiders have been using RPTs to transfer 
profits and assets to other firms for the benefit of those own them. Similarly, Jian and 
Wong (2004) state that business groups report abnormal RP sales when they have 
incentives to meet some regulatory requirement. Liu and Lu (2007) are of the opinion 
that agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders is a dominant 
factor that leads to earnings management in emerging markets.  
Munir et al., (2013) posit that the effects of related-party transactions on earnings 
quality are determined by the level of family ownership. Johari et al. (2008) find that 
high management ownership induces managers into earnings management. That is to 
say, managers used their inside information and influence on the business operations 
to manipulate reported earnings and meet their desired objectives. Consistent with this, 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) state that management opportunistic behavior was the 
main factor that drives management to frauds, misappropriation of firm’s assets and 
misleading financial statements in recent governance cases (Enron, Healthsouth, and 
others). The authors state that most of the frauds were perpetrated in RPTs. Fisman 
and Wang (2010) document a negative relationship between abusive RPTs and firm 
value. Similarly, Xiao and Zhao (2014) find that excess controls rights are associated 
with value-destroying related-party loan guarantees and the stock market react 
negatively to the release of such transactions. 
Aharony et al. (2000) state that management of the state-owned enterprises that need 
capital market listing have incentives to engage into RPTs that will boost their earnings 
with their controlling shareholder since financial performance is one of the criteria for 
listing. Consistently, Chen and Yuan (2004) show that firms engage in earnings 
management to meet the capital market requirement on ROE for offering right issues. 
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Similarly, Aharony et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that firms manipulate 
earnings in the pre-initial public offering period through RP sales of goods or services. 
Firms that perpetrate earnings management practice through related party sales 
employ both accrual and REM methods (Jian & Wong, 2010). 
In contrast, Kuan, Tower, Rusmin and Van der Zahn (2010) examine the relationship 
between RPTs and earnings management practice and find that there is no association 
between the two variables. The authors state that mere existence of RPTs may not 
necessarily signal earnings management. This is consistent with the view held by 
Wong and Kim (2015) that RPTs can be arranged for tax minimization not necessarily 
for earnings management purpose. In whatever position, Hwang et al. (2013) find that 
earnings management within the business group can be mitigated through increased 
disclosure regulations.  
4.2.4 Earning Management and Firm Value 
Most of the studies in accounting literature believe that both accruals earnings 
management and REM approaches are detrimental to the firm value. However, the 
approaches differ in term of the time taken before the consequences manifest on the 
value of a firm (Graham et al., 2005). Although, a survey conducted by de Jong, 
Mertens, van der Poel and van Dijk (2014) reveals that all forms of earnings 
management (excluding share repurchases) to influence investor’s perceptions of firm 
value are value-destroying. Family firms involve less in both accruals earnings 
management and REM to preserve the transgenerational sustainability of the firm 
(Achleitner, Günther, Kaserer, & Siciliano, 2014). However, Gunny (2010) provides 
that REM to meet earnings benchmarks are not detrimental to the future performance 
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of a firm. Similarly, Taylor and Xu (2010) reveal that firms that engage in REM are 
not associated with a decrease in subsequent operating performance. 
Several studies assess the effect of accrual earnings management on firm value. 
Rangan (1998) documents that the market value of firms that engage in earnings 
management during the seasoned equity offerings declines in subsequent years after 
the offerings. He attributes the decline to earnings management at the period of the 
seasoned equity offerings. Consistently, Teoh, Welch, & Wong (1998) and Louis 
(2004) find that the market value of firms that engage in earnings management during 
the initial public offerings/firm acquisition declines in subsequent years after the 
offerings/acquisition. The authors provide evidence that initial public offerings issuers 
with higher earnings management indices have a three-year post-offering stock return 
of almost twenty percent less than initial public offerings issuers with lower earnings 
management indices. However, the negative relationship between earnings 
management and firm value is more pronounced in firms with weak corporate 
governance (Tang & Chang, 2015). 
Like accrual earnings management, REM also has a negative effect on the firm value. 
(Farooqi, Harris, & Ngo, 2014; Graham et al., 2005). Recent studies on REM have 
shown that firms manipulate real activities to influence reported earnings as a 
substitute to accruals earnings management (Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012), or as its 
complement (Chi et al., 2011; Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). 
Moreover, Cohen et al. (2008) and Kuo et al. (2014) indicate that changes in 
mandatory and incentive-based regulations are associated with a decline in accruals 




Cohen and Zarowin (2010) reveal that the performance of firms that engage in 
earnings management during the seasoned equity offerings declines in subsequent 
years after the offerings. The decline as a result of REM is severe compared to that of 
accrual earnings management. Consistently, Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury 
(2015) document that both earnings management strategies induce overvaluation at 
the period of seasoned equity offerings. These earnings management strategies are 
linked with the decline in the stock market performance in the post seasoned equity 
offerings period.  
Zhu et al. (2015) provide evidence that accrual earnings management is more costly 
to a firm than REM in the short-term. This is because accrual earnings management 
predicts changes in post-acquisition operating performance in Chinese reverse merger 
firms. however, REM is more detrimental to the firm as it affects the actual cash flow 
of the firm (Roychowdhury, 2006), increase the volatility of the future cash flow (Ge, 
2009) and its long-term value (Chi et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2005). 
4.3 Underpinning Theories 
4.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been a dominance theory in organizational control and governance 
studies for decades (see Fernando, Schneible, & Suh, 2013; Hossain, Perera, & 
Rahman, 1995; Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981; Watts, 1977). In most of the 
corporate setting, the capital providers who are the owner of the firms (principal) 
employ the service of the agent (managers) to run the affairs of the firm on their behalf. 
Under the rationality assumption Fernando et al. (2013) state that both parties act in 
the way that will maximize their interest. Watts (1977) states that vast of literature 
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believe that an agent can only maximize his satisfaction (compensation) through 
acting in the best interest of his principal. Based on this premise, the theory assumes 
a direct and positive relationship between agent’s compensation and their 
performance. This situation is termed as a reconciliation of conflict (Watts, 1977).  
However, in most cases, the principal has neither possesses the basic knowledge and 
experience to run the firm nor does he has information on the day-to-day operational 
information of the firm (Fernando et al., 2013). Hence poses the threat of having an 
agency cost—a situation where the agent derives financial benefits from the firm at 
the detriment of the principal as propounded by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This 
type of agency problem (principal-agent) is referred to as type I agency cost (Cai et 
al., 2015; Cheng, 2014; Lei, Lin, & Wei, 2013).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) recommend that this type of agency problem can be 
mitigated through a high portion of managerial ownership. This is because, the higher 
the managerial ownership, the more their personal interest is aligned with that of the 
shareholders. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) demonstrate the importance of 
having large shareholders in public corporations to perform monitoring function and 
reduce the managerial opportunistic behavior. 
Although insider ownership is widely proposed as the mechanism of dealing with 
principal-agent agency problem, this kind of ownership structure comes with its 
peculiar agency problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). It presents an opportunity for 
insiders (large shareholders and management) to expropriate the wealth of the firm at 
the expense of outsiders (minority shareholders and creditors). This type of agency 
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(principal-principal) problem is widely known as type II agency problem (Bruslerie & 
Latrous, 2012; Fernando et al., 2013).   
RPTs are generally believed to be the common tool used by controlling shareholders 
to expropriate the minority shareholders. Lin et al. (2012) state that controlling 
shareholders are linked with some value-destroying activities in both developed and 
developing nations. These activities include self-serving financial transactions, 
outright theft, and expropriation of corporate opportunities such the use of corporate 
information to secure a contract for another company (Johnson, La Porta, et al., 2000; 
Su et al., 2014).  
Corporate transparency and information disclosure have been identified as the means 
of preserving the sanctity of financial reporting system as well as dealing with type II 
agency problem. Cottingham and Hussey (1995) emphasize the importance of the 
disclosure of RPTs in financial statements for the prevention of misleading financial 
information. Similarly, La Porta et al. (2006) find strong evidence that mandatory 
information disclosure benefits stock market operators in regulating the conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders. Stressing on the importance of 
disclosure in curbing the negative effect of RPTs on minority shareholders, Djankov 
et al. (2008) designed a unique and comprehensive disclosure index to be used for 




4.3.2 Institutional Theory 
Managers should not only focus on improving internal efficiencies but should also 
scan and adopt external environmental factors so as to build and sustain institutional 
legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1997). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
suggest that organizations can compete favorably in the modern environment only if 
they adopt institutional isomorphism. Institutional isomorphisms are the forces that 
make organizations embrace similar environmental conditions (such as accounting 
standard). They argue that the process takes place through one or a combination of 
coercive, mimetic or normative pressures.  
Coercive pressures arise from the formal and informal interactions with the external 
environment. This form of isomorphism arises due to pressures from the organizations 
in particular and general society in general that focal organization depends on. This 
pressure may take a form of force, persuasion and or invitation to join the club. A 
typical example of this type of pressure is the disclosure regulation by the relevant 
authorities on the minimum amount of information (such as RPTs) that must be 
disclosed in the annual report. This form of pressure is beyond the control of managers 
who may be seeking for the strategies that will help them to secure legitimacy (Scott, 
1987).  
It must be noted that not all the institutional isomorphism derive their pressure from 
coercive forces. Some forms of isomorphism arise because of powerful forces that 
motivate organizations to imitate from their peer organizations due to fear of 
uncertainty. Pressures of this kind are termed as mimetic pressures. A typical example 
of this kind of pressure is a situation where multinational and other large corporations 
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disclose information on corporate social responsibility to suit their class and protect 
their corporate image.   
The last form of institutional isomorphism derives its force from normative pressure 
and professionalization. In most of the organizational settings, employees acquire 
similar training and job experience through direct engagement with their routine 
duties. Members of professional bodies interact with one another through the platform 
of their professional bodies. These interactions and other professional codes make 
professionals act uniformly in their respective organization, which in turn will make 
their organization to look similar with respect to activities of professionals. A common 
example of this form of pressure is the period where professional bodies regulate 
accounting practices and disclosures through the activities of their members. Oliver 
(1997) articulates that harnessing institutional forces with internal resources is 
indispensable in achieving sustainable competitive advantage. 
In emerging economies, the nature of institutional setting has a great impact on the 
agency contract, which makes its enforcement problematic and costly (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000; Peng & Delios, 2006). Institutional isomorphism (more especially 
coercive pressure) can serve as a better alternative in dealing with agency problem 
(Chizema & Kim, 2010). Organizations can imitate from their peer group or be 
compelled to release the information considered necessary for minority shareholders 
protection in particular, and legal enforcement and investor protection in general.  
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4.3.3 Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory assumes that the firm is embedded in its environment 
and depends on the resources from that environment to survive. The theory provides 
a theoretical basis for the role of corporate directors in the provision of resource and 
advice. Unlike the agency theory which assumes the main role of directors is 
monitoring, resource dependency theory provides that the main role of corporate 
directors is the provision of resource function (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theory 
provides that effectiveness of the board depends on the external resources that external 
directors are able to bring to the board for the benefit of the firm.  
Under the resource dependency theory, the board of directors is useful as they provide 
the firm with important resources at lower costs and mediate the firm with the external 
environment (Chen, 2014; Davis & Adam Cobb, 2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that directors 
provide four benefits to the firms: i) provision of advice and counsel, ii) channeling of 
information between firm and external environment, iii) preferential access to 
resources, and iv) legitimacy. However, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) states that firms 
benefit most from directors when director provide both monitoring and resource 
functions. 
This study uses the resource dependency as underpinning theory for the relationship 
between board characteristics, audit committee characteristics and firm disclosure 
behavior (Biermann & Harsch, 2017; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The theory assumes 
that directors with vast industry and business knowledge and multiple directorships 
are saddled with the responsibility of counsel and advice as they possess the requisite 
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knowledge, expertise and experience to handle the duties. Therefore a well-diversified 
large boards handle the duties effectively (Castro, De La Concha, Gravel, & Periñan, 
2009; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   
4.3.4 Capital market theory 
Capital market researches mostly constitute studies that tested the market reactions 
with the release of the choice of accounting methods, value-relevance of financial 
reporting and fundamental analyses (Kothari, 2001). Market-related studies are mostly 
based on the assumption of capital market efficiency. Hence, most of the regulations 
in the field of financial reporting are formulated on the premise that once a financial 
information is disclosed, the stock price will be adjusted to reflect that particular 
information (Beaver, 2002). The accuracy of the outcome of the value-relevance 
studies depends heavily on the relevance and reliability of accounting information 
disclosed to the market. These disclosures are critical to the effectiveness of the 
efficient capital market (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
Based on capital market transaction theory, firm has to release more information to 
the market to reduce the information asymmetry with the investors which in turn 
lowered the firm cost of capital (Barry & Brown, 1984, 1985; Merton, 1987). 
Similarly, managers with the potential capital market transaction have to provide 
market participants with more information to enable them to evaluate the strength and 




The theoretical foundation of value-relevance studies is made up by the combination 
of contextual accounting arguments and valuation theory that permit the researchers 
to envisage how accounting figures associate with the stock price (Beaver, 2002). 
Value-relevance is one of the major dimension of capital market researches (Beaver, 
2002; Healy & Palepu, 1995; Kothari, 2001). Value-relevance studies are categorized 
into the relative association, incremental association and marginal information content 
studies (Holthausen & Watts, 2001). This study used the incremental approach to test 
value-relevance of RPT disclosure. Under this approach accounting information is 
said to be value-relevant if its coefficient differs significantly from zero. The same 
approach is used to investigate the incremental value-relevance of RPTs disclosure as 
a result of a switch in accounting standard from FRS to MFRS. 
4.4 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter discusses the concept of value-relevance of the disclosed accounting 
information in general and that of the disclosed RPTs in particular. Value-relevance is 
defined as the ability of the accounting information to influence the stock valuation. 
The major factors that lead to the change in the value-relevance of accounting 
information are the changes in the accounting standard and change in the enforcement 
regime. The chapter also reviews the definition and classification of earnings 
management. Although most of the previous studies focused on the accrual earnings 
management, REM is getting monumental attention nowadays. There exist strong 







This chapter contains the methodological approaches adopted to achieve the objectives 
of the study. The chapter discusses the conceptual frameworks for the factors that 
determine the level of compliance with the accounting standard on RPTs. Also, it 
contains the frameworks effect of MFRS 124 adoption on value-relevance of 
accounting numbers and that of the mitigating effect of compliance with accounting 
standard on RPTs on the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value, and 
research hypotheses are generated therefrom. The chapter covers the philosophy 
adopted in the study which consists of research paradigm and research design. It also 
presents the process adopted in the operationalization of the study. The chapter 
concludes with the sample selection procedure adopted in the study. 
5.1 Research Philosophy  
This section discusses the research paradigm and research design adopted during the 
conduct of the study. 
5.1.1 Research Paradigm 
Research paradigm can be seen as the researcher’s fundamental philosophical and 
theoretical assumptions about the nature of society and the social world, together with 
his personal beliefs, values, and knowledge that influence the selection of a 
methodological approach to a particular study (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Hopper & 
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Powell, 1985). Early researchers have established the use of two extreme research 
paradigms (positivism and interpretivism). However, many more paradigms have 
evolved from the mixture of the assumptions of the two extreme paradigms to 
overcome the shortfall of the earlier paradigms (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2013). 
Positivism is a philosophical paradigm that supports the application of the natural 
science method to study the social reality and beyond (Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
Positivists believed that the researcher is independent of being researched, the actual 
reality cannot be affected by the study of social reality and the aim of the research is 
the discovery of theory from the empirical facts (Creswell, 1994). Interpretivism, on 
the other hand, was built on the philosophy of idealism (Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
Unlike the former, interpretivism believed that social reality cannot be studied through 
the application of principles developed for natural science phenomenon (Blumberg, 
Cooper, & Schindler, 2011). They argued that social reality is highly subjective, has a 
meaning for human beings and highly affected by the intentional actions of the 
researcher (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Creswell, 1994). Collis and Hussey (2009) 
described interpretive research as any research that does not involve the use of the 
statistical technique of quantitative data analysis in arriving at the findings of the 
study.  
This study subscribes to the idea of positivism paradigm for the following reasons. 
First, the objective of this study is to determine the level of compliance and the factors 
that influence the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of accounting 
standard on RPTs, assess the relationship between stock price and RPTs disclosure, 
investigate the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value and investigate if 
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the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value is moderated by compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of accounting standard on RPTs. 
In this regard, the study assumes that the influences, factors and the relationship have 
existed and are real. Second, theoretical conjunctures are developed and tested through 
empirical observation with the aid of statistical techniques of data analysis. 
Specifically, twenty research hypotheses are formulated and focus on theory testing 
and verification through the deductive approach. Based on this, the study subscribed 
to the ontological, epistemological, axiological, rhetorical and methodological 
assumptions of positivism paradigm. 
5.1.2 Research Design 
Research design is a blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data, 
based on the research questions of the study (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Quantitative 
research approach is designed to collect secondary data from a sample, analyze them 
using statistical techniques to determine if any relationship exists between pairs of or 
multiple variables and generalize the result to a population (Collis & Hussey, 2009). 
The study adopts this approach to determine the level of compliance and the factors 
that influence the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs, assess the relationship between stock price and RPTs 
disclosure, investigate if such disclosed figures are associated with earnings 
management and explore the moderating effect of level of compliance on the 
relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value based on the aforementioned 
theories. This approach is the most appropriate for the research of this nature as was 
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widely adopted in most of the financial reporting and corporate governance studies 
(Abdul Latif, 2010; Barth et al., 2008; Dechow, Hutton, Kim, & Sloan, 2012; 
Misirlioǧlu et al., 2013). Secondary data are sourced from the annual reports and 
account of the firms, company announcement from the website of Bursa Malaysia and 
the Thompson DataStream. 
Quantitative techniques for data analyses are employed to examine the relationship 
between research variables based on the data collected from the sampled firms and 
inferences are drawn from them. Descriptive statistics are run to condense, summarize 
and display the data in a logical manner that permits a logical insight into the possible 
outcome of the study. It comprises the mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard 
deviation skewness and kurtosis values for the research variables.  
Pearson’s correlation was used to determine the direction and magnitude of the 
association between the research variables. It was used to assess the multicollinearity 
among the research variables. The statistical significance level of (p< 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.1) was adopted in the study.  The study uses the independent t-test to test the mean 
difference of the extent of compliance. Multiple linear regressions are used to examine 
the relationship between dependent and independent variables in the research models.  
Microsoft Excel and Stata 12 statistical packages were used in the study to compute 
the disclosure index and run the above-stated techniques namely, descriptive statistics, 
independent t-test, Pearson’s correlations and multiple regressions. The use of the 
packages has helped the researcher to generate significance level easily, determine the 
coefficients of the models, residuals and R square, which serve as a yardstick to decide 
whether research hypotheses are supported or not supported.  
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5.2 Hypotheses Development and Research Frameworks 
Several studies investigate the factors that determine the general level of information 
disclosure in the annual reports (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Core, 2001; Samaha et al., 
2012; Verrecchia, 1990) during voluntary (Heitzman et al., 2010; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Street & Bryant, 2000) and mandatory regimes (Al-Akra et al., 2010; Glaum et al., 
2013). Most of these disclosure studies are based on the whole set of accounting 
standard while studies on the individual accounting standard remain scanty (Glaum et 
al., 2013; Utama & Utama, 2014). Based on the reviewed literature, corporate 
governance variables and firm financial characteristics are identified and hypothesized 
to affect the level of compliance with the accounting standard on RPTs.  
5.2.1 Extent of Compliance with the Accounting Standard on RPTs 
Based on the institutional theory, firms employ many mechanisms to create and 
maintain sound institutional legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These mechanisms 
include among others proper means of communication with outside environment. 
Regulators and other external parties use coercive isomophia to compel a firm to 
disclose certain information for public consumption. Listed firms are required to 
comply with mandatory disclosure requirements in totality, and anything in short of 
that can be sanction by appropriate regulatory bodies (Houqe et al., 2012; La Porta et 
al., 2006). However, Tsalavoutas (2011), and Yeoh (2005) argue that existence of 
regulatory bodies cannot guarantee compliance.  
Empirical studies document a low level of compliance in emerging market (Carlin, 
Finch, & Laili, 2009a; Dang-Duc, 2011; Hodgdon et al., 2008). Glaum et al. (2013) 
reveal substantial noncompliance with IFRS across seventeen (17) European nations 
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as postulated by (Street & Gray, 2002).  Bova and Pereira (2012) document that, 
though both public and private firms are required to comply with IFRS requirement, 
the level of compliance is high for public firms.  Hence, this study hypothesizes that: 
5.2.2 Determinants of Compliance with Accounting Standard on RPTs 
For the purpose of this study, corporate governance mechanisms, firm financial 
characteristics and control variables are identified and tested to assess their influence 
on the level of firm RPTs disclosure practice. Corporate governance mechanisms are 
divided into board characteristics, audit committee characteristics, CEO 
characteristics and ownership structure. Similarly, firm financial characteristics are 
divided into RPT motives and firm performance. Last, the study adopts firm size, 
auditor type and MCCG as control variables. 
5.2.2.1 Corporate Governance 
Agency theory by Fama and Jensen (1983) provide a theoretical support for using 
corporate governance variables in disclosure related studies. The role of corporate 
governance in promoting corporate information disclosure and mitigating the type II 
agency problem has long been established by literature (Chen, Chung, Lee, & Liao, 
2007; Elhelaly, 2014; Gisbert & Navallas, 2013; La Porta et al., 2000; Lakhal, 2005; 
Singh & Davidson III, 2003). Apart from agency theory, resource dependency theory 
plays important role in explaining the firm decisions and disclosure behavior (Brown 
& Hillegeist, 2007; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Mudambi & Pedersen, 2007; Pugliese 
et al., 2014). Therefore, this study identified some corporate governance variables and 
assessed their effect on the compliance with the RPTs disclosure requirements.  
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Among the board characteristics, board independence and board size are selected for 
this study. This is based on their explaining power in defining the corporate disclosure 
behavior as documented by previous studies (Chau & Gray, 2010; Grigoris, 2014; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Samaha et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Similarly, 
the choice of audit committee independence and audit committee financial expertise 
is based on the vital role they played in explaining the firm disclosure behavior during 
voluntary regime (Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Carcello et al., 2006). 
5.2.2.1.1 Board Characteristics 
Agency theory has been the dominant theory in board characteristic studies (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Based on agency theory, several studies document 
that presence of independent directors on the board minimises both type I and II 
agency problems (Adams et al., 2008; Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2014; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983), and their adequacy protect the interest of all stakeholders (Lo et al., 
2010; Mallin et al., 2015). Resource dependency theory provides that outside directors 
promote firm disclosure prectices through counseling and advising role (Davis & 
Adam Cobb, 2010; Pugliese et al., 2014). Germain, Galy and Lee (2014) state that the 
issue of independent directors has been gaining much attention in recent years and 
notice an upward trend of independent directors in many corporate boards. Several 
studies conducted on board independence establishes a positive association between 
the number of independent directors and the firm disclosure behavior (Chen & Jaggi, 
2000; Ferreira et al., 2011; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). 
Chau and Gray (2010) examine the relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and board independence, including the influence of an independent director 
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serving as the chairman. The authors use the sample of firms listed on Hong Kong 
stock exchange and find that appointment of an independent director as chairman 
improves the firm’s disclosure level in family firms. Similaly, Armstrong et al. (2014) 
investigate the causal effect of independents directors and firm transparency. Using 
NYSE and Nasdaq regulations that require independent directors to constitute more 
than fifty percent of the membership of listed firms. The authors find that it is the 
independent directors that influence the firm transparency and not the other way round.  
Similarly, Wahab et al. (2011) investigate the effect on corporate governance on the 
relationship between RPTs and firm performance. The authors use the sample of 
Malaysian listed firms and found that independent directors mitigate the negative 
effects of RPTs on firm performance. However, the effect of independent directors on 
the level of compliance with accounting standard on RPTs remain unknown. Based on 
this, the study hypotheses that: 
H1a1: There is a significant positive relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. 
Building on the same agency and resource dependency theories,  the principal 
(owners) installs a large board to monitor the actions and advice their agents 
(Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007). This has been proved by Germain et al. (2014)  that board 
size has remained stable from 2000 to 2007 globally and grows based on the firm size 
and complexity. Regarding the effect of board size on corporate disclosure practice, 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) document absence of any association between corporate 
voluntary disclosure with board size. However, Gordon et al. (2004) reveal that an 
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increase in the number of directors on the board has resulted to a higher occurrence of 
RPTs more especially in relation to executive directors. Notwithstanding this, Coles 
et al. (2008) use the sample of firms in the IRRC database and arrived at U-shape 
relationship between board size and firm value. This suggests that neither large board 
size nor small board size is optimal for a firm. 
Based on the concept of expert power of resource dependency theory, large board 
contains many people with diverse knowledge, skills and experiences which imply 
strong monitoring and advising roles, thus promoting corporate transparency (Samaha 
et al., 2015).  Nekhili and Cherif (2011) use the sample of the firms listed on Paris 
stock exchange for the period of 2002-2005 to investigate the relationship between 
board size and RPTs. The findings revealed that RPTs is influenced by the size of the 
board. In view of this, the next hypothesis is developed: 
H1a2: There is a significant positive relationship between the size of the board and 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on 
RPTs. 
5.2.2.1.2 Audit Committee Characteristics 
Based on agency and resource dependency theories, audit committee plays important 
role in explaining firms’ disclosure practice. Audit committee has a fiduciary duty of 
monitoring compliance with all related financial requirements (Al-Akra, Eddie, & Ali, 
2010; Brochet & Srinivasan, 2014). Generally, the presence of audit committee is 
found to increase the firm disclosure behavior and mitigates agency costs (Al-Najjar 
& Abed, 2014; Cai, Hillier, Tian, & Wu, 2015; Cheung, Qi, et al., 2009; Gao & Kling, 
 
 138 
2012; Ho & Shun Wong, 2001). The degree of independence in the audit committee 
affects the quality of the oversight of the firm financial reporting process (Black & 
Kim, 2012; Li, Mangena, & Pike, 2012). Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) confirm 
that the presence of the independent audit committee with strong monitoring activities 
decreases the tendency of producing misleading financial reports. 
Nekhili and Cherif (2011) use 3SLS simultaneous model on 85 Paris-listed firms to 
investigate the effect on audit committee independence on the RPTs. The results show 
that the degree of independence of audit committee influences the level of firm’s 
RPTs, hence affecting the firm value. Similarly, Cai et al. (2015) investigate the role 
of the audit committee in mitigating the effect of agency costs of ownership structure. 
The authors used 3217 firm-year observations from 1126 sampled listed Chinese firms 
for the period of 2002 to 2004. The findings provide empirical evidence that audit 
committee independence is valued by shareholders and mitigates the agency costs 
associated with ownership structure. Based on this, the study hypothesizes that: 
H1a3: There is a significant positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and compliance with the disclosure requirements the of 
accounting standard on RPTs. 
Furthermore, audit committee financial expertise allows the committee to identify 
shortly internal control weaknesses and ask management to take corrective measures 
accordingly (Goh, 2009; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007). Based on agency and resource 
dependency theories, board members use their diverse knowledge and experience to 
monitor and advise management. This provides that audit committee members with 
financial expertise will assist the committee to work effectively (Dhaliwal, Naiker, & 
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Navissi, 2010). Lack of requisite expertise by audit committee members may trigger 
fraudulent reporting (Abbott et al., 2004),  reduces investors ability in making wise 
economic decisions and consequently increases agency costs (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). 
Consolidating on these result, Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2013) use 
the large sample of 18564 firm-year observations to measure the effect of audit 
committee expertise in monitoring financial reporting processes. The results prove that 
both industry and financial expertise play an important role in the prevention of 
financial misstatement. 
Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal (2006) document a significant level of compliance 
with Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the disclosure of financial expert on audit committee in 
the annual reports. This result signals the value attached to audit committee financial 
expertise by both the regulatory bodies and the reporting entities. Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX) in U.S stressed the importance of audit committee financial expertise 
in enhancing the firm reporting quality (Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2014). It is also 
established that audit committee financial expertise improves firm performance 
(Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara, & Nagel, 2012) and curtail earnings 
management practices and transfer price manipulations (Abbott et al., 2004; Davidson 
III, Xie, & Xu, 2004), hence mitigating the agency conflicts. Therefore, the next 
hypothesis is: 
H1a4: There is a significant positive relationship between audit committee financial 
expertise and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting 
standard on RPTs. 
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5.2.2.1.3 CEO Characteristics 
CEO characteristics have been studies based on both agency and resource dependency 
theories. The level of CEO expertise has been found to influence the success or 
otherwise of the numerous decisions and strategies he takes in a firm. Custódio and 
Metzger (2013a) investigate the relationship between CEO expertise and firm market 
value of 1500 Standard and Poor (S&P) firms. Using the sample of 25,562 CEO- firm-
years observations, the results show that financially expert CEOs increase the market 
value of the firms. Financially expert CEOs take favorable business strategy decisions 
related to cash holding, share repurchase and so on. Accordingly, Custódio and 
Metzger (2013b) and Huang (2014) document that firms that focus on the industry in 
which they possess managerial expertise achieved significant improvement in 
performance. The improvement is higher for the firms with CEO with much 
experience in that industry.  
Consistently, Haislip and Richardson (2015) find that IT expert CEOs make more 
accurate estimations that lead to more accurate earnings forecast. Correspondingly, 
Dubocage and Galindo (2013) conclude that venture capitalists retain the CEOs with 
core business expertise. However, previous studies did not pay attention to the effect 
of CEO expertise on firms disclosure practice. Based on the findings of Gul and Leung 
(2004) that independent directors expertise mitigate the negative CEO duality and 
voluntary information disclosure relationship, this study postulate that CEO expertise 
motivates CEO to comply with the regulatory disclosure requirements, hence 
hypothesize that:   
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H1a5: There is a significant positive relationship between CEO expertise and 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting standard on 
RPTs. 
The level of family ownership and control determine the appointment and power of 
the CEO in a family-controlled firm (Ansari, Goergen, & Mira, 2014). Family owned 
firms have unique characteristics that distinguished them from other firms. These 
characteristics affect their level of information disclosure and general disclosure 
practice. According to Chau and Gray (2002) firms with concentrated ownership are 
characterized by less voluntary information disclosure, but the problem is severe in 
family-controlled firms. In most cases, family members become the CEOs of the 
family firms even if they are not the best candidate for the position.  
Ali et al. (2007) reveal that family firms release less information about their corporate 
governance practices compared to non-family firms. Consistently, Miller et al. (2014) 
report that the comparison of the degree of professionalism of family and non-family 
CEOs reveals that the superiority of the latter is very plausible. Based on this, it 
becomes clear that family CEO may be at a lower end once it comes to the decision to 
corporate transparency. Given this, the next hypothesis is: 
H1a6: There is a significant negative relationship between CEO family lineage and 





According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), CEO ownership minimizes the principal 
manager agency conflict. Based on this, Kim and Lu (2011), and Ting, Azizan and 
Kweh (2015) provide empirical evidence that CEO ownership improves the firm value 
by aligning the interest of the management with that of the firm. Regarding corporate 
governance, CEO ownership has been found to play an important role in improving 
the firm control mechanisms. Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) reveal that CEO 
ownership mitigates the negative effect of weak governance on the firm. The authors 
argue that CEO owned firms are better organized and efficiently managed.  
Kim and Lu (2011) document that in the absence of external governance mechanisms, 
CEO ownership can serve as a substitute. In most of the CEO owned firms, CEOs are 
found to play dual roles which enable them to control the firm decision-making 
process  (Chen, Lin, & Yi, 2008) including the firm disclosure practice. Several studies 
identify firms with high level of insider ownership with low information disclosure to 
prevent information leakages of proprietary information and rent-seeking activities 
(Fan & Wong, 2002; Gul & Lai, 2002). This can be connected with the CEO duality 
that is frequent in most of the CEO owned firms which affect the firm disclosure 
practice negatively (Lakhal, 2005; Wang and Hussainey, 2013). Given this, the next 
hypothesis is: 
H1a7: There is a significant negative relationship between CEO ownership and 




5.2.2.1.4 Ownership Structure 
Based on agency theory, family owned businesses are associated with less agency 
problem. Since both ownership and control lay within the same circle, some of the 
stakeholders have the first-hand information on the operation and the financial 
position of their firm. Family-controlled firms are associated with less voluntary 
disclosure on forward-looking information, earning forecast and are characterized by 
high opaque information environment than disperse firms (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 
2009; Chen et al., 2008). Ali et al. (2007) reveal that family firms release less 
information about their corporate governance practices compared to non-family firms. 
Chau and Gray (2010) report that the extent of firm’s voluntary disclosure depends on 
the level of the family ownership in that firm. 
However, some level of improvement has been reported in the family firm disclosure 
behavior across Asian countries about governance disclosure Nowland (2008) and 
accounting information disclosure  Wan-Hussin (2009) after the Asia financial crises. 
Fernando, Schneible and Suh (2013) argue that RPT disclosure regulation can be used 
as a means of minority shareholder protection. Correspondingly, Di Carlo (2014) in 
his case studies on some selected Italian family-controlled firms recommends for more 
disclosure from such firm. In line with the above, the study hypothesizes that: 
H1a8: There is a significant negative relationship between family ownership and 




Based on agency theory, managerial ownership aligns the goal and financial incentives 
of the management with those of the outside shareholders (Arcay & Vázquez, 2005). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that as management ownership increases, the value 
of the firm will also rise because of reduction in agency cost. The theory of the firm 
provides that managerial ownership improves the financial reporting quality (Warfieid 
et al., 1995). Similarly, Kweh (2015) provides empirical evidence that management 
ownership improves the firm value by aligning the interest of the management with 
that of the firm. Furthermore, Al-Najjar and Abed (2014) state that managerial 
ownership provides incentives for managers to release more information in order to 
increase the stock market price, minimize overall monitoring costs and enhance the 
firm value. Based on these, this study hypothesizes that: 
H1a9: There is a significant positive relationship between managerial ownership and 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting standard on 
RPTs. 
Based on agency theory, foreign ownership serves as external governance mechanism 
(Cho, Huang, & Padmanabhan, 2014). Foreign institutional ownership has improved 
the firm transparency level in emerging markets Liang, Lin and Chin (2012) and 
increases the desirability of high quality audit (He, Rui, Zheng, & Zhu, 2014). A 
positive association between corporate governance and firm performance was 
identified to be the result of the debt monitoring and foreign ownership (Chari, Chen, 
& Dominguez, 2012; Greenaway, Guariglia, & Yu, 2012; Haat, Rahman, & 
Mahenthiran, 2008). Hence, foreign ownership improves the firm general disclosure 
practice because of the increased information needs by the foreign investors 
(Misirlioǧlu, Tucker, & Yükseltürk, 2013). 
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Moreover, foreign ownership has been found to have a direct association with 
increased disclosure (Bova & Pereira, 2012; Misirlioǧlu et al., 2013). However, the 
place of living or physical distance affects the information disadvantage and effective 
monitoring of foreign directors (X. Du, Jian, & Lai, 2017). Thus foreign shareholders 
need some monitoring mechanisms to protect their investment rather than being seen 
as good inspectors of the management. Consistently, He et al. (2014) contend that 
foreign shareholders need high quality auditors to compensate for information 
barriers. This is based on the fact that big auditing firms persuade their clients to 
disclose more information in their financial reports (Premuroso & Bhattacharya, 
2008). Therefore, the study hypothesizes that: 
H1a10: There is a significant positive relationship between foreign ownership and 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting standard on 
RPTs. 
5.2.2.2 Firm Financial Characteristics 
Firm financial attributes have been identified as among the factors that affect its 
corporate decisions (Iatridis, 2012). Many studies have established the relationship 
between some firm attributes and its disclosure practices (Alsaeed, 2006; Gisbert & 
Navallas, 2013; Inchausti, 1997; Murphy, 1999). This study identified RPT motives 
and firm performance as some of the financial attributes and assess their effect on the 
compliance with the RPTs disclosure requirements. 
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5.2.2.2.1 RPT motives 
Agency and resource dependency theories provide the conflicting view on the 
rationality behind the RPTs. Based on agency theory, RPTs are seen as a means by 
which the controlling shareholders, directors or managers used to expropriate firm 
resources at the expense of minority shareholders (Di Carlo, 2014; Wong & Kim, 
2015). On the contrary, resource dependency theory views RPTs as a mean by which 
firms leverage their operations through collaborations with the related party to enhance 
their performance (Claessens et al., 2002; Jian & Wong, 2010; Williamson, 1985). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)  identify another form of agency problem among 
shareholders in a firm with concentrated ownership. Based on type II agency cost, 
controlling shareholders expropriate the minority shareholders in most cases in RPTs. 
Empirical evidence proves that capital market reacts to the announcement of RPTs, 
though the results are inconclusive. Lou et al. (2014) find that capital market reacts 
indifferently to the announcement of any form of RPTs. Contrary to this, Lei and Song 
(2011) record that the Tobin’s Q and market to book value of firms that engage in 
prejudicial RPTs are significantly lower than those with no such form of transactions. 
This is consistent with the findings that investors cannot foresee tunneling, but they 
discount firms if it occurs (Cheung et al., 2006). Cheung, Jing, et al. (2009) document 
that RPTs representing tunneling hardly been public compared to those representing 
propping.  
Lei and Song (2011) find that Chinese listed firms use RPTs with disclosure exemption 
in tunneling, signaling the significance of disclosure requirement in curtailing 
prejudicial RPTs. Similarly, Black et al. (2015) document that public listed chaebols 
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in Korea hardly disclose the pricing policies used in the complicated RPTs with 
privately held firms—a clear sign of minority shareholders’ expropriation or RPTs 
that are not based on arm’s length principles. Similarly, Xiao and Zhao (2014) argue 
that even though Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission has required all listed 
firms to disclose all RPTs in their financial reports, in practice, most of these firms do 
not comply with those requirements. Given the above findings, the study hypotheses 
that, 
H1b1: There is a significant negative relationship between tunneling and compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting standard on RPTs. 
The market for corporate control theory of Jensen and Ruback (1983) provide that 
controlling shareholders take desperate actions to protect their firms from hostile 
takeovers. Yeh et al. (2012) document that controlling shareholders prop-up their 
firms through abnormal related party sales to avoid reporting loss or on the verge of 
the issue of seasoned equity. Similarly, (Bai et al., 2004) portend that small piece of 
bad news by a listed firm attract overwhelming market reactions and may even lead to 
undue regulatory surveillance. These kinds of reactions motivate some controlling 
shareholders to engage in propping to overcome the possible damages that may result 
from the release of bad news to the market. Cheung et al. (2009) find that RPTs related 
to propping activities are accompanied with significant information disclosure 
compared to that of tunneling activities. Accordingly, Peng et al. (2011) find that 
capital market reacts favorably to the announcement of propping transactions. Given 
these, the study hypotheses that, 
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H1b2: There is a significant positive relationship between propping and compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting standard on RPTs. 
5.2.2.2.2 Firm Performance 
Profitability has been identified as one of the major determinants of corporate 
disclosure (Al-Akra et al., 2010; Bokpin, 2013; Hussainey et al., 2011; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). Profitable firms have many incentives to disclose their favorable 
performance to numerous stakeholders to address the issue of information asymmetry 
based on signaling theory. This is consistent with the signaling theory, which suggests 
that information disclosure signals good business position to market participants. 
However, studies on the association between firms’ profitability and corporate 
disclosure behavior produce inconsistent results. Samaha et al. (2012) and Sodikin 
(2013) have arrived at a negative association between profitability and corporate 
disclosure practice. Another stream of studies has reported the absence of association 
between the profitability and firm disclosure behavior (Grigoris, 2014; Sharma, 2014).  
Alsaeed (2006) examines three proxies of profitability (Return on Equity, Profit 
margin, and liquidity) and finds that none of them explain the variability of firms 
disclosure behavior. This is consistent with the insignificant association arrived at by 
(Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). Tsalavoutas (2011) is of the opinion that the increase in 
the reported profit as a result of migration to IFRS is among the major incentives that 
motivate firms to adopt and disclose much information in their annual report. Based 
on this, the study hypotheses that, 
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H1b3: There is a significant positive relationship between firm profitability and level 
of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting standard 
on RPTs. 
Firms with growth potential have many incentives to disclose detail information to 
inform and justify some of their corporate decisions and minimize information 
asymmetric between managers and owners (Chau & Gray, 2010). Gul and Leung 
(2004) argue that firms with high potential growth signs have to disclose more 
information to justified that their stocks are not overvalued. This is consistent with the 
position of signaling theory. Similarly, Hassan et al. (2009), and Hussainey and 
Mouselli (2010) portended that firms with high sales and asset growth disclosed 
information to signal a future increase in production capacity and dividend 
respectively. Soon Yau et al. (2009) provide empirical support for the above 
assertions. The authors have found that among the sample of small firms, high growth 
firms make more disclosure on the information regarding their intellectual capital. 
Iatridis (2012) document that high growth firms provide detail disclosure in 
accordance with the provisions of IFRS. 
In contrast to the above, Liu and Sun (2010), and Lo and Wong (2011) document a 
negative correlation between growth and corporate disclosure practice. This is in line 
with the finding of Bamber and Cheon (1998). The authors find that the higher the 
growth potential, the low the managers intend to release information to the public 
because of proprietary information cost. Similarly, Gisbert and Navallas (2013) find 
that high potential growth firms shelve away from unnecessary disclosure to deny 
competitors access to their strategic information. Given this, the next hypothesis is: 
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H1b4: There is a significant positive relationship between firm growth potential and 
level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the of accounting 
standard on RPTs. 
Investors request for the dividend payment to wipe out excess cash from the firm to 
minimize managers opportunistic behavior (Brockman & Unlu, 2011; La Porta et al. 
2000). Harada and Nguyen (2011) reveal that ownership concentration is significantly 
associated with lower dividend payout ratio. They document that firms with 
concentrated ownership structure are less likely to increase dividend payment even 
after the increase in operating earnings or when debt capital decrease. Large dividend 
payment in a firm with concentrated ownership signal that controlling shareholder is 
not willing to expropriate corporate resources (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003; Su, Fung, 
Huang, & Shen, 2014; Williams, 2014).  
High dividend payout represents financial transparency in weak reporting 
environment (Van Overfelt et al. 2010). A similar position has been arrived at by 
Williams (2014). He concludes that low dividend payout ignites the conflict among 
the shareholders and allow the dominant shareholders to expropriate the excess 
resources through RPTs. Lin, Kuo and Wang (2014) portrays that it is a better 
disclosure that leads to high payout ratio. Given this, the next hypothesis is, 
H1b5: There is a significant positive relationship between dividend payment and 




Figure 5.1 represents the theoretical framework for the determinants of compliance 










                  
 
 
Figure 5.1  













 Family Ownership 
Managerial Ownership 





 Firm Profitability 
 Firm Growth 
Dividend Payment 
Control Variables 





the RPT Standard 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
 
 152 
5.2.3  Value-Relevance of MFRS 124 Adoption 
Accounting information produced using IFRS are value-relevant (Alali & Foote, 2012; 
Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 2014). Several empirical studies support the superiority of 
the capital market responsiveness with the accounting information produced with 
IFRS under mandatory regime over voluntary or non-IFRS standards (Barth et al., 
2008; Chua et al., 2012; Dimitropoulos et al., 2013; Kim, 2013). A recent study by 
Badenhorst et al. (2015) reinforces the previous literature on the value-relevance of 
IFRS through the use of the single standard. Similarly, Paglietti (2010) finds a 
significant improvement in the value-relevance of accounting information in the post-
IFRS adoption era compared to pre-adoption period. However, Hung and 
Subramanyam (2007), and Gjerde et al. (2008) record no improvement in the value-
relevance of accounting information for both voluntary and mandatory adoption 
periods respectively.  In line with these previous studies, this study hypothesizes that: 
H2a: RPTs disclosure in the financial reports of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia is 
value-relevant. 
H2b: Mandatory adoption of MFRS 124 increases the value-relevance of the 
disclosed RPTs in the financial reports of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
The theoretical framework of value-relevance of MFRS 124 mandatory adoption using 












Figure 5.2  
Theoretical Framework: Value-Relevance of MFRS 124 Adoption (Price Method) 
Where: 
MVPS = Market Value per Share of firm 3 months after the financial year-end;  
BVPS = Book Value per Share of firm;  
EPS = Accounting Earning per Share of firm;  
RPTFirms = Dummy variable set equal to one for firms with RPTs disclosures, zero 
for otherwise;  
BVPS*RPTFirms = BVPS multiply by RPTFirms;  
EPS*RPTFirms = EPS multiply by RPTFirms.  
Similarly, the theoretical framework of value-relevance of MFRS 124 mandatory 
adoption using Easton and Harris (1991) return model is depicted as follows: 
  

















Theoretical Framework: Value-Relevance of MFRS 124 Adoption (Return Method) 
Where: 
Returns = (Price in month t − Price in month t−1)/Price in month t−1. Returns are 
accumulated during the 12-month period covering trading months, preceding March 
31st of each year;  
NetIncome = Net earnings in year t /Market value of equity in t−1;  
RPTFirms = Dummy variable set equal to one for firms with RPTs disclosures, zero 
for otherwise;  
NetIncome*RPTFirms = NetIncome multiply by RPTFirms. 
 
5.2.4 Real Earnings Management  
5.2.4.1 Real Earnings Management in RPTs 
The quality of accounting standard determines its ability to curtail earnings 
management practices. Goncharov and Zimmermann (2006) reveal low earnings 
management for the firms that reported under US-GAAP compared to those that 
reported under German-GAAP. Accordingly, many countries in the world have 
adopted the IFRS on the premise of its higher reporting quality (Ball, 2006). Empirical 
result on the supremacy of IFRS over other accounting standards in curtailing earnings 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
Net Income 
Return 
 Net Income*RPTFirms 
            RPTFirms              
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management practice is inconclusive (Barth et al., 2008; Doukakis, 2014; Ismail et al., 
2013). Nevertheless, the use of IFRS has recorded tremendous success in curbing 
earnings management practices across the world and more especially in emerging 
market (Capkun, Collins, & Jeanjean, 2013; Dimitropoulos et al., 2013; Guindy, 2014; 
Ismail et al., 2013). 
Johari et al. (2008) document that high managerial ownership induces managers to 
engage in earnings management practice. Similarly, Lo and Wong (2011) find that 
management that engaged in RPTs to increase reported earnings or bonus 
remuneration are less likely to disclose the transfer pricing policy used in those 
transactions. Related to this, Beuselinck and Deloof (2014) provide empirical evidence 
that inter-group transactions play a substantial role in earnings management, while 
Hwang et al. (2013) disclose that disclosure regulation minimizes the earnings 
management in RPTs. Based on this, this study hypothesizes that: 
H3a: Firms engage in real earnings management in related party transactions. 
The theoretical framework of  real activity manipulations using Roychowdhury (2006) 














Theoretical Framework: Real Earnings Management in RPTs 
Where: 
Abnormal components = Abnormal production costs, abnormal CFO and abnormal 
discretionary expenses as dependent variables (are determined based on 
(Roychowdhury, 2006)).  
Size = natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the year. 
MTV= Market-to-book ratio.  
ROA = EBIT/Total Assets and,  
RPTFirms are defined as firms with RPTs of up to 20% of its revenue or the firms that 
engage in more than one form of RPTs in any given year. 
 
Because of the complexity and time-consuming nature associated with the compliance 
index, several compliance studies use market capitalization (see for example Glaum 
et al., 2013; Henry, 2010; Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou, 2014) to draw the sample size 
that represents the population of the study to relax the tediousness and time involved 
in constructing compliance index. Glaum et al. (2013) and  Tsalavoutas et al. (2014) 
use the sample of large firms for disclosure index in their respective studies. In 









Malaysia, Carlin et al. (2009) use the sample of 36 firms out of the 100 firms that 
constitute the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index. However, restricting the sample size to 
bigger firms eliminates the small firms with frequent and heavy RPTs, hence, will not 
be ideal for the study of this nature. In view of this, this study, firms with RPTs of up 
to 20% of its revenue or firms that engage in more than one form of RPTs in any given 
year are identified and leveled as RPTFirms. This method captures the firms that split 
the transactions to avoid some reporting and other regulatory requirements. 
5.2.4.2 Real Earnings Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
Jong et al (2014) reveals that investors perceived all forms of earnings management 
(save share repurchases) as value-destroying. Teoh et al (1998) and Louis (2004) find 
that the market value of firms that engage in earnings management during the initial 
public offerings/firm acquisition declines in subsequent years after the 
offerings/acquisition. Similarly, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) reveal that the 
performance of firms that engage in earnings management during the seasoned equity 
offerings declines in subsequent years after the offerings. The decline as a result of 
REM is severe compared to that of accrual earnings management.  
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) state that management opportunistic behavior was the 
main factor that drives management to frauds, misappropriation of firm’s assets and 
misleading financial statements in recent governance cases (Enron, Healthsouth, and 
others). In these cases, RPTs are used to siphon the firm resources which led to the 
loss of value and untimely liquidation of the giant corporations.This problem is severe 
in the firms characterized by weak corporate governance (Gordon et al., 2004; Tang 
& Chang, 2015) and concentrated ownership structure (Johnson, Boone, Breach, & 
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Friedman, 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007). Fisman and Wang (2010) and Xiao and Zhao (2014) 
view RPTs as value-destroying transactions (related-party loan and guarantee in 
particular) which trigger the stock market to react negatively to the release of such 
transactions. Based on this, this study hypothesizes that: 
H3b: There is a significant negative relationship between real earnings management 
in related party transactions and firm value. 
The theoretical framework of real activity manipulations in RPTs and firm value 









































Theoretical Framework: Real Earnings Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
5.2.5 Mitigating Effect of Compliance with MFRS 124 on Real Earnings 
Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
Accounting standards are meant to describe the minimum amount of relevant and 
high-quality information that a firm must disclose while making financial reports. This 
is because firms that fail to comply with the disclosure requirement withhold some 
vital information that can affect capital market operations. Based on the dual (value-
Firm Value 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
Real Earnings Management 
Firm Size 
Profitability 
Change in Income 
Board Size 
Audit Committee Expertise 










generating and value-destroying) roles of RPTs, many countries across the globe resort 
to RPTs regulation. This is to ensure that only value-generating transactions are 
permitted. Generally, accounting standards are used as the main source of RPTs 
disclosure regulations across the globe. The adoption of MFRS 124 in Malaysia as 
financial reporting standard for the conduct and report of RPTs has led to uniformity 
in RPTs regulation between Malaysia and other countries across the world. Although, 
the disclosure requirements are the same, countries vary in terms of compliance level. 
The quality of accounting standard is meaningless if not been complied with. 
Therefore, full compliance with the standard is essential for any standard to attain its 
basic objectives. Since accounting standards on RPTs are formulated and adopted on 
the premise that it will curtail the earnings management practice and improve 
transparency in RPTs reporting, compliance with the standards is expected to mitigate 
the negative effects of RPTs on the firm value.  
Lei and Song (2011) document a negative cumulative abnormal return for some RPTs 
types, however, the cumulative abnormal return is lower for RPTs with disclosure 
exemption. This demonstrates that the negative relationship between REM in RPTs 
and firm value is more visible in firms characterized by the low information disclosure. 
Therefore, full compliance with disclosure requirements on RPTs (MFRS 124) 
indicates that the absence of tunneling in the transaction, hence, the firm has nothing 
to hide. On the contrary, when the extent of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements is low, investors will be skeptical about the real motive behind the 




H4: Compliance with disclosure requirements on RPTs significantly moderates the 
relationship between real earnings management in related party transactions 
and firm value. 
The theoretical framework of mitigating effect of compliance with MFRS 124 on 



















Theoretical Framework: Mitigating Effect of Compliance with MFRS 124 on Real 
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5.3 Measurement of the Research Variables 
Variables measurement refers to the process of the operationalization of the research 
variables (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2013). In this study, the research variables 
were operationalized through the processes used in prior studies. 
5.3.1 Level of Compliance (Disclosure index) 
The extent (level) of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting 
standard on RPTs was measured using weighted disclosure index. The selection of 
weighted disclosure index is merited to overcome the drawbacks associated with un-
weighted disclosure index (see for example Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Tsalavoutas, 
2011; Yeoh, 2005). The disclosure index used by Cheung et al. (2010) was adopted 
and modified for this study. Under this approach, 0, 1, 2 and 3 points were given to 
the absent, partial, full and excellent level of compliance respectively. Absent 
compliance indicates none compliance while partial compliance represents incomplete 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. Full 
compliance signifies total compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
standard. Lastly, excellent compliance represents a situation where the reporting 
entities go extra mile to disclose extra information in addition to what is mandatorily 
required from them to meet international standard.  The classification of firms into 
absent, partial, full or excellent permits for the identification of the features of high 
and low compliance firms easily. 
Specifically, a minimum of zero and maximum of three points are assigned to each of 
the 17 items required to be disclosed by the MFRS 124 as provided in appendix A. 
Firms with the full level of compliance can score more than thirty-four points while 
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firms with total non-compliance can score zero points. Hence, the disclosure score for 
each firm is the ratio of the points scored by a firm to the total points required to meet 



















CSJ = total compliance score for each company. 
T = Total number of points scored.  
J = Firm under consideration. 
M = Total points required to meet the mandatory disclosure requirement.  
To ensure the reliability of the disclosure index, independent person was asked to score 
up to 10% of the sampled firms through the use of the disclosure index used in the 
study. The results from his scorecard are similar to those obtain for this study. 
Independent t-test was used to test the mean differences of the compliance with the 
transaction-based disclosure and general disclosure. Similarly, the same test was used 
to test the mean difference of the compliance level between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms.  
5.3.2 Determinants of Compliance with Accounting Standard on RPTs 
In this study, fifteen variables are tested as determinants of compliance with the 
disclosure requirement of the accounting standard on RPTs. The variables include 




Under corporate governance variables, board independence is measured by the 
proportion of independent directors on the board of directors as was used in prior 
studies (Benkel et al., 2006; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Tang et 
al., 2013). Board size is measured by the number of directors on the firm board (Boone, 
Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Chang, Oh, Jung, & Lee, 2012; Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006).  
Audit committee independence is measured through dummy variable which was set to 
“1” if all members are independent non-executive directors and “0” if otherwise (Goh, 
2009; Sharma, 2014; Sierra García et al., 2012). Audit committee expertise is 
measured by the proportion of members with a membership of accounting professional 
body, finance-related academic qualification or work experience in the finance-related 
field (Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2014; Goh, 2009).  
CEO was considered financial expert and coded as “1” if he is a member of accounting 
professional body, possesses a finance-related academic qualification or work 
experience in the finance-related field, and “0” for otherwise (Custódio & Metzger, 
2013a; Haislip & Richardson, 2015). Family CEO was measured through dummy 
variable that was set to “1” if he is a member of the controlling family and “0” if 
otherwise (Miller et al., 2013; Minichilli et al., 2010). CEO ownership was measured 
by the percentage of shares held by CEO out of the total outstanding shares (Kim & 
Lu, 2011; Xie, 2014).  
Family ownership was measured by the percentage of family shareholding in the firm 
as it was used in the prior studies (Anderson et al., 2003; Cheng, 2014; Munir et al., 
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2013; Sodikin, 2013). Managerial ownership was measured by the percentage of 
shares held by the executive directors out of the total outstanding shares (Huafang & 
Jianguo, 2007; Rashid, 2016).  Percentage of equity shares held by foreigners (non-
Malaysians) was used to measure the level of foreign ownership (Greenaway et al., 
2012; Li et al., 2011). 
Financial Characteristics 
Under the financial characteristics, the variables of concern are tunneling, propping, 
profitability, growth and dividend. Because of the complexities in identifying 
tunneling and propping transactions, this study adopted the measurements used by 
Peng et al. (2011) and Ying and Wang (2013) in measuring the variables. Under this 
approach, controlling shareholders tunnel the firm with sound financial performance 
(firms with ROE of more than 10%) and prop up the firms in difficult financial (ROA 
of less than 6%) condition to maintain the shell resources and enjoy the private benefits 
of control when the circumstance permit. Hence, firms with the higher performance 
(ROE of more than 10%) are tunnel and coded “1”, and “0” if otherwise. Similarly, 
firms with the lower performance (ROE of less than 6%) are propped-up and coded 
“1”, and “0” if otherwise. 
Return on asset was used to measure the firm profitability (Cheung et al., 2010; 
Onofrei, Tudose, Durdureanu, & Anton, 2015; Taplin et al., 2002; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013). Market to book value was adapted to proxy the firm growth. This method is not 
new in disclosure studies as it was used in numerous studies (Chau & Gray, 2010; 
Chen et al., 2008; Iatridis, 2012; Lo & Wong, 2011). Dividend payout ratio measured 
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as cash dividend divided by sales was used as a proxy for a firm dividend policy 
(Hwang, Kim, Park, & Park, 2013; Lin et al., 2014). 
Control Variables  
Natural logarithm of the total asset was used as a proxy for firm size. This is consistent 
with the work of (Chen et al., 2008; Eiler, Miranda-Lopez, & Tama-Sweet, 2015; 
Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Tang et al., 2013). Auditor type was measured through 
dummy variable that was set equal to “1” for a firm with Big-4 auditing firm (Deloitte 
& Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers) and set to “0” for 
otherwise (Bokpin, 2013; Gao & Kling, 2012; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Utama & 
Utama, 2014). MCCG was used to control for other regulatory changes (MCCG in 
2012) in the accounting environment. It was measured through dummy variable that 
will be equal to “1” for the event after 2012 and “0”  for otherwise. 
Model Specification   
Dscore = f (corporate governance mechanisms, firm financial characteristics, control 
variables)  
Dscore = α0 + β1Bindit + β2Bsizeit + β3Aindit + β4Aexpit+ β5Cexpit + β6Cfamit + 
β7Cownit + β8Fmownit + β9Mownit + β10Frownit + β11Tunnit + β12Propit + β13ROAit + 
β14MTVit + β15Diviit + β16Sizeit + β17Audit + β18MCCGit +εtit             (1) 
Where:  
Dscore = Disclosure index as defined in section 5.4.1 
Bind = Board independence 
Bsize = Board size  
Aind = Audit committee independence 
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Aexp = Audit committee expertise  
Cexp = CEO expertise 
Cfam = CEO family  
Cown = CEO ownership 
Fmown = Family ownership  
Frown = Foreign ownership  
Tunn = Tunneling  
Prop = Propping  
ROA = Return on assets  
MTV = Market to book value  
Divi = Dividend 
Size = Firm size.  
Aud = Auditor type  
MCCG = Malaysia code of corporate governance 
α = Constant 
β = Coefficients in the regression model 
Ɛ  = Error term  
i = Entity (Firm) 
t = Time period 
Table 5.1 presents the acronym, description, measures, expectation and expected data 




Table 5.1  
Descriptive of Variable Measurement 






Points scored by a firm divided 
by the total obtainable points. 
     + Annual 
Report 
Corporate Governance     
Bind Board 
Independence 
Proportion of independent 
directors in the board  
     + Annual 
Report 
Bsize Board Size Number of directors on the firm 
board  





Dummy variable “1”  if all 
members are non-executive 
directors and “0” otherwise  





Percentage of members with 
membership of accounting 
professional body, academic 
qualification or work experience 
in finance related field 
     + Annual 
Report 
Cexpt CEO Expertize Dummy variable “1”  if CEO 
possesses a graduate level 
academic degree in any business 
related field or works in an 
executive capacity before his 
appointment as CEO, “0” if 
otherwise 
     + Annual 
Report 
Cfam Family CEO Dummy variable “1”  if CEO is a 
member of controlling family and 
“0” otherwise 








Percentage of family 
shareholding in the firm 




Percentage of executive 
shareholding in the firm 




Percentage of equity shares held 
by foreigners 




Table 5.1 (Continue) 




Financial Characteristics     
Tunn Tunneling Dummy variable “1” for firm 
with ROE of more than 10% 
and “0” otherwise 
     - Data Stream 
Prop Propping Dummy variable “1” for firm 
with ROE of less than 6% 
and “0” otherwise 
     + Data Stream 
ROA Profitability EBIT/Total Assets      + Data Stream 
MTV Firm Growth Market-to-book ratio      + Data Stream 
Divi Dividend Cash dividend divided by 
sales 
     + Data Stream 
Control Variables     
Size Firm Size Natural logarithm of total 
asset 
     + Data Stream 
Aud Auditor Type Dummy variable “1” for firm 
audited by  Big 4 and “0” 
otherwise 
     + Data Stream 
MCCG MCCG Dummy Dummy variable “1” for 
event before MCCG 2012 
and “0” otherwise 
     + Annual 
Report and 
Data Stream  
5.3.3 Value Relevance of MFRS 124 Adoption 
In value-relevance studies, price model by Ohlson (1995) and return model developed 
and empirically proven by Easton and Harris (1991) are used to measure the 
relationship between stock price and accounting numbers. Kothari and Zimmerman 
(1995) document that Easton and Harris's model is preferred by most of the researchers 
than price model for its simplicity, but price model coefficients are proved to be less 
biased. In order to arrive at strong and justifiable results, this study tested the both 
models to assess the value-relevant of RPT disclosure before and after the mandatory 
adoption of MFRS 124. Price model is popular in value relevance literature and was 
used by Barth et al., (2008), Hamberg and Beisland, (2014) and Oliveira et al., (2010). 
The model defines the relationship between stock price, the book value of equity and 
net income. Mathematically can be depicted as follows: 
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MVPS = α0 + β1BVPSit + β2EPSit + β3Vit + εit                                                          (2) 
Where:  
MVPS = Market Value per Share 
BVPS = Book Value per Share  
EPS = Accounting Earning per Share  
V = other non-accounting information available 
α = Constant 
β = Coefficients in the regression model 
Ɛ  = Error term  
i = Entity (Firm) 
t = Time period 
The model 2 was adjusted to assess the value-relevance of RPT disclosure by replacing 
the V with the RPT firms as follows: 
MVPS = α0 + β1BVPSit + β2EPSit + β3RPTFirmsit + εit    (3) 
Where:  
RPTFirms = Dummy variable set equal to one for firms with RPTs disclosures, zero 
for otherwise. Other variables as defined above. RPTFirms are defined 
in section 5.2.4.1. 
The model 2 was further expanded to assess the changes in value-relevance of the 




MVPS = α0 + β1BVPSit + β2EPSit + β3RPTFirmsit + β4BVPSit*RPTFirmsit + 
β5EPSit*RPTFirmsit + εit         (4)6 
Where:  
BVPSit*RPTFirmsit = BVPSit multiply by RPTFirmit  
EPSit*RPTFirmsit = EPSit multiply by RPTFirmit.   
Other variables are as defined above. 
As mentioned earlier, the study used the return model to robust the outcome of the 
previous model. Return model that depends on the level of earnings was employed by 
many studies (Gul, Lynn, & Tsui, 2002; Ismail et al., 2013; Kothari & Zimmerman, 
1995). It describes how changes in stock price relate to the level of income.  Return 
model is depicted as follows: 
R = α0 + β1NetIncomeit + β2RPTFirmsit + β3NetIncome*RPTfirmsit + εit (5) 
Where:  
R= (Price in month t − Price in month t−1)/Price in month t−1. Returns are 
accumulated during the 12-month period covering trading months, preceding 
March 31st of each year.  
NetIncomeit = Net earnings of the firm in year t scaled by market value of equity in t−1. 
NetIncomeit*RPTFirmsit = Net earnings multiply by RPTFirmsit. Other variables as 
previously defined. 
                                                     




5.3.4 Real Earnings Management 
5.3.4.1 Real Earnings Management in RPTs 
This study adopts the models developed and used by Roychowdhury (2006) to 
estimate the abnormal production cost, cash flow from operations and discretionary 
expenses. Subsequent studies on REM studies (see for example Cohen & Zarowin, 
2010; Cupertino et al., 2015; Doukakis, 2014; Zang, 2012) have proved that the 
models capture real-activity manipulations. The models were estimated for each 
industry to control for industry peculiarities on the dependent variables (Doukakis, 
2014). 
Model Specification 
CFO/Assetst-1  = α0 + β1(1/Assetst-1) + β2(Salest/Assetst-1) + β3(ΔSalest/Assetst-1)      
+ εt       (6) 
PROD/Assetst-1 = α0 + β1(1/Assetst-1) + β2(Salest /Assetst-1) +β3(ΔSalest/Assetst-1) 
+β4 (ΔSalest-1/Assetst-1) + εt    (7) 
DISC/Assetst-1 = α0 + β1(1/Assetst-1) + β2(Salest-1/Assetst-1) + εt  (8)                                                                
Where  
CFO = cash flows from operations 
PROD = production costs, defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change 
in inventories from year t-1 to year t  
 DISC = discretionary expenses defined as selling, general and administrative 
expenses  
Assetst-1 = Total assets in year t-1  
ΔSalest = change in sales from year t-1 to year t  
ΔSalest-1 = change in previous sales from year t-2 to year t-1  
 
 174 
Abnormal level of CFO, abnormal level of production costs and abnormal level 
discretionary expenses for each firm-year are computed as residuals from the predicted 
(normal) value from the corresponding industry regression. Each of the model 
measures a relevant aspect of REM. When the firm actual cash flow from operation is 
lower than the predicted value from the equation 6, then abnormal cash flow 
(Ab_CFO) from operation is negative as a result of lower margin to accelerate current 
year’s sales by offering sales discount or relax credit terms. Similarly, if the actual 
production costs are higher than the value predicted by the equation 7, then the 
abnormal production cost (Ab_PRO) is positive indicating that the firm manipulates 
earnings by altering the level of production to lower its cost of goods sold. Lastly, 
when the actual discretionary expenditure is lower than the predicted value computed 
from equation 8, then the abnormal discretionary (Ab_DISC) expenditure is negative 
suggesting earnings manipulation by the altering expenditure (that do not generate 
immediate revenue) such as employee training, R&D, advertising and alike.  
Consistent with the extant literature (see for example Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; 
Cupertino et al., 2015; Doukakis, 2014; Zang, 2012), the residual of Ab_CFO 
(equation 6) and Ab_DISC (equation 8) are transformed by multiplying them with 
minus one (-1) to have a uniform sign for all REM measures.  Hence abnormally high 
values indicate REM across the three models. 
Thus, the model for estimating the REM in RPTs is as follow: 




REM = (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) as described above. The test is repeated 
for each of the three proxies for REM 
Size = natural logarithm of total assets  
MTV = market-to-book value  
ROA = earnings before extraordinary incomes (EBXI), scaled by total assets  
RPTFirms = Dummy variable equals to one for the RPTFirms and zero for otherwise. 
RPTFirms are defined in section 5.2.4.1 
5.3.4.2 Real Earnings Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
Following Downs et al. (2016), Kim et al. (2017) and Wang (2002), this study use 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value to investigate the relationship between REM in 
RPTs and firm value. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of total liabilities scaled by total assets. Fama and French (1998) argued that 
regression of cross-sectional data has an upper hand over an event study in valuing the 
firms. This is because it is based on the long-term effect of the firm characteristics on 
the firm value. The variable of interest in the above equation is the proxy of REM (EM 
proxy).  
Tobins’Q = α0 + β1REMit + β2Sizeit + β3ROAit + β4ChangeNIit + β5Bindit + β6 Aexpit 
+ β7 Aindit + β8 Tunnit + β9 Propit + β10Leverageit + β11Dividendit + β12Liquidityit 
+ β13Auditit + β14Industryit + εtit         (10)  
Where  




REM = one of the three proxies for REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) as 
determined in section 5.4.4.1. The test is repeated for each of the three proxies 
for REM  
ChangeNI = change in a firm’s EBXI, scaled by total asset in year t-1 
Leverage = total debt, scaled by total assets; Dividend = declared dividend, scaled by 
total assets 
Liquidity = Current assets by current liabilities; Audit = audit fee, scaled by total asset 
Industry = dummy variable 1 for firm manufacturing sectors and 0 otherwise. 
Others as defined in section 5.4.2 
5.3.5 Mitigating Effect of Compliance with MFRS 124 on Real Earnings 
Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
Equation 11 is used to investigate the mitigating effect of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements on RPTs on the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm 
value. The model was arrived at after adding the level of compliance with MFRS 124 
(Dscore) and the interacting variable with REM proxy (REM proxy*Dscore). The 
variable of interest in the above equation is the interaction of proxy of REM with the 
Dscore (EM proxy * Dscore). 
Tobin’s Q = α0 + β1REMit + β2Dscoreit + β3REMit* Dscoreit + β4Sizeit + β5ROAit + 
β6ChangeNIit + β7Bindit + β8 Aexpit + β9 Aindit + β10 Tunnit + β11 Propit + 
β12Leverageit + β13Dividendit + β14Liquidityit + β15Auditit + β16Industryit + εtit 
           (11)  
Where  




REM = one of the three proxies for REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) as 
determined in section 5.4.4.1. The test is repeated for each of the three proxies 
for REM  
Dscoreit = Points scored by a firm divided by the total obtainable points as defined in 
section 5.4.1 
β3REMit* Dscoreit = REM multiply by Dscoreit 
Other variables are as previously defined. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the research variables, their measurement models, expectation 




Table 5.2  
Description of Variables Measurement 
Acronym Formula Data Source 
Value-Relevance models  
Price model MVPS = α0 + β1BVPSit + β2EPSit + β3RPTFirmsit 
+ εit …………………….……………...…….(3) 
Data Stream 
MFRS Effect MVPS = α0 + β1BVPSit + β2EPSit + β3RPTFirmsit 
+ β4BVPSit* RPTfirmsit+ β5EPSit*RPTfirmsit + 




R = α0 + β1 NetIncomeit + β2RPTFirmsit 
β3NetIncome*RPTfirmsit + εit ………………(5) 
Data Stream 
Real Earnings Management Models   
CFO model α0 + β1(1/Assetst-1) + β2(Salest/Assetst-1) + 




α0 + β1(1/Assetst-1) + β2(Salest /Assetst-1 





DISXP/Assetst-1 = β 0 + β1(1/Assetst-1) + β2 




Y = α0 + β1Sizeit + β2MTVit + β3ROAit + 
β4RPTFirmsit + εtit …………………………...(9) 




Y = α0 + β1REM proxyit + β2Sizeit + β3ROAit + 
β4ChangeNIit + β5Bindit + β6 Aexpit + β7 Aindit + 
β8 Tunnit + β9 Propit + β10Leverageit + 
β11Dividendit + β12Liquidityit + β13Auditit + 
β14Industryit + εtit. …………………………..(10) 




Y = α0 + β1REMproxyit + β2Dscoreit + 
β3REMproxyit* Dscoreit + β4Sizeit + β5ROAit + 
β6ChangeNIit + β7Bindit + β8 Aexpit + β9 Aindit + 
β10 Tunnit + β11 Propit + β12Leverageit + 
β13Dividendit + β14Liquidityit + β15Auditit + 
β16Industryit + εtit……………………………(11) 
Data Stream & 
announcement 
5.4 Sample Selection Procedure 
The population of this study consists of all firms listed on both security markets of 
Bursa Malaysia.  Bursa Malaysia comprises two security markets namely Main and 
ACE markets. The Main market is the security market where mostly big and some 
medium firms are registered upon meeting admission criteria. ACE market is designed 
to enable high growing small and medium size enterprises to meet their financing 
needs. Firms are registered on the ACE market after meeting the lax market admission 
criteria than that of the Main market.  
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Target population refers to the members of the general population that meet the crucial 
characteristics needed to form a data source  (Zikmund et al., 2013). The target 
population of the study consists of firms that are listed on Bursa Malaysia for the 
period of at least three years before IFRS mandatory adoption year (2009, 2010 and 
2011) and three years after the adoption (2013, 2014 and 2015). This is to enable the 
researcher to access consistent and relevant annual reports pertaining to the period 
under study. Firms that operate in the Banks and other financial service, close-end 
fund, REIT and SPAC sectors were eliminated from the population of the study. This 
is consistent with the works of Abdul Latif (2010), and Roychowdhury (2006) which 
state that those firms have other regulators that monitor their disclosure behavior. 
Additional filtration criteria were applied on the target population to form different 
final samples based on the objectives thesis. To arrive at the sample size for the four 
objectives of the study (objective one, two, four and five), firms  with trading RPTs of 
up to 20% of its revenue or the firms that engage in more than one form of RPTs in a 
given year were identified through circulars, market release and annual reports and 
used as the sample of the study7. Table 5.3 presents the detail procedures adopted, 
number of firms for each industry and for each year for the sample size as presented 
below. 
                                                     
7 The justification has been provided in the section 5.2.4.1 of this thesis. 
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Table 5.3  
Sample selection procedure, industry and year distribution 
Details No. Obs. Industry No. Obs. % Year Obs. Percent 
Total firm year observation 996 6972 Construction 10 27 4.1% 2009 92 14.1% 
Banks and other financial service, closed-end, REIT 
and SPAC  141 (987) Consumer products 32 143 21.9% 2010 94 14.4% 
Non-highly regulated firm years 855 5985 Hostel  1 2 0.3% 2011 96 14.7% 
Dead, delisted and non-equity firms 39 (273) Industrial products 58 227 34.7% 2012 100 15.3% 
Firm years with continuing operations 816 5712 IPC 2 4 0.6% 2013 96 14.7% 
Firms without complete data 83 (581) Plantation 19 69 10.6% 2014 97 14.8% 
8Final firms/observations available for the study 
to test real earnings management in RPTs 733 5131 Properties 16 35 5.4% 2015 79 12.1% 
Firms without intention or actual RPT 379 (2653) Technology 11 41 6.3%    
Firms with  actual RPT 354 2478 Trading and services 34 106 16.2%    
Firms/firm-years without  actual RPT    0 (1389)        
Firms/firm-years with  actual RPT 354 1089        
Firms/firm-year with less 20% or multiple RPT 171 (435)        
Final Firms/firm-years available for the study 183 654 Total 183 654 100% Total 654 100% 
 
                                                     
8 Consistent with the Roychowdhury (2006) these firm-year observations are used as full sample to test real earnings management in RPTs. RPTFirms are expected to exhibit 
abnormally low cash flow from operations, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expense. These characteristics evidenced the REM in RPT, 
hence can be used as experiment variable in any earnings management studies. 
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To arrive at the sample size for the value-relevance of the disclosed RPTs (objective 
three), firms with non 31st December year-end were excluded from the total firms with 
complete data (733 firms) available for the study. This practice is consistent with 
existing literature (Alali & Foote, 2012; Ku Ismail, 2003). This process ensures that 
the sample has a uniform accounting year-end and same firm-year observation in both 
pre and post-MFRS 124 adoptions which help in depicting a clear picture of the market 
reaction to the release of accounting numbers. Table 5.4 presents the sample selection 
process as follow. 
Table 5.4  
Sample selection procedure  (Value-Relevance) 
Details No. Obs. Industries Firms Obs. Years Obs. 
Firms listed on Bursa Malaysia  996 Construction 21 126 2009 369 
Less: Financial service firms 141  Consumer 46 276 2010 369 
Dead, delisted and non-equity firms 39  Hostel 4 24 2011 369 
Firms not listed throughout the period of 
study 83 -263 
Industrial 
products 122 732 2013 369 
Firms with complete data 733 IPC 2 12 2014 369 
Less: Firms with non-31 December year-end -364 Plantation 23 138 2015 369 
Firm included in the final sample 369 Properties 12 72   
Number of years 6 Technology 44 264   
   
Trading and 
services 95 570   
Total    2214  369 2214 Total 2214 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the research variables are redefined and research hypotheses are drafted 
therefrom. This study employed the ontological, epistemological, axiological, 
rhetorical and methodological assumptions of positivism paradigm in the 
operationalization process. Appropriate design has been drafted and followed to arrive 
at the valid findings and conclusion at the end of the study. Based on this, this study 
adopts the measures of the research variables from the existing literature. Weighted 
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disclosure index approach and multivariate regression model are used to assess the 
extent of and determinants of compliance with disclosure requirement on RPTs. The 
study applies the Ohlson’ price model and Easton’ return model to measure the value-
relevance of the disclosed RPTs. Similarly, the study employs the Roychowdhury 
model to capture REM practices in RPTs. Also, the study used regression analyses to 
investigate the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. Lastly, hierarchical 
regression method was adopted to investigate the moderating role of compliance with 






ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION I  
THE EXTENT AND DETERMINANTS OF RELATED PARTY 
TRANSACTIONS (RPT) DISCLOSURE 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analyses and interpretations of the first two objectives of the 
study. The objectives are the extent of compliance and the determinants of compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standards on RPTs. The chapter 
also explains the sampled firms, observations and related descriptive statistics for the 
firms. The multiple regression part of the chapter discusses the results of the 
multivariate regression diagnostic tests and the results of the estimation model. Lastly, 
the chapter concludes with the additional analyses. 
6.1 Extent of Compliance with the Accounting Standard on RPTs 
This section presents the data analyses and discussions on the first objective of the 
study. The section deals with the research findings on the extent of compliance with 
the accounting standard on RPTs. 
6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of RPT Firms 
Table 6.1 presents the sectoral pattern of the firms that involved in the actual related 
party transactions (RPTs). From 2009 to 2015, a total of 183 firms from nine sectors 
of the Bursa Malaysia have involved in 654 various types of RPTs. Industrial products 
sector records the highest number of RPTs firms (58 firms) with the 227 incidents of 
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RPTs representing 34.7% of the total RPTs during the period under review. Consumer 
products sector is the second largest RPTs with the 143 cases from 32 firms 
representing 21.9% of the total related party transactions, then followed by trading and 
services sector with the 106 cases from 34 firms representing 16.2% of the total 
transaction. 
Table 6.1  
Industry classification of RPT firms 
Industry No. Observations Percentage 
Construction 10 27 4.1% 
Consumer products 32 143 21.9% 
Hotel  1 2 0.3% 
Industrial products 58 227 34.7% 
IPC 2 4 0.6% 
Plantation 19 69 10.6% 
Properties 16 35 5.4% 
Technology 11 41 6.3% 
Trading and services 34 106 16.2% 
Total 183 654 100% 
 
The number of firms that engage in RPTs from trading and services sector is 34 which 
is greater than 32 firms from the consumer products. This indicates that consumer 
products sector has more repeated RPTs firms than trading and services sector. Other 
sectors include plantation sector which records 69 cases, then followed by 41 cases for 
technology, 35 cases for properties, 27 cases for construction, 4 cases for IPC and 2 
cases for hotel representing 10.6%,  6.3%, 5.4%, 4.1%, 0.6% and 0.3% of the total 
RPTs for plantation, technology, properties, construction, IPC and hotel sectors 
respectively. 
Table 6.2 displays the trend of the RPTs on yearly basis. It shows a nearly stable case 
of RPTs across the study period. However, further analysis portrays an increase in the 
number of RPT cases from 92 cases in 2009 to the 94 cases in 2010 and 96 cases in 
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2011 representing 14.1%, 14.4% and 14.7% of the total RPTs respectively. The 
number of cases increases further to its highest of 100 cases in 2012 representing 
15.3% of the total RPTs.  
Table 6.2  
RPTs Cases based on Year  
Year Observations Percentage 
2009 92 14.1% 
2010 94 14.4% 
2011 96 14.7% 
2012 100 15.3% 
2013 96 14.7% 
2014 97 14.8% 
2015 79 12.1% 
Total 654 100% 
 
RPTs begin to slide down to 96 cases (14.7%), 97 cases (14.8%) and 79 (12.1%) cases 
in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. This signifies that an increased regulation9 of the 
RPTs in 2012 has made the transactions less attractive to some firms leading to its 
decrease from 100 cases in 2012 to 79 cases which are the lowest figure recorded 
throughout the review period. Even though the number of firms that engage in RPTs 
remains considerably high, the magnitude and the frequency of RPTs are affected by 
the changes in the regulatory regime. Nevertheless, the number of Malaysian firms 
that engage in RPTs is not much compared to 90% of Chinese firms as reported by 
Jian and Wong (2010). This is because of the nature of the economic system used by 
the later gave rise to the higher level of government ownership which induced the level 
of related party activities in the economy.   
                                                     
9 Include mandatory adoption of IFRS as reporting standard, introduction of the revised set of Malaysian 
code of corporate governance and alike. 
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Table 6.3 presents the number of times that firms engage in the RPTs. The table shows 
that 55 firms representing 30.03% of the total firms have engaged into RPTs on one 
occasion only throughout the period of the study, while others have repeated the RPTs 
at varying frequencies. Out of the repeated firms, 36 firms representing 19.67% of the 
total firms have engaged in RPTs across all the years under review. 
Table 6.3 
Frequency of RPTs by firms from 2009 to 2015  
No. of RPTs No. of Firms Percentage 
1 55 30.05% 
2 28 15.30% 
3 13 7.10% 
4 20 10.93% 
5 14 7.65% 
6 17 9.29% 
7 36 19.67% 
Total 183 100.00% 
6.1.2 Compliance with the Accounting Standard on RPTs 
One of the objectives of this study is to examine the level of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements on RPTs by listed firms in Malaysia. Table 6.4 presents the 
yearly and overall assessment of the level of compliance with the accounting standard 
on RPTs by the firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia. The descriptive statistics of the 
level of compliance with the accounting standard on RPTs for the period of the study 
reveals that the mean, minimum and maximum level of compliance were 0.705, 0.492 
and 0.912 respectively. This implies that the average level of compliance was 70.5%.  
This finding is closely similar to the mean of 68% and 75% found by Hodgdon et al. 
(2008) and Street and Bryant (2000) in their respective studies. However, the standard 
deviation of 9% for this study is lower than 18% and 19% reported by Hodgdon et al. 
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and Street and Bryant respectively. This indicates more stability in terms of 
compliance behavior of Malaysian firms. Similarly, Glaum et al. (2013) have found 
that the average level of compliance with the IFRS 3 Business Combination and IAS 
36 Impairment of Asset for 17 European countries was 73% with the standard 
deviation of 18%.  The mean of 70.5% in Malaysia is at par with the other countries 
that adopt IFRS as reporting standard such as United Arab Emirate (75%), Saudi 
Arabia (75%), Belgium (74%), France (73%), Kuwait (72%), Qatar (69%) and Italy 
(65%).  
The average of the maximum level of compliance with the accounting standard on 
RPTs for the period was 94.1% which is short of the expected (100%) level of 
compliance. Accounting standards are expected to be complied with in totality and 
anything in short of that can be sanctioned by the appropriate bodies (Houqe et al., 
2012; La Porta et al., 2006). Compliance with the disclosure requirements on the 
management compensation, employee’s retirement benefit plan and arm’s length 
transactions are generally lacking. For example, several firms state that the 
transactions were based on negotiated price. This piece of information may not allow 
the users to assess the motive and the faithfulness of the transactions that a firm 
engages with the other related parties. The information on the provision for and the 
actual bad debt was also lacking. 
Table 6.4  
Descriptive Statistics of the MFRS 124 compliance 
IFRS 24 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 All 
Mean 0.708 0.702 0.715 0.706 0.699 0.698 0.707 0.705 
Std. Dev. 0.091 0.089 0.097 0.089 0.089 0.086 0.086 0.089 
Min 0.471 0.471 0.529 0.441 0.471 0.471 0.588 0.441 
Max 0.941 0.912 0.941 0.912 0.882 0.882 0.912 0.941 




The year-by-year analyses also reveal the steady level of compliance across the study 
period. The mean of the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs was 70.8%, 70.2%, 71.5%, 70.6%, 69.9%, 69.8% and 
70.7% for 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 years respectively. This 
indicates that the mandatory adoption of IFRS as reporting standard in 2012 did not 
increase the level of compliance with the accounting standard on the RPTs. This may 
be connected to the fact that the previous accounting standards (FRSs) are 
substantially similar to IFRSs (Ismail et al., 2013). The second possible reason can be 
attributed to the effect of early adopters of IFRS as reporting standard. Since it was 
permitted to use the IFRS as reporting standard before 2012, some firms have 
voluntarily adopted the IFRS in their financial reporting before the mandatory year.  
Further analyses on the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs as presented in table 6.5 reveal that the level of 
compliance was high for transaction-based requirements (DscoreT) compared to non-
transaction-based requirements (DscoreG) when the total compliance was partitioned 
into transaction-based disclosure requirements and non-transaction-based disclosure 
requirements. The mean compliance of transaction-based disclosure requirements was 
84.45% which is much higher than 58.1% for non-transaction-based disclosure 
requirements. This indicates that firms disclose more information on trading 
transactions with the related parties, while the other segments of the requirements are 
more or less neglected.  
Consistently, as presented in table 6.5 there is a significant difference in the mean of 
the compliance level of the two groups of the disclosure requirements.  The mean 
compliance for DscoreT was 0.844 which is higher than 0.581the mean compliance 
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for the non-transaction-based disclosure. The implication of this finding is that 
managers conceal information on non-transaction-based disclosure requirements. 
Cross examination of the compliance index reveals that some of the non-transaction-
based disclosure requirements in the accounting standard on RPTs are not been 
complied with appropriately. These requirements include disclosure of the total 
managerial compensation most especially related to the long-term and termination 
benefits which may be an item of interest to the relevant users of the financial 
statement and are mostly lacking in the financial statements. 
Table 6.5  
IFRS 24 compliance on disclosure type 
Disclosure 
Type N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max t-stat P-value 
DscoreT 654 0.844 0.127 0.375 1.000 39.3542*** 0.0000 
DscoreG 654 0.581 0.119 0.222 0.944   
 DscoreT refers to the transaction-based disclosure requirement 
 DscoreG refers to the non-transaction-based disclosure requirement 
Table 6.6 presents the results of the comparison between the means of the level of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs by 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Manufacturing firms constitute the firms 
listed under construction, consumer products, industrial products, plantation and 
properties segments of the Bursa Malaysia. On the other hand, non-manufacturing 
firms are firms registered under the hotel, independent power companies, technology 
and trading and services segment of the market. The results proved a higher level of 
compliance by the manufacturing firms and a significant difference in the mean of the 
level of compliance with the requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. This 
can be attributed to the fact that some manufacturing firms source their raw materials 
from the related parties and most of their revenue come also from the related parties. 
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This indicates that manufacturing firms have more tendencies in engaging in varieties 
of RPTs than non-manufacturing counterpart as confirm by the number of 
observations in manufacturing activities (501) against the (153) for the non-
manufacturing observations. 
Table 6.6  
Firm-Industry analyses on IFRS 24 compliance 
Industry N Mean t-stat P-value 
Manufacturing 501 0.713338 4.3325*** 0.0000 
Non-manufacturing 153 0.6780085   
 
Conclusively, the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs 
(71%) by the firms listed on Bursa Malaysia can be seen as moderate level of 
compliance. Although Glaum et al. (2013)  termed the 73% level of compliance with 
the IFRS 3 Business Combination and IAS 36 Impairment of Asset for 17 European 
countries as low compliance, this cannot warrant the 71% of compliance in Malaysia 
to be seen as low. This is because of the differences in term of capital market 
development, ownership structure, corporate governance mechanisms, legal 
enforcement, economic, cultural and political factors among the others between the 
sampled countries. Moreover, this level of compliance is at par with other countries 
such as United Arab Emirate (75%), Saudi Arabia (75%), Belgium (74%), France 
(73%), Kuwait (72%), Qatar (69%) and Italy (65%).  
6.2 Determinants of Compliance with the Accounting Standard on RPTs 
This section presents the data analyses and discussions on the second objective of the 
study. The section deals with the analyses and interpretations of the research findings 
on the determinants of compliance with the accounting standard on RPTs. 
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6.2.1 Summary Statistics on Determinants of Compliance with the Accounting 
Standard on RPTs 
This section presents and discusses the descriptive statistics of the research variables 
used for the first segment of the data analyses and interpretations. Descriptive statistics 
are used to condense and present data in a logical form to allow for a quick 
understanding of an event, behavior or circumstances.  
Table 6.7 presents the descriptive statistics of the determinants of compliance with the 
disclosure requirement of the accounting standard on RPTs for the continuous 
variables. The results show that the mean of the board independence (Bind) is around 
45% and the standard deviation of 11.5% for the variable is not much volatile. On 
average, the mean of Bind is above the one-third requirement of the MCCG (2007) as 
independent directors. The minimum value of 20% for the Bind indicates that there 
still exist some firms that yet to meet the requirement of at least one-third for 
independent directors.  
The mean, minimum and maximum of the board size (Bsize) was 7.83, 3 and 17 
respectively. This indicates that on average, 8 persons sit on the board of Malaysian 
firms with a minimum of 3 persons and maximum of 17 persons. This is similar to the 
size of Singaporean firms with the average of 8 persons on the board and maximum 
and minimum of 13 and 4 persons respectively (Cheng & Courtenay 2006). 
Comparatively, the average size of Malaysian boards is similar to the 7 persons 
obtainable in the UK (Guest, 2008), and differs with the 11 persons in Spain (Castro 




Summary statistics on independent variables (Continuous Variables) 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Bind 0.4450 0.429 0.2 1 0.1154 0.9984 4.3092 
Bsize 7.8349 8 3 17 1.9140 0.6269 4.0129 
Aexp 0.8261 1 0.25 1 0.2416 -0.9880 2.5334 
Cown 0.2013 0.1014 0 0.8288 0.2264 0.8118 2.4217 
Fmown 0.2773 0.2823 0 0.8302 0.2622 0.2983 1.6960 
Mown 0.2862 0.3004 0 0.8302 0.2421 0.2369 1.7684 
Frown 0.1623 0.0228 0 0.8619 0.2319 1.2561 3.1958 
RoA 0.0508 0.0617 -0.5688 0.4745 0.1664 -0.9902 6.9479 
MTV -0.0195 -0.0894 -2.3752 2.3814 0.8150 0.5373 3.9196 
Divi 0.0635 0.015 0 0.4 0.1120 2.1498 6.3891 
Size 13.2463 13.233 9.317 17.673 1.4698 0.0534 2.8386 
Bind = Board independence; Bsize = Board size; Aexp = Audit committee expertise; Cown = CEO 
ownership; Fmown = Family ownership; Mown= Managerial ownership; Frown = Foreign ownership; 
ROA = Return on assets; MTV = Market to book value; Divi = Dividend; Size = Firm size. 
 
The result also reveals the mean of audit committee expertise (Aexp) as 0.8261 and 
the minimum of 0.25, an indication that independent directors with financial expertise 
have dominated the audit committee of the Malaysian corporate boards. By examining 
the ownership structure, the results reinforced the findings of Abdullah (2006) and 
Wahab et al. (2011) on the concentrated ownership structure of Malaysian firms. CEO 
ownership (Cown) ranges from zero to 83% with the mean of 20%. This range is at 
par with the pattern of Cown obtainable in other countries with concentrated 
ownership structure. The mean of Cown in Greek is 23% as reported by Bekiris 
(2013). The mean of family ownership (Fmown) was 28%, indicating the presence of 
family firms in the country. Family ownership has the highest of 83% in some firms 
and absent of family ownership in others. A similar structure with the mean of 19% 
and highest ownership of 85% was recorded by the USA firms (Anderson et al., 2003). 
The mean of managerial ownership (Mown) as presented in table 6.8 was 29% 
indicating a strong presence of managerial control. This is in line with the figure 
reported by other Malaysian studies such as 8.26% by Kamardin et al. (2015) and 
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17.68% by Mustafa et al. (2011). The Mown ranges from zero to 83%. A similar trend 
was recorded in Taiwan with the mean of 25% (Liang et al., 2012) and a mean of 35% 
and a maximum of 92% in Greek. The mean of foreign ownership (Frown) was 16% 
with the standard deviation of 0.23. The average foreign ownership in Malaysia has 
recorded a significant level of growth compared to just 6.31% reported by Said, et al 
in (2009). This can be seen as the result of the deregulation of the foreign investment 
committee during 2009 to 2012. With this development, Malaysian foreign ownership 
may in near future be at par with 25% in Australia (Henry, 2010) and 32% in sub-
Saharan Africa (Munisi et al., 2014). 
Profitability, as measured by return on asset (ROA), has a mean of 5%, while the mean 
of the firms’ growth (MTV) was 2%. Dividend (Divi) was having a mean of 6% and 
standard deviation of 11%. The mean, median, minimum and maximum values of the 
firm size (Size) is 13.25, 13.23, 9.32 and 17. 67 respectively. The slight difference 
between the mean and median of the firm size indicates that the variable is normally 
distributed as reaffirmed by the skewness of 0. 0534 and kurtosis of 2.8386. 
Table 6.8 presents the descriptive statistics of the determinants of compliance with the 
disclosure requirement of the accounting standard on RPTs for the dichotomous 
variables. The mean of the audit committee independence (Aind) was 0.5642 
indicating that independent directors dominate the membership of audit committee in 
most of the Malaysian firms. This is consistent with the requirement of MCCG (2007) 
that independent directors should constitute the majority of audit committee members. 
The distribution of the Aind i.e. skewness (-0.2590) and kurtosis (1.0671) are within 
the normal range. The mean of CEO expertise (Cexp) was 51% indicating that more 
than 50% of the CEOs are financially literate. The skewness and kurtosis of Cexp 
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demonstrate the normal distribution of the Cexp among the firms. The mean of CEO 
family (Cfml) is 49% indicating almost 50% of the sample firms have a family 
member as CEO of the firm. This is consistent with the Cheng (2014) who reports that 
founding family retain more than 62% of the CEO position in a family owned firms 
to ensure that their interest is protected. 
Table 6.8 
Summary statistics on independent variables (Dichotomous Variables) 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Aind 0.5642 1 0 1 0.4962 -0.2590 1.0671 
Cexp 0.5183 1 0 1 0.5000 -0.0734 1.0054 
Cfml 0.4878 0 0 1 0.5002 0.0489 1.0024 
Tunn 0.4205 0 0 1 0.4940 0.3221 1.1038 
Prop 0.4159 0 0 1 0.4933 0.3413 1.1165 
Aud 0.5596 1 0 1 0.4968 -0.2402 1.0577 
MCCG 0.5688 1 0 1 0.4956 -0.2779 1.0772 
Dscore = Points scored by a firm divided by the maximum obtainable points; Bind = Board 
independence; Bsize = Board size; Aind = Audit committee independence; Aexp = Audit committee 
expertise; Cexp = CEO expertise; Cfam = CEO family; Cown = CEO ownership; Fmown = Family 
ownership; Frown = Foreign ownership; Tunn = Tunneling; Prop = Propping; ROA = Return on assets; 
MTV = Market to book value; Divi = Dividend; Size = Firm size; Aud= Auditor type; MCCG = 
Malaysia code of corporate governance dummy. 
 
On average, 42% of the firms have been expropriated as displayed by the mean of 
tunneling (Tunn). Though Tunn is highly volatile with the standard deviation of 49%, 
its distribution is within the normal range. Extant literature provides that in most cases 
profitable firms are subjected to expropriation while non-performing firms are 
propped up by the controlling holders (Peng et al., 2011; Ying & Wang, 2013). Based 
on this, the result reveals that 42% of the sampled firms are highly profitable and are 
subjected to expropriation. The mean of the propping (Prop) on the other hand reveals 
that 42% of sampled firms have been propped up by their controlling shareholders. 
This indicates that propped-up firms performed below the average profitability.  
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The average of 0.5596 in the audit quality (Audi) indicates that almost 56% of the 
sample firm-year were audited by Big-4 auditing firms. This provides an insight of 
higher audit quality among the sample firms. The skewness of -0. 2402 and kurtosis 
of 1.0577 indicate that the variable was normally distributed. The mean of time 
variable (MCCG) 0.5688 signifies that almost 57% of the sampled firm-years are 
during the post-MCCG 2012 period. This implies that MCCG 2012 has not reduced 
the volume or magnitude of RPTs among the Malaysian listed firms. The skewness of 
-0.2779 and kurtosis of 1.0772 indicates that MCCG was normally distributed. 
6.2.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 6.9 presents the correlation matrix for the research variables. Generally, the 
results reveal the less severe multicollinearity problem among the research variables. 
The highest correlation among the research variables was 0.8196 between audit 
committee independence (Aind) and audit committee expertise (Aexp). This indicates 
a strong correlation between the Aind and Aexp. Gujarati (2003) considers a 
correlation of more than 0.5 as high correlation. However, Hair, Black, Babin and 
Anderson (2014) and  Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) state that a correlation of less than 
90% could not be a problem to estimation. Hence, the correlation between Aind and 
Aexp, in this case, does not expose the regression model to severe multicollinearity 
problem. The dependent variable (Dscore) was having a significant and positive 
correlation at 1% level of significance with the board independence (Bind). Similarly, 
the association between Dscore and Aind was positive and significant at 10% level of 
significance. Based on this, it can be inferred that audit committee independence also 
affects the firm’s level of compliance. Though the correlation is not as statistically 
significant as that of Bind. 
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Aexp was found to have a significant positive correlation at 1% with the Dscore. This 
can be interpreted that Aexp influences the firm’s extent of disclosure practice. 
Nevertheless, causal analyses need to be employed to validate this initial insight. The 
correlation between Dscore with the CEO ownership was negative and significant at 
10%. This also provides a preliminary clue of the effect of CEO ownership on the 
firm’s level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard 
on RPTs. The association between Dscore and return on asset (ROA) was negative 
and significant at 10% level of significance. This indicates a possible negative effect 
of the profitability on the firm’s disclosure behavior. Dscore was having a significant 
positive correlation with the dividend payment. From this, one can infer that dividend 
payment affects the firm’s level of disclosure practice. A similar correlation was found 
by Dscore with the firm size and audit quality.
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Table 6.9  
Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Research Variables 
  Dscore Bind Bsize Aind Aexp Cexp Cfml Cown Fmown Frown 
Dscore 1          
Bind 0.1309*** 1         
Bsize 0.0103 -0.3333*** 1        
Aind 0.0702* 0.3536*** 0.0950** 1       
Aexp 0.1377*** 0.2825*** 0.0805** 0.8196*** 1      
Cexp 0.0295 0.0095 0.1952*** -0.0017 -0.0308 1     
Cfml -0.0636 -0.0936* 0.0267 -0.0431 -0.0575 -0.1613*** 1    
Cown -0.0672* -0.0244 0.009 0.1294*** 0.0754* -0.2070*** 0.4763*** 1   
Fmown 0.057 -0.0133 0.0017 0.0481 0.0158 -0.0625 0.6727*** 0.4804*** 1  
Frown -0.0225 0.005 0.0078 -0.0906** -0.1528*** 0.1805*** -0.3191*** -0.3523*** -0.2248*** 1 
Mown 0.0102 -0.1179*** 0.0313 0.0782** 0.028 -0.1862*** 0.5010*** 0.7582*** 0.6147*** -0.3006*** 
Tunn 0.0087 -0.0411 0.1432*** -0.0072 0.0186 0.0338 -0.0752* -0.0809** -0.0609 0.1371*** 
Prop 0.0025 0.043 -0.1477*** -0.0154 -0.0595 0.0125 0.0517 0.1198*** 0.0884** -0.0867** 
RoA -0.0741* -0.1066*** 0.1110*** -0.0205 -0.0359 0.092** -0.0906** -0.1569*** -0.1226*** 0.1611*** 
MTV 0.047 -0.0002 0.0828** -0.0443 0.0149 0.0927** -0.1687*** -0.0307 -0.1961*** 0.1770*** 
Divi 0.0702* -0.0637 0.1161*** -0.1305*** -0.0900** 0.1210*** -0.2236*** -0.2357*** -0.2038*** 0.4343*** 
Size 0.3616*** 0.0064 0.2885*** 0.1203*** 0.1167*** 0.078** -0.0151 -0.0608 0.0213 0.0761* 
Audi 0.0730* -0.0098 0.1118*** 0.0466 0.0175 0.1250*** -0.0587 -0.0980** -0.0114 0.2709*** 
MCCG -0.0323 0.0752* -0.0364 0.0131 0.0358 0.0258 -0.0213 -0.0529 -0.0372 0.0011 
Dscore = Points scored by a firm divided by the maximum obtainable points; Bind = Board independence; Bsize = Board size; Aind = Audit committee independence; Aexp = 
Audit committee expertise; Cexp = CEO expertise; Cfam = CEO family; Cown = CEO ownership; Fmown = Family ownership; Frown = Foreign ownership; Tunn = Tunneling; 
Prop = Propping; ROA = Return on assets; MTV = Market to book value; Divi = Dividend; Size = Firm size; Aud= Auditor type; MCCG = Malaysia code of corporate 




Table 6.9 (Continued) 
  Mown Tunn Prop RoA MTV Divi Size Audi MCCG 
Mown 1         
Tunn -0.0597 1        
Prop 0.1166*** -0.7188*** 1       
RoA -0.1298*** 0.6178*** -0.6424*** 1      
MTV -0.1408*** 0.3640*** -0.3337*** 0.3664*** 1     
Divi -0.2669*** 0.4094*** -0.3676*** 0.4362*** 0.4564*** 1    
Size -0.0678* 0.1254*** -0.1719*** 0.1041*** 0.0379 0.2581*** 1   
Audi -0.1181*** 0.1317*** -0.1139*** 0.1725*** 0.1700*** 0.2459*** 0.2562*** 1  
MCCG -0.0322 -0.0777** 0.0707 -0.0229 0.061 -0.0512 0.0592 -0.082** 1 
Dscore = Points scored by a firm divided by the maximum obtainable points; Bind = Board independence; Bsize = Board size; Aind = Audit committee independence; Aexp = 
Audit committee expertise; Cexp = CEO expertise; Cfam = CEO family; Cown = CEO ownership; Fmown = Family ownership; Frown = Foreign ownership; Tunn = Tunneling; 
Prop = Propping; ROA = Return on assets; MTV = Market to book value; Divi = Dividend; Size = Firm size; Aud= Auditor type; MCCG = Malaysia code of corporate 
governance.***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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On the board characteristics, the association between Bind with the Bsize was negative 
and significant. This indicates that the larger the board, the less the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. However, Bind was having a significant positive 
correlation with the Aind and Aexp. This implies that the proportion of independent 
directors on the board influences the level of audit committee independence as well as 
audit committee expertise. This is because independent directors are appointed to the 
board based on their reputation and expertise. Since members of the audit committee 
are part of the board members, the independence and expertise of the board 
automatically manifest in the audit committee.  
The association between Bsize was positive and significant with the Aind, Aexp and 
Cexp. This can signal that CEOs with the financial expertise prefers working with 
large board to tap the vast knowledge and expertise of the board members and apply 
it to the day-to-day management of the firm. Other variables with statistically 
significant correlation with the Bsize are tunneling, propping, ROA, MTV, Dividend, 
firm size and audit quality. Large boards are less likely to involve in the PRT that may 
lead to tunneling or propping. This is because of the number of persons with the 
divergence knowledge and interest that involved in the decision process which makes 
it less possible to reach consensus on the transactions that may harm the firm and 
impede their reputation. More so, large boards are characterized by the high 
profitability, high growth potentials, high dividend payment and with the high quality 
audit. 
Aind was found to have a significant positive correlation with the Cown and Mown. 
This indicates more independent audit committee members in the firms with higher 
CEO or managerial ownerships.  Aind and Aexp were having a significant negative 
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association with the dividend and significant positive association with the firm size 
respectively.  The associations between Aexp with the CEO ownership (Cown), 
dividend and firm size was also statistically significant. 
The association between Cexp with the CEO family (Cfml), Cown and management 
ownership (Mown) was negative and statistically significant. This type of correlation 
has been widely reported in the extent of literature (Barnett, 1960; Bennedsen et al., 
2007; Hillier & McColgan, 2009). Family members or business founders used to be 
the CEO of the firms without due regards to their level of expertise. However, the 
association between Cexp and Frown was positive. The positive correlation between 
Cexp with the ROA, MTV, dividend, firm size and audit quality indicates that firms 
with a financial expert as CEOs are positively associated with the size, profitability, 
dividend payment, growth potential and higher audit quality.  
The correlations between family CEO with the Cown, Fmown and Mown are positive 
and significant. This correlation reveals high tendency of having a family member as 
CEO in a firm with higher CEO ownership, family ownership and managerial 
ownerships. Meanwhile, the Cfml was found to have a significant negative correlation 
with the ROA, MTV and dividend. The correlation between the Cown and other 
research variables and that Fmown with the other research variables are similar to 
those reported in the Cfml. In addition, the significant positive correlation between 
Cown and Fmown with the Mown indicates that firms with the higher CEO and family 
ownerships are managed by the family members. The negative correlation of tunneling 
with the Cfml and Cown provides additional evidence for the underperformance of the 
family member as CEO and CEO owned firms.  
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Firms with the high form of foreign ownership performed better as indicated by the 
positive correlation between Frown with the tunneling and negative correlation with 
the propping. Foreign owned firms are large and profitable firms with the higher 
growth potentials. The positive correlation of Frown with dividend and audit quality 
can be justified that foreign investors usually repatriate their earnings to their local 
countries and engaged the service of big audit firms to guarantee the quality of the 
financial information. 
The strong negative correlation between tunneling and propping indicates that the 
variables are nearly mutually exclusive. Furthermore, the positive correlation between 
tunneling and ROA, MTV, dividend and firm size indicates that large and profitable 
firms with the higher growth potentials and dividend payments are mostly tunneled. 
This may indicate that controlling shareholders engage in expropriation activities 
when the firms are performing well. It is widely believed that higher audit quality 
curtails the extent of tunneling. However, the positive correlation between tunneling 
and audit quality indicates that audit quality as proxied by big-4 auditing firm did not 
constrain the tunneling practices among the firms. Interestingly, the changes and 
improvements in the reporting regulations in 2012 have curtailed the extent of 
tunneling as demonstrated by the negative correlation between tunneling and MCCG. 
The correlation between propping and other research variables was in direct 
opposition to those reported under tunneling. 
On the firm's characteristics, the univariate analysis reveals that profitable firms are 
large firms with the higher growth potentials, good history of dividend payments and 
are been audited by the big audit firms. These correlations are displayed by the 
significant positive correlation of ROA with the MTV, dividend, firm size and audit 
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quality. Similarly, the correlation between MTV with the dividend and audit quality 
are positive and significant. This indicates the dividend payments and high audit 
quality by the firms with the growth potentials. More so firms with the dividend 
payment are found to be large with the high quality audit. The negative correlation 
between audit quality and MCCG indicates a decrease in audit quality in the post-
MCCG period. 
6.2.3 Multiple Regression 
This section presents the results of the diagnostic tests conducted to ensure that the 
research data satisfied all the basic regression assumptions. The section also contains 
the results of the model specification tests to ensure that the research models are 
correctly specified. The section presents the model selection criteria and concludes 
with the presentation and discussion of the results of the estimation models. 
6.2.3.1 Multivariate Regression Diagnostic Test 
The basic assumptions of the linear regression model include that the data should be 
free from outliers, normality, linearity, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. This 
study conducts the Doornik and Hansen (2008) normality test, Breusch and Pagan 
(1980) heteroskedasticity test, Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson (2014) variance 
inflation test of multicollinearity and Pregibon (1980) model specification test. The 
results of these tests are presented in the table 6.10. In addition, the study employs the 
Dixon (1980) outlier treatment method to minimize the effect of the outlier on the 




Table 6.10  
Results of the Diagnostic Tests 
Test p-value 
Test for Normality (Doornik-Hansen) 0.1004 
Heteroskedasticity (Breusch & Pagan) 0.1829 
Test for Multicollinearity (VIF Test) 2.04 
Model specification (Hat test) 0.798 
Model specification (Hat-square) 0.452 
6.2.3.2 Outliers 
Outliers are observations with unique attributes that differ from the other observations 
(Hair et al., 2014). All continuous variables with unusual observations are winsorized 
at 1% top and bottom. Dixon (1980) states that winsorization of data gives more stable 
results than trimmed means. The added variable plots as displayed in figure 6.1 
indicates that the data points of the research variables against the others are within the 
acceptable region.  
 
Figure 6.1  
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Normality is one of the fundamental assumptions of linear regression. Failure to 
satisfy the normality assumption distorts the relationship and the level of significance 
between the research variables and renders the results from the statistical test invalid. 
Doornik-Hansen test for multivariate normality was used in this study to test the 
normal distribution of the residual of the model. This approach is superior to Shapiro-
Wilk test for multivariate distributions (Doornik & Hansen, 2008). The p-value of 
0.1004 as presented in Table 6. 10 indicates that the residual of the model is normally 
distributed. A graphical method of normality test was also employed in this study to 
support the results of the Doornik-Hansen test for multivariate normality. The 
histogram kdensity normal test was performed to check the pictorial distribution of the 
data. Based on Figure 6.2, the residual of the model is normally distributed. 
 

















Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was used in this study to 
test for the homoscedasticity of the regression model. The p-value of 0.1829 in the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity as presented in table 6. 10 
shows that the model is homoscedastic. A graphical residual versus fitted (RVF) plot 
was used to support the result of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity. Figure 6.3 graphs the residuals against the fitted values which 
shows that the dots seem to fluctuate around zero in unpattern direction, hence, 
indicating that the model used in this study is homoscedastic. 
 
 Figure 6.3  




















Linearity assumption provides that the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables should be linear. The linearity between dependent and 
independent variables demonstrates the degree to which changes in the independent 
variable affects the dependent variable. In this study, the linearity relationship is tested 
by comparing the standard deviation of the dependent variable with that of the residual 
of the regression. The rule of thumb is that linearity is achieved if the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable is greater than that of the residual of the model 
(Garson, 2012; Hair et al., 2014). Table 6.11 presents the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable and the residual of the regression. It reveals that the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable is greater than that of the residual. Hence, the 
linearity assumption is satisfied. 
Table 6. 11  
The Standard Deviation of the level of Compliance and Residuals 




Multicollinearity is a situation whereby the independent variables are highly correlated 
with one another. Though multicollinearity does not affect the consistency of ordinary 
least square regression coefficient estimates, it poses a challenge in arriving at 
imprecise and unreliable regression coefficient estimates (Defusco, Leavey, Pinto, & 
Runkle, 2011). The coefficient of the correlation matrix is widely used to detect the 
existence of multicollinearity (Garson, 2012). The highest correlation among the 
research variables was 0.8196 as presented in table 6.9 between audit committee 
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independence and audit committee expertise. This correlation does not pose a 
challenge to the regression coefficient estimates of this study10 as it does not exceed 
the threshold of 90% stated by Hair et al. (2014) and Tabachnik and Fidell (2007).  
To support this, variance inflation factor (VIF) multicollinearity check was conducted 
for each independent variable.  Multicollinearity can be said to exist where the 
tolerance value is less than 0.01 and the VIF is more than 10 (Hair et al., 2014; Pallant, 
2007).  Table 6.12 shows that there is no evidence of multicollinearity problem as both 
tolerance value and VIF are within the acceptable region. 
  
                                                     
10 Separate regressions are run for the variables with strong correlations (i.e. with either Aind or Aexp 
for the audit committee characteristics and another set of regressions with either Fmown or Mown for 
the ownership structure). The sign and significance of the results of these regressions as reported in the 
additional analyses section of this chapter are substantially similar with that of the main analyses. 
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Table 6.12  
Collinearity Statistics: Tolerance Value and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variables Collinearity Statistics 
 Tolerance Value VIF 
Aind 0.28098 3.56 
Aexp 0.30541 3.27 
Mown 0.32024 3.12 
Cown 0.36776 2.72 
Prop 0.3965 2.52 
Fmown 0.41613 2.4 
Tunn 0.41817 2.39 
Cfml 0.4748 2.11 
RoA 0.4768 2.1 
Divi 0.52568 1.9 
Frown 0.66289 1.51 
MTV 0.68225 1.47 
Bind 0.68919 1.45 
Bsize 0.71717 1.39 
Size 0.77739 1.29 
Audi 0.82658 1.21 
Cexp 0.86091 1.16 
MCCG 0.94392 1.06 
Note. The mean VIF = 2.04; whereas VIF = Variance Inflation Factor. Bind = Board independence; 
Bsize = Board size; Aind = Audit committee independence; Aexp = Audit committee expertise; Cexp 
= CEO expertise; Cfam = CEO family; Cown = CEO ownership; Fmown = Family ownership; Frown 
= Foreign ownership; Tunn = Tunneling; Prop = Propping; ROA = Return on assets; MTV = Market to 
book value; Divi = Dividend; Size = Firm size; Aud= Auditor type; MCCG = Malaysia code of 
corporate governance 
6.2.3.7 Model specification Test 
Gujarati (2004) states that model specification bias may be the result of or a 
combination of omission of important relevant variable(s), inclusion of unnecessary 
variable(s), measurement error, adoption of wrong functional form or wrong 
specification of the stochastic error terms. Pregibon (1980) model specification test 
was used to ensure that the model in this study is correctly specified. The results of 
the specification test as presented in table 6.10 reveals that the p-value of the Hat-
square was 0.452. This indicates that the research model has been correctly specify. 
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6.2.4 Model Selection Criteria 
Panel data regression analysis is used where the data are collected from the same unit 
over the period of time. To select the best model for the estimation, Baltagi (2005) 
states that the first step is to determine whether pooled Ordinary Least Square (Pooled-
OLS) or random effect Generalized Least Square (RE-GLS) is appropriate. This is 
achieved through the estimation of heterogeneous (λ) of models using the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effect. When RE model was taken, the 
next step is to identify whether the Random or Fixed effect is more appropriate through 
Hausman specification test. 
However, the above process is designed for the ideal panel data set. Where the panel 
data is extremely unbalanced, Baltagi (2005) suggests the use of Pooled-OLS 
estimators. The technique can be used for unbalanced data set without causing 
inconsistencies to the estimators. Consistently, Davis (2002) provides statistical 
evidence that OLS suffice for unbalanced data set arises from peculiar instances such 
as self-selectivity as was the case of this study. This is because both estimators of 
Pooled-OLS and Maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) produce similar results. The 
Pooled-OLS model was used in several studies of this nature such as Glaum and Street 
(2003), Glaum et al. (2013) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002). In view of this, the Pooled-
OLS model was used and discussed to make meaningful inferences throughout the 
study. 
6.2.5 Regression Results 
Table 6.13 presents the coefficients of the regression for the determinant of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. 
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Board independence and board size are the components of the board characteristics 
adopted in this study to measure their influence in the firm’s compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs.  Board independence 
was measured as the proportion of independent directors on the corporate board. On 
the other hand, board size represents the actual number of persons that sit on the 
corporate board. The coefficient of board independence in this study was positive and 
significant at 1%. This indicates the positive relationship between board independence 
and firm's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on 
RPTs.  
Previous studies have established that board independence enhances the firm 
disclosure practice (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Ferreira, Ferreira, & Raposo, 2011; Patelli 
& Prencipe, 2007). This supports the agency theory that presence of independent 
directors on the board minimizes both type I and II agency problems (Adams et al., 
2008; Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2014; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The result for 
this study is consistent with the Lo and Wong (2011) that independent directors control 
the manager's behavior in RPTs. Hence H1a1 which states that there is a significant 
positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and compliance 




Table 6.13  
Regression Result on the Determinant of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the Accounting Standard on RPTs 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t-value P-value 
Constant 0.338 0.039 8.57 0.000*** 
Bind 0.087 0.033 2.66 0.004*** 
Bsize -0.003 0.002 -1.56 0.06* 
Aind -0.030 0.012 -2.56 0.005*** 
Aexp 0.073 0.023 3.09 0.001*** 
Cexp 0.001 0.007 0.22 0.415 
Cfml -0.022 0.009 -2.44 0.008*** 
Cown -0.089 0.023 -3.90 0.000*** 
Fmown 0.038 0.019 2.06 0.020** 
Mown 0.073 0.023 3.19 0.001*** 
Frown -0.029 0.017 -1.77 0.039** 
Tunn 0.005 0.010 0.49 0.313 
Prop 0.009 0.010 0.85 0.199 
RoA -0.064 0.027 -2.34 0.02** 
MTV 0.012 0.005 2.67 0.008*** 
Divi 0.008 0.039 0.21 0.419 
Size 0.024 0.002 9.93 0.000*** 
Audi -0.001 0.007 -0.16 0.875 
MCCG -0.016 0.007 -2.40 0.017** 
R2 0.2229    
Adj R2 0.2009    
F-stat 10.12***    
N 654    
Equation (1) Dsocre = β0 + β1Bind + β2Bsize + β3Aind + β4Aexp+ β5Cexp + β6Cfam + β7Cown + 
β8Fmown + β9Mown + β10Frown + β11Tunn + β12Prop + β13ROA + β14MTV + β15Divi + β16Size + 
β17Aud + β18MCCG +εt. Dscore = Points scored by a firm divided by the maximum obtainable points; 
Bind = Board independence; Bsize = Board size; Aind = Audit committee independence; Aexp = Audit 
committee expertise; Cexp = CEO expertise; Cfam = CEO family; Cown = CEO ownership; Fmown = 
Family ownership; Frown = Foreign ownership; Tunn = Tunneling; Prop = Propping; ROA = Return 
on assets; MTV = Market to book value; Divi = Dividend; Size = Firm size; Aud= Auditor type; MCCG 
= Malaysia code of corporate governance.***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
It is widely believed that board size affects the firm’s disclosure behavior. The benefit 
of shared responsibility permits board members to go deep into the financial reports 
and ensure that they comply with the requirements of the relevant laws. Based on this, 
it is hypothesized that board size improved the corporate transparency because of the 
diverse knowledge, skills and experience that are present on the large boards. 
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However, the results of this study as presented in table 6.13 do not support this 
hypothesis. The coefficient of the board size was negative and significant at 10%. The 
possible explanation for the negative relationship is the dominance of family members 
and cronies on the board. The finding is in line with Mak and Kusnadi (2005) that 
board size reduces the firm value of Malaysian and Singaporean firms. This by 
extension hampers the firm disclosure behavior. Hence H1a2 which states that there is 
a significant positive relationship between the size of the board and compliance with 
the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs is rejected. 
Another aspect of internal governance mechanisms considered in this study is the audit 
committee characteristics. Audit committee independence and audit committee 
financial expertise were chosen for this study. To ensure the independence of audit 
committee, MCCG (2007) requires that none of the executive directors can be a 
member of the audit committee. This is because, previous studies established that the 
adequacy of independent directors protects the interest of all stakeholders (Lo et al., 
2010; Mallin et al., 2015). 
However, contrary to the expectation, the coefficient of audit committee independence 
was negative and significant at 1%. This proved that audit committee independence 
constrains the extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting 
standard on RPTs. This finding is contrary to the previous studies that audit committee 
independence improves the financial reporting oversight (Black & Kim, 2012; Li, 
Mangena, & Pike, 2012). Hence H1a3 which states that there is a significant positive 
relationship between audit committee independence and compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs is rejected. 
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The possible explanations for this finding may be any of the following issues. First, 
the issue of the substance of the independence of the independent director. Some 
independent directors appears to be independent only in name but not fact. The number 
of years that independent director serves in a firm may impair his independence and 
his ability to form objective view on the firm operations. The second possible 
explanation to this can be related to the issue of the chairman busyness. The busyness 
of chairman is a position where one person heads the board and audit committee 
concurrently. In this setting, the tight schedule of the chairman may not allow him to 
fully participate in the activities of the committee, hence making his membership a 
minus to the committee.  
The second variable under the audit committee characteristics is audit committee 
financial expertise. The committee’s financial expertise allows it to identify internal 
control weaknesses and ask management to take corrective measures accordingly 
within the shortest possible time (Goh, 2009; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007). The 
coefficient of audit committee financial expertise in this study was positive and 
significant at 1%. This indicates the positive relationship between audit committee’ 
financial expertise with the firm's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. The result is consistent with the previous studies that 
audit committee financial expertise mitigates manipulations in RPTs (Abbott et al., 
2004; Davidson III, Xie, & Xu, 2004) and improves the firm’s disclosure practices 
(Carcello et al., 2006). Hence H1a4 which states that there is a significant positive 
relationship between audit committee financial expertise and compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs is accepted. 
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The next category of corporate governance mechanisms in this study is the CEO 
characteristics. CEO characteristics influence firm’s decisions and disclosure 
behavior. Several CEO’s characteristics are used simultaneously in the model to 
analyze the influence of CEO in defining the firm disclosure behavior. These 
characteristics are CEO’s financial expertise, CEO family lineage and CEO 
ownership. A CEO with financial expertise are more likely to pilot the financial affairs 
of the firm effectively (Custódio & Metzger, 2013a). Though the coefficient of the 
CEO expertise is positive as predicted, it is not a statistically significant determinant 
of the compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on 
RPTs. H1a5 which states that there is a significant positive relationship between CEO 
expertise and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard 
on RPTs is rejected. 
The possible reason behind this may be the concentrated ownership structure of the 
firms in Malaysia. The appointment of several financially expert CEO was influenced 
by the extent of their ownership and family decisions, not on the level of their 
competence. Therefore, once the disclosure works against their interest they may 
prefer to conceal the information to avoid the public outburst or market reaction 
against their internal dealing. 
Several studies such as Ansari et al. (2014), Chen et al. (2013) and Chau and Gray 
(2002) prove the influence of the family members on the firm's disclosure practices. 
When the CEO is appointed from within the family, the family members enjoy the 
related monetary and non-monetary benefits11 from the firm and might hesitate to 
replace him regardless of the consequences of his decisions. Therefore, family CEO 
                                                     
11 These benefits are highlighted in section 3.3.1 of this thesis. 
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provide opaque information to hide the rent-seeking activities of the family members 
and covers his under-performance. Consistently, the coefficient of the CEO family 
lineage (Cfml) for this study was negative and significant at 1% level of significance. 
This result supports the hypothesized negative relationship between the CEO family 
lineage and the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting 
standard on RPTs. H1a6 which states that there is a significant negative relationship 
between CEO family lineage and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs is accepted. 
On the CEO ownership, previous studies provide evidence that the level of CEO 
ownership assist in controlling the decision making processes of the CEO owned firms 
(Chen et al., 2008; Kim & Lu, 2011). As hypothesized, the coefficient of CEO 
ownership was negative and significant at 1%. The result reveals the negative 
relationship between CEO ownership and the level of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. This finding is consistent with the 
extent of literature that CEO ownership is associated with the low information 
disclosure to prevent information leakages of proprietary information and rent-seeking 
activities (Fan & Wong, 2002; Gul & Lai, 2002). Hence, H1a7 which states that there 
is a significant negative relationship between CEO ownership and compliance with 
the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs is accepted. 
Other forms of ownership structure considered in the study include family ownership, 
managerial ownership and foreign ownership. It is generally believed that family 
ownership is associated with the low level of information disclosure (Anderson, Duru, 
& Reeb, 2009; Chen et al., 2008). Conversely, the result of this study was positive and 
significant at 5%. Hence, H1a8 which states that there is a significant negative 
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relationship between family ownership and compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs is rejectedted. 
The possible reasons behind this finding can be seen from two perspectives. First, the 
intention to preserve the family name might force the family members to disclose more 
information to compete favorably with the non-family firms. Consistently, Wang 
(2006) finds that founding family ownership is associated with the greater earnings 
informativeness. Similarly, Wan-Hussin (2009) reports improvement in the extent of 
information disclosure of family firm after the Asian financial crises. This 
improvement might be the result of the efforts of the family firms to alleviate the fears 
of market players on the internal dealings in the family firms.  
The second reason for this result might be seen from the alignment effect viewpoint. 
With the average ownership of almost 28% and a maximum of more than 83%, the 
family members have less to benefit from if they destroy the image of the firm with 
the opaque information to the market.  Anderson et al. (2009) reveal that family firms 
provide more opaque information when they pursue entrenchment policy12. Based on 
this, the reverse may be the case when the family firm pursues the alignment policy. 
This is consistent with the Chau and Gray (2010) that the extent of family firm’s 
voluntary disclosure depends on the level of the family ownership in that firm. 
Therefore, with this high level of family ownership in Malaysia, family firms might 
vote to exhibit a high level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. 
                                                     
12 Most of the previous study on the disclosure behaviour of family firms have followed Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) to identify the family firms and focussed on the enrichment effect. This is because in some 
of these studies firms with the family ownership of just 2% were categorized as family firms and the 
findings were generalized see Xia Chen et al. (2013) and Chung (2014) for examples.  
 
 217 
Based on agency theory, management ownership aligns the interest of the managers 
with that of the shareholders. Therefore, managerial ownership increases the firm's 
disclosure practices. Unlike Hidalgo et al. (2011) and Said et al. (2009) that failed to 
establish statistically significant relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
disclosure behavior, this study document a significant positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and compliance with the requirements of the accounting 
standard on RPTs. The result of managerial ownership for this study was positive and 
significant at 1%.  H1a9 which states that there is a significant positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and compliance with the disclosure requirements of 
the accounting standard on RPTs is accepted. 
This finding is consistent with the Doidge et al. (2009) and Singh and Davidson III 
(2003) that as the managerial ownership increases, any decision taken by managers to 
benefit themselves at the detriment of minority shareholders has a cost that diminishes 
the firm value. Therefore, managers will be willing to comply with the disclosure 
requirements to improve the firm’s image and increase the liquidity of the shares of 
the firm. Alternatively, the alignment effect in the ownership structure has manifested 
its self in the above findings. The mean of the managerial ownership among the 
sampled Malaysian firms was around 29%, while the highest level of managerial 
ownership was more than 83%. This level of ownership forces the managers to act in 
the best interest of the firm as they will be more affected by any slight stock shocks. 





The last form of ownership considered in the study was foreign ownership. Based on 
agency theory, foreign ownership serves as external governance mechanism (Cho, 
Huang, & Padmanabhan, 2014). Bova and Pereira (2012) and Misirlioǧlu et al. (2013) 
identify foreign ownership with the increased information disclosure. In contrast with 
the above, the results of this study reveal a negative relationship between foreign 
ownership and the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs.  
The coefficient of the foreign ownership was negative and significant at 5%. The 
negative relationship can be attributed to the level of foreign ownership among 
Malaysian firms. The median of the foreign ownership was 2%, unlike the 28% and 
30% reported for the family and management ownership respectively. Given the lack 
of strong ownership may hamper the foreign investors’ intention to control the firm 
and influence its level of information disclosure. This is consistent with the Desender 
et al. (2014) and Lskavyan and Spatareanu (2011) that foreign investors survive in 
countries with weak legal investor protection through substantial equity ownership. 
The strong commitment and increased monitoring role of foreign ownership 
documented in prior studies are associated with the large foreign investors. Therefore, 
small foreign ownership may not yield the benefits obtainable from large foreign 
ownership. H1a10 which states that there is a significant positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting 
standard on RPTs is rejected. 
The next set of variables assessed in this study as determinants of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs are the firm financial 
characteristics. These variables are categorized into RPT motive and firm 
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performance. The variables considered under the RPT motive are tunneling and 
propping. Following prior studies such as Black et al. (2015), Cheung, Jing, et al. 
(2009) and Lei and Song (2011), this study hypothesized a negative relationship 
between tunneling (Tunn) and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. Nonetheless, the results as presented in Table 6.13 was 
positive and insignificant. This indicates absent of statistically significant relationship 
between tunneling and compliance with the requirements of the accounting standard 
on RPTs. Hence H1b1 which states that there is a significant negative relationship 
between tunneling and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting 
standard on RPTs is rejected. 
The possible reason for this finding might be the nature of the information released to 
the market which makes it difficult to identify firms with the tunneling RPTs. This 
position is supported by Xiao and Zhao (2014) who believed that even though Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission has required all listed companies to disclose all 
RPTs in their financial reports, in practice, most of these firms do not comply with 
those requirements. This practice makes the finding of this study to be at par with the 
Lou et al. (2014) that capital market react indifferently to the announcement of any 
form of RPTs. 
Peng et al. (2011) find that capital market reacts favorably to the announcement of 
propping transactions. Similarly, Cheung et al. (2009) find that RPTs related to 
propping activities are accompanied with significant information disclosure. Based on 
these, the study hypothesized a positive relationship between propping (Prop) and the 
level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on 
RPTs. Though the result from this study is positive as expected, the relationship was 
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found to be insignificant. This implies the absence of the strong relationship between 
propping and the level of compliance with the requirements of the accounting standard 
on RPTs. Hence H1b2 which states that there is a significant positive relationship 
between propping and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting 
standard on RPTs is rejected. 
Several performance proxies are used concurrently in the regression model to assess 
their influence in defining the firm disclosure practice. The proxies are profitability 
(ROA), firm growth (MTV) and dividend payment (Divi). The coefficient of the 
profitability was negative and significant at 5%. This is consistent with the Samaha et 
al. (2012) and Sodikin (2013) that document a negative relationship between 
profitability and corporate disclosure practice. The possible explanation of this might 
be that firms involve in RPTs to manipulate their operational capacity and present 
exciting performance. It is expected that detailed disclosure may expose the internal 
arrangements. Thus, firms provide less information on the RPTs to avoid market 
reaction and regulatory sanctions. Another possible reason for this can be seen from 
the overall goal of rational investors. It is argued that once the profit is made, many 
investors may not be interested in the detail information on the process and source of 
that profit. Therefore, profitable firms have less pressure on the volume of information 
required to satisfy the information needs of the users of the financial statement. The 
practice saves the firms from the potential conflicts with the workers, regulatory 
bodies and other government agencies. Hence H1b3 which states that there is a 
significant positive relationship between firm profitability and compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs is rejected. 
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The coefficient of MTV was positive and significant at 1%. This finding is consistent 
with the Gul and Leung (2004) and Soon Yau et al. (2009) that document a positive 
relationship between firm growth with the voluntary corporate and intellectual capital 
disclosure respectively. Firms with the high growth potentials disclose more 
information to reduce the information asymmetric (Chau and Gray 2010; Huafang and 
Jianguo 2007). Therefore, high growing firm have to disclose more information to 
convince the market that the stock growth was based on fundamentals. H1b4 which 
states that there is a significant positive relationship between firm growth potential 
and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs 
is accepted. 
Based on agency theory, dividend payment is used to wipe out the excess cash from 
the management and minimize the agency conflict. Dividends were used as a substitute 
for financial reporting transparency during unregulated disclosure period (Van 
Overfelt et al., 2010). Therefore, it is hypothesized that dividend payment improves 
the firm level of disclosure during regulated disclosure period. The result as presented 
in Table 6.13 was positive as expected, but not statistically significant, thus not 
supporting the hypothesis. This might be the effect of the dominance ownership where 
ownership and control lay within the party. Therefore dividend policy may not 
increase the agency cost in those firms. Hence H1b5 which states that there is a 
significant positive relationship between dividend payment and compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs is rejected. 
The comparison between the expected and actual results of the study are presented in 
the table 6.14. In summary, out of the fifteen variables tested in the study, seven 
variables support the research hypotheses while the remaining do not. More specific, 
 
 222 
of the remaining eight, five variables are insignificant while the remaining three have 
the opposite sign with the research expectations. 
Table 6.14  
Comparison between expected and actual results 






Corporate Governance     
 Board Characteristics    
  Board independence Bind + + Accepted 
  Board size Bsize + - Rejected 
 Audit Committee Characteristics   Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
 Audit committee 
independence Aind + - Rejected 
 
 Audit committee 
financial expertise Aexp + + Accepted 
 CEO Characteristics    
  CEO expertise Cexp + Insign. Rejected. 
  CEO Family lineage Cfml - - Accepted 
  CEO ownership Cown - - Accepted 
 Ownership Structure    
  Family ownership Mown - + Rejected 
  Management ownership Fmown + + Accepted 
  Foreign ownership Frown + - Rejected 
Firm Financial Characteristics     
 RPT Motive    
  Tunneling Tunn - Insig. Rejected 
  Propping Prop + Insig. Rejected 
 Firm Performance    
  Profitability ROA + - Rejected 
  Firm growth MTV + + Accepted 
   Dividend payments Divi + Insig. Rejected 
Insig = Insignificant 
6.3 Additional Analyses 
6.3.1 Alternative Sampling Pattern (Sample Size) 
To ensure the findings are free from unwanted bias, robustness checks were conducted 
to confirm that the results of the regression are insensitive to the sample partitioning 
or increase in the volume of RPTs. Inchausti (1997) and Street and Gray (2002) 
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document that industry type influences the firm level of information disclosure. Based 
on this, the sample was divided into manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. 
Thus, manufacturing firms are subjected to further analysis to determine whether 
similar results can derive from the use of manufacturing firm alone. The total firm-
year observations for the study are 654 observations. Out of this number, 501 firm-
year observations belong to manufacturing industries while the remaining 153 firm-
year observations belong to non-manufacturing industries as presented in table 6.6. 
Based on this, this section used the 501 firm-year observations for the additional 
analyses.  In addition, the size of RPT was increased to 30% to test whether the volume 
of RPT influences the firm compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. This process generated the 417 firm-year observations 
for further regression analysis.  
Table 6.15 presents and compares the results of the main and additional analyses. The 
results of the initial model (Model 1 for the full sample as explained above) were 
presented and compared with the results from the Model 2 (manufacturing firms), 
Model 3 (for firms with the trading RPTs of up to 30% of the total revenue). 
In general, the results from the additional tests are substantially similar to the results 
of the main findings. The results are robust to all the research variables adopted. None 
of the corporate governance variables (with exception of Cexp) that changes the sign 
in the additional tests indicating that the same pattern of relationship has been arrived 
at throughout the additional tests. Though Cexp was not statistically significant in 
model 1 and model 2, it becomes negative and significant at 5% when the volume of 
RPTs was increased to 30%. This implies that as the volume of RPTs increases, the 
CEOs with financial expertise tend to reduce the volume of information disclosure or 
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the level of compliance with the requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. 
This signal fishy transactions that need further investigation to identify the logic or 
motive behind such reduction in the level of information disclosure. Besides, 
managerial ownership (Mown) is statistically insignificant in Model 2 while foreign 
ownership (Frown) is statistically insignificant in the both additional tests, though the 




Table 6.15  
Results of the Alternative Sampling Pattern (Sample Size) 







Constant 0.338 0.406 0.269 
 (8.57)*** (8.95)*** (5.69)*** 
Bind 0.087 0.099 0.141 
 (2.66)*** (2.55)*** (3.76)*** 
Bsize -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 
 (1.56)* (2.12)** (0.14) 
Aind -0.030 -0.029 -0.046 
 (2.56)*** (2.25)** (3.39)*** 
Aexp 0.073 0.077 0.097 
 (3.09)*** (3.16)*** (3.53)*** 
Cexp 0.001 0.003 -0.017 
 (0.22) (0.42) (2.09)** 
Cfml -0.022 -0.055 -0.032 
 (2.44)*** (5.35)*** (2.71)*** 
Cown -0.089 -0.052 -0.028 
 (3.90)*** (2.00)** (1.01) 
Fmown 0.038 0.091 0.054 
 (2.06)** (4.07)*** (2.42)*** 
Mown 0.073 0.015 0.034 
 (3.19)*** (0.55) (1.29)* 
Frown -0.029 -0.004 -0.005 
 (1.77)** (0.21) (0.23) 
Tunn 0.005 0.001 0.002 
 (0.49) (0.01) (0.17) 
Prop 0.009 0.003 0.013 
 (0.85) (0.29) (1.09) 
ROA -0.064 -0.071 -0.016 
 (2.34)** (2.12)** (1.55)* 
MTV 0.012 0.023 0.010 
 (2.67)*** (4.29)*** (1.86)** 
Divi 0.008 -0.058 -0.019 
 (0.21) (1.39)* (0.39) 
Size 0.024 0.022 0.025 
 (9.93)*** (7.57)*** (8.38)*** 
Audi -0.001 -0.012 0.015 
 (0.16) (1.49)* (1.79)** 
MCCG -0.016 -0.027 -0.019 
 (2.40)** (3.79)*** (2.42)*** 
Adj R2 0.20 0.26 0.25 
F-stat 10.12*** 10.41*** 8.84*** 
R2 0.22 0.28 0.29 
N 654 501 417 
Equation (1) Dsocre = β0 + β1Bind + β2Bsize + β3Aind + β4Aexp+ β5Cexp + β6Cfam + β7Cown + 
β8Fmown + β9Mown + β10Frown + β11Tunn + β12Prop + β13ROA + β14MTV + β15Divi + β16Size + 
β17Aud + β18MCCG +εt. Variables as previously defined. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter 
estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
On the firm financial characteristics, all the variables under the RPT motive (Tunn and 
Prop) produced results similar to those reported in the main regression. Equally, the 
variables under firm performance (ROA, MTV and Divi) have materially maintained 
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the position in terms of sign and statistical significance. The few exceptions are that 
the sign of the Divi that turns to negative in both additional tests and significant in 
model 2.  
The sign and the statistical level of significance of the firm size remain the same across 
the three models. Similar results have been arrived at with respect to MCCG except 
for the level of significance that increased from 5% to 1% in the additional tests. 
Conversely, for audit quality variable (Audi) the sign turns to positive and significant 
at 5% in model 3. This validates the insight in the descriptive and univariate analyses 
as presented in table 6.7 and table 6.9 respectively which highlighted the role of audit 
quality in explaining the firm compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. The practical implication of this finding is of much 
interest. This is because it reveals that Big auditing firms scrutinize and influences the 
level of RPTs disclosure in the firms with a high volume of RPTs. However, their 
influence is less visible (as revealed by model 1 and model 2) in the firm with the low 
RPT, which may be detrimental to the users of the financial statement of those firms. 
6.3.2 Alternative Models without Strongly Correlated Variables 
Some additional regressions are conducted to check whether the strong correlation 
among some of the research variables influences the coefficients and level of 
significance of the main regression estimation. As presented in table 6.9 the 
coefficients of the correlation between Aind and Aexp and that of the Fmown and 
Mown are 0.8196 and 0.6147 respectively. Hence, it will be interested to check if these 
strong correlations affect the consistency of the initial findings. Based on this, separate 
estimations are run by removing one of the variables identified with the strong 
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correlation with the other variable. Generally, the results from the new regressions are 
substantially similar with that of the main analysis. The sign of the coefficients of 
variables across all the four new regressions remain the same with those presented in 
the main analysis save for slight changes in the parameters. Nevertheless, little 
variations are noticed with regards to the level of significance in the new regressions. 
Table 6.16 presents the results of the regressions after the removal of some selected 
variables. The second column of Table 6.16 contains the results of the main analysis 
to ease comparison. The results presented in the third column were arrived at after 
removing the Aexp from the list of the variables used in the main analysis. The major 
difference with the main analysis is that Aind is not statistically significant in the new 
regression as against the 1% level of significance recorded in the main regression. 
Similarly, Frown and ROA are statistically significant at 1% in the new regression 
while the level of significance was at 5% in the main regression.  
The results of the regression after the exclusion of the Aind from the variables used in 
the main analysis are presented in the fourth column of table 6.16. The major 
variations with the main analysis are that Bsize is statistically significant at 5% against 
the 10% recorded in the main regression. Similarly, the statistical level of significance 
of the ROA has increased to 1% from the 5% recorded in the main analysis. However, 
the statistical level of significance of the Bind and Aexp has decreased to 5% from the 





Table 6.16  
Results of the Alternative Models without Strongly Correlated Variables 








Constant 0.338 0.386 0.381 0.353 0.331 
 (8.57)*** (10.62)*** (10.68)*** (8.98)*** (8.41)*** 
Bind 0.087 0.083 0.064 0.071 0.093 
 (2.66)*** (2.52)*** (2.03)** (2.18)** (2.84)*** 
Bsize -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (1.56)* (1.60)* (1.94)** (1.48)* (1.65)** 
Aind -0.030 -0.001  -0.029 -0.031 
 (2.56)*** (0.17)  (2.43)*** (2.56)*** 
Aexp 0.073  0.025 0.071 0.074 
 (3.09)***  (1.74)** (2.99)*** (3.14)*** 
Cexp 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.22) (0.09) (0.18) (0.00) (0.48) 
Cfml -0.022 -0.023 -0.021 -0.024 -0.012 
 (2.44)*** (2.55)*** (2.31)** (2.57)*** (1.57)* 
Cown -0.089 -0.093 -0.095 -0.043 -0.092 
 (3.90)*** (4.05)*** (4.17)*** (2.41)*** (4.01)*** 
Fmown 0.038 0.040 0.038 0.061  
 (2.06)** (2.13)** (2.07)** (3.54)***  
Mown 0.073 0.071 0.071  0.091 
 (3.19)*** (3.09)*** (3.09)***  (4.31)*** 
Frown -0.029 -0.038 -0.035 -0.028 -0.028 
 (1.77)** (2.34)*** (2.09)** (1.68)** (1.70)** 
Tunn 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 
 (0.49) (0.52) (0.55) (0.71) (0.57) 
Prop 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.009 
 (0.85) (0.58) (0.71) (0.99) (0.86) 
ROA -0.064 -0.074 -0.073 -0.061 -0.066 
 (2.34)** (2.73)*** (2.71)*** (2.21)** (2.43)*** 
MTV 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.012 
 (2.67)*** (2.91)*** (2.90)*** (2.44)*** (2.48)*** 
Divi 0.008 0.014 0.019 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.21) (0.37) (0.51) (0.04) (0.24) 
Size 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 (9.93)*** (9.91)*** (9.80)*** (9.77)*** (10.04)*** 
Audi -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.26) (0.37) (0.01) 
MCCG -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 
 (2.40)** (2.25)** (2.29)** (2.27)** (2.45)*** 
R2 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 
Adj R2 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 
F-stat 10.12*** 10.02*** 10.24*** 9.997*** 10.41*** 
N 654 654 654 654 654 
[Main equation (1)] Dsocre = β0 + β1Bind + β2Bsize + β3Aind + β4Aexp+ β5Cexp + β6Cfam + β7Cown 
+ β8Fmown + β9Mown + β10Frown + β11Tunn + β12Prop + β13ROA + β14MTV + β15Divi + β16Size + 
β17Aud + β18MCCG +εt; [Without Aexp] Dsocre = β0 + β1Bind + β2Bsize + β3Aind + β4Cexp + β5Cfam 
+ β6Cown + β7Fmown + β8Mown + β9Frown + β10Tunn + β11Prop + β12ROA + β13MTV + β14Divi + 
β15Size + β16Aud + β17MCCG +εt; [Without Aind] Dsocre = β0 + β1Bind + β2Bsize + β3Aexp + β4Cexp 
+ β5Cfam + β6Cown + β7Fmown + β8Mown + β9Frown + β10Tunn + β11Prop + β12ROA + β13MTV + 
β14Divi + β15Size + β16Aud + β17MCCG +εt; [Without Mown] Dsocre = β0 + β1Bind + β2Bsize + β3Aind 
+ β4Aexp+ β5Cexp + β6Cfam + β7Cown + β8Fmown + β9Frown + β10Tunn + β11Prop + β12ROA + 
β13MTV + β14Divi + β15Size + β16Aud + β17MCCG +εt; [Without Fmown] Equation (1) Dsocre = β0 + 
β1Bind + β2Bsize + β3Aind + β4Aexp+ β5Cexp + β6Cfam + β7Cown + β8Fmown + β9Frown + β10Tunn 
+ β11Prop + β12ROA + β13MTV + β14Divi + β15Size + β16Aud + β17MCCG +εt;  Variables as previously 
defined. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
 
 229 
The fifth column in table 6.16 presents the results of the regressions after the exclusion 
of the Mown from the list of the variables used in the main analysis. The major 
difference with the main analysis is that the level of significance of Bind in the new 
regression has decreased to 5% from the 1% recorded in the main analysis. 
Nevertheless, the level of significance of the Fmown has increased to 1% in the new 
regression from the 5% recorded in the main analysis.  
The last column in table 6.16 presents the results of the regressions after the exclusion 
of the Mown from the list of the variables used in the main analysis. The major 
difference with the main analysis is that Bsize is statistically significant at 5% against 
the 10% recorded in the main regression. Similarly, the statistical significance of ROA 
and MCCG have increased to 1% from the 5% recorded in the main regression. 
However, when the Fown was removed from the model, Cfml becomes significant 
only at 10% in the model. The implication of this finding is that absent of family 
ownership undermines the influence of the Cfml in explaining corporate disclosure 
behavior.  
6.3.3 Alternative Measures of Independent Variables 
Some variables from both corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
characteristics are selected for additional sensitivity analyses. In the main analysis, 
Aexp and Fmown are considered as continuous variables. Hence, in this sensitivity 
analyses, these variables are measured as dummy variables. Similarly, because of the 
problem associated with the measurement of tunneling and propping in the literature, 
the variables were measured in the main analyses using the ROE threshold of more 
than 10% to denote tunneling and less than 6% to denote propping. Extant literature 
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does not provide a clear measure of tunneling and propping because of the 
complexities in identifying tunneling and propping transactions. In this sensitivity 
check, the study employs the event study technique for the window period of -10, +10 
days from the RPTs announcement date to determine the cumulative abnormal returns 
as a result of the announcement of RPTs using the 21 days window period. The 
selection of 21 days window is justified by Ismail and Manaf (2016) that used 21 days 
window in their study. Similarly, Ishak and Abdul Latif (2012) find significant market 
reaction to new information within the same window period. Transactions with 
negative cumulative abnormal return (CAR) are regarded as tunneling transactions 
because they are value-destroying transactions. Similarly, transactions with the firms 
with the small positive profits are considered as an attempt by the controlling party to 
inject resources to those firms to avoid reporting a small loss. Hence, these transactions 
are regarded as propping transactions. 
Table 6.17 presents the results of the regression for the sensitivity checks. The signs 
of the coefficients and the parameters of the sensitivity model remain similar to those 
of the main analyses. The major exception is MTV which was positive and significant 
at 1% in the main analyses but turns to negative and significant at 1% in the sensitivity 
check. More on this, although the coefficient of the Aind remains negative, the 
variables become insignificant in the sensitivity check. The statistical significance of 
Cfml and ROA has decreased to 5% and 10% respectively from the 1% and 5% 





Table 6.17  
Results of the Alternative Measures of Independent Variables 
Dscore Main Alternate measures 
Contant 0.338 0.378 
 (8.57)*** (10.58)*** 
Bind 0.087 0.106 
 (2.66)*** (3.15)*** 
Bsize -0.003 -0.003 
 (1.56)* (1.31)* 
Aind -0.030 -0.003 
 (2.56)*** (0.36) 
Aexp 0.073 0.022 
 (3.09)*** (2.87)*** 
Cexp 0.001 0.004 
 (0.22) (0.64) 
Cfml -0.022 -0.020 
 (2.44)*** (2.12)** 
Cown -0.089 -0.076 
 (3.90)*** (3.27)*** 
Fmown 0.038 0.017 
 (2.06)** (1.77)** 
Mown 0.073 0.074 
 (3.19)*** (3.22)*** 
Frown -0.029 -0.034 
 (1.77)** (2.05)** 
Tunn 0.005 0.005 
 (0.49) (0.66) 
Prop 0.009 0.006 
 (0.85) (0.76) 
ROA -0.064 -0.017 
 (2.34)** (1.57)* 
MTV 0.012 -0.008 
 (2.67)*** (3.19)*** 
Divi 0.008 0.010 
 (0.21) (0.95) 
Size 0.024 0.024 
 (9.93)*** (9.37)*** 
Audi -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.16) (0.19) 
MCCG -0.016 -0.013 
 (2.40)** (1.95)** 
R2 0.22 0.19 
Adj R2 0.20 0.17 
F-stat 10.12*** 8.30*** 
N 654 654 
Equation (1) Dsocre = β0 + β1Bind + β2Bsize + β3Aind + β4Aexp+ β5Cexp + β6Cfam + β7Cown + 
β8Fmown + β9Mown + β10Frown + β11Tunn + β12Prop + β13ROA + β14MTV + β15Divi + β16Size + 
β17Aud + β18MCCG +εt. Variables as previously defined. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter 
estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
6.4 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter presents the findings and the interpretations of the extent of compliance 
and the determinants of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting 
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standards on RPTs. The variables used are drawn from the corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm financial characteristics. Overall, the results indicate moderate 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standards on RPTs. 
Firms listed on Bursa Malaysia comply with the most of the disclosure requirements 
on the transaction-based disclosures. However, the level of compliance with the non-
transaction-based disclosure requirements is obviously low.  
The study provides evidence that board independence and audit committee financial 
expertise improve the firm’s compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. Similarly, family and managerial ownerships are 
associated with the high level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. This is the result of the alignment effect because of the 
concentrated ownership associated with the Malaysian firms. On the contrary, CEO 
ownership and family lineage affect the firm compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs negatively. The practice signals 
shady deals in a firm with higher CEO ownership.  
Firms with high market growth are associated with the high compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. This is to provide 
justifications that the stock price is not overvalued. Similarly, firms with high growth 
disclose more information to lower the future cost of capital as many studies believed 
that disclosure reduces the information asymmetry and lower the cost of capital. 
Contrarily, firm profitability influences the firm’s compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs negatively. This shows that firms 
involve in RPTs to manipulate their operational capacity and present exciting 
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performance. The study documents no evidence that dividend payment affects the 





ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION II 
VALUE-RELEVANCE AND REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
7.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the second part of the analyses and interpretations of the study. 
The first part covers the extent of and determinants of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. This second part of the study covers 
the analyses and interpretations of the value-relevance of MFRS 124 disclosure, the 
relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value and the moderating effect of 
compliance with disclosure requirements on RPTs on the relationship between REM 
in RPTs and firm value. 
7.1 Value-Relevance of MFRS 124 Compliance 
This section presents the analyses and interpretation of findings of the tests conducted 
to determine whether RPTs disclosure is value-relevant and if mandatory adoption of 
MFRS 124 has increased the value-relevance of the disclosed RPTs.  
7.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables for the combined, pre and 
post-MFRS 124 adoption periods. The mean, median and standard deviation of the 
market value per share (MVPS) for the post-MFRS adoption period are 2.0330, 0.7100 
and 5.8206. These values are higher than the corresponding mean, median and 
standard deviation for the combined (1.6810, 0.6000 and 4.8283 respectively) and pre-
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MFRS adoption (1.3290, 0.4960 and 3.5382 respectively) periods. This indicates that 
the stock prices have witnessed some level of appreciation after the mandatory 
adoption of MFRS.  
Interestingly, a similar pattern has been recorded in the mean, median and the standard 
deviation of the book value per share (BVPS) and earnings per share (EPS). The mean, 
median and standard deviation of the BVPS for the post-MFRS adoption period are 
1.3885, 0.9060 and 1.6576 respectively. These values are higher than the 
corresponding values 1.1739, 0.8040 and 1.3700 for the pre-MFRS adoption period 
and 1.2812, 0.8535 and 1.5241 for the combined period. Likewise, the mean, median 
and standard deviation of the EPS for the post-MFRS adoption period are 0.1177, 
0.0380 and 0.5363 respectively. These values are higher than the corresponding values 
0.1039, 0.0460 and 0.2655 reported for the pre-MFRS adoption period and 0.1108, 
0.0430 and 0.4231 for the combined period. These figures provide initial insight that 
stock market responses to the disclosure of accounting information. In other words, 
the pattern can be seen as an early evidence that BVPS and EPS are value-relevant. 
Further investigation on the trend of the mean of MVPS, BVPS and EPS reveals that 
the stock market is healthier and more responsive to EPS in the post-MFRS adoption 
period. This is because a slight increase of 0.0138 (0.1177-0.1039) in the EPS in the 
post-MFRS adoption period resulted in the wider difference 0.704 (2.0330-1.3290) in 
the MVPS for the post-MFRS adoption period. The difference in the mean of MVPS 
and BVPS during the post-MFRS adoption period is 0.6445 (2.0330-1.3885) which is 
greater than 0.1551 (1.3290-1.1739) and 0.3998 (1.6810-1.2812) for the pre-MFRS 
adoption and combined periods respectively. The summary statistics of the RPTs 
variables of interaction (BVPS*RPTfirms and EPS*RPTfirms) are not materially 
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different from that of the basic variables. This indicates that a part of the general 
improvement in MFRS adoption, MFRS 124 on RPTs disclosure has incremental 
value-relevance in the post-adoption era. 
Table 7.1  
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables of Value-Relevance  
  Combined Pre-MFRS Post-MFRS 
 Mean Median 
St. 
Dev Mean Median 
St. 
Dev Mean Median 
St. 
Dev 
MVPS 1.6810 0.6000 4.8283 1.3290 0.4960 3.5382 2.0330 0.7100 5.8206 
BVPS  1.2812 0.8535 1.5241 1.1739 0.8040 1.3700 1.3885 0.9060 1.6576 
EPS  0.1108 0.0430 0.4231 0.1039 0.0460 0.2655 0.1177 0.0380 0.5363 
BVPS*RPTfirms 0.4488 0.0000 1.3607 0.4065 0.0000 1.2169 0.4912 0.0000 1.4900 
EPS*RPTfirms 0.0450 0.0000 0.2214 0.0431 0.0000 0.1911 0.0469 0.0000 0.2480 
RPTfirms 0.2407 0.0000 0.4276 0.2430 0.0000 0.4291 0.2385 0.0000 0.4263 
Return 0.2454 0.1457 0.6030 0.3165 0.1955 0.7168 0.1744 0.0907 0.4512 
NetIncome 0.0454 0.0634 0.6121 0.0462 0.0803 0.5352 0.0446 0.0495 0.6805 
ChngNetIncome 0.0350 0.0042 0.6776 0.0558 0.0102 0.6040 0.0143 0.0011 0.7437 
NetIncome*RPTFirms 0.0573 0.0000 1.6017 0.0997 0.0000 2.2541 0.0150 0.0000 0.2212 
ChngNetIncome*RPT
Firms 0.0047 0.0000 0.2294 0.0093 0.0000 0.3019 0.0001 0.0000 0.1188 
MVPS = Market Value per Share of firm 3 months after the financial year-end; BVPS = Book Value 
per Share of firm; EPS = Accounting Earning per Share of firm; RPTfirms = Dummy variable set equal 
to one for firms with RPTs disclosures, zero for otherwise; BVPS*RPTfirms = BVPS * RPTfirms; 
EPS*RPTfirms = EPS * RPTfirms; Returns = (Price of firm i in month t − Price of firm i in month 
t−1)/Price of firm i in month t−1. Returns are accumulated during the 12-month period covering trading 
months, preceding March 31st of each year; NetIncome = Net earnings for firm i in year t /Market value 
of equity in t−1; ChngNetIncome = (Net earnings for firm i in year t − Net earnings for firm i in year t 
−1) / Market value of equity in t−1; NetIncome*RPTFirms = NetIncome * RPTfirms and 
ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms = ChngNetIncome * RPTfirms. 
The widening gap between the mean of BVPS and MVPS for the periods is an 
indicator for the decrease in the value-relevance of BVPS. This is because, the closer 
the BVPS to the MVPS the higher the contribution in influencing the stock price which 
signals less operating earnings to a firm. Darrough and Ye (2007) state that when the 
past or current earnings have no implication to the future earnings, then the MVPS 
equates the BVPS. Barth et al. (1998) have found that the financial health of the firm 
decreases when the explanatory power of its earnings (book-value) decreases 
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(increases). Therefore, the trend of the MVPS, BVPS and EPS denote an increase in 
the financial health of the firms in the MFRS post-adoption period.  
The descriptive analyses of the return model variables highlight the decrease in the 
market return. The average return for the post-MFRS adoption period was 0.1744 
which is less than (0.3165 and 0.2454) the mean of the return during the pre-MFRS 
and combined era. This might be the result of the increases in the scaling factor (price 
in t-1) in arriving at the return for the period. A similar pattern has been witnessed in 
the Net Income (NetIncome), changes in net income (ChngNetIncome), net income of 
RPT firms (NetIncom*RPTfirms) and changes in net income of RPT firms 
(ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms). 
7.1.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 7.2 presents the correlation matrix for the value-relevance variables. In general, 
correlations between variables are considered moderate with the highest being 0.7126. 
Therefore, it can be said that there is less severe multicollinearity issue. Panel A 
presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the combined period. The correlation 
matrix reveals that the relationships between the dependent variable (MVPS) with the 
BVPS and EPS are positive. However, the relationship is stronger with the EPS 
(0.5693) than the BVPS (0.4020). The same positive association have been recorded 
for the BVPS*RPTfirms and EPS*RPTfirms. The correlation coefficient for 
EPS*RPTfirms was 0.5769 which was the highest between the MVPS and other 
variables. The coefficient of the association between BVPS*RPTfirms and MVPS was 
0.3539. MVPS was positively (0.1664) correlated with the RPTfirms which was the 
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least between MVPS and other variables. All the relationships among the price model 
variables are significant at 1%. 
On the return model where stock return serves as a dependent variable, its relationship 
with the NetIncome was positive and significant at 1%. This provides initial prove that 
the return on the stock of the firms listed in Bursa Malaysia is determined by the net 
profit of the firm. ChngNetIncome was also having a significant positive association 
with the stock return at 1% significance level. This implies that as the firm operating 
performance increases, such increase was reflected in the return of the stock of that 
firm, so also when the reverse is the case. On the relationship between stock return 
and the NetIncom*RPTfirms, the univariate result reveals absent of significant 
association between the variables. However, the relationship between stock return 
with the ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms was positive and significant at 1%. This 
indicates that ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms can influential in defining the variability of 
the stock return. 
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Table 7.2  
Correlation Matrix of the Value-Relevance variables 
 Panel A (Pearson correlation for the combined period) 











MVPS            
BVPS 0.4020***           
EPS 0.5693*** 0.3302***          
BVPS*RPTfirms 0.3539*** 0.7126*** 0.2542***         
EPS*RPTfirms 0.5769*** 0.4103*** 0.4916*** 0.5840***        
RPTfirms 0.1664*** 0.2155*** 0.1013*** 0.5859*** 0.3610***       
Return -0.0789*** -0.1038*** -0.0041 -0.0359* 0.0067 0.0182      
NetIncome 0.0117 0.0657*** 0.1959*** 0.0272 0.0781*** -0.0157 0.1005***     
ChngNetIncome -0.0156 -0.026 0.1218*** -0.0116 0.033 -0.0129 0.1356*** 0.7141***    
NetIncome*RPTFirms -0.0108 -0.0263 -0.0321 -0.0075 -0.0506** 0.0636*** -0.0015 -0.3373*** -0.1663***   
ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms -0.0037 -0.0027 0.0619*** 0.0095 0.1243*** 0.0362* 0.1091*** 0.1640*** 0.3376*** -0.4866***  
MVPS = Market Value per Share of firm 3 months after the financial year-end; BVPS = Book Value per Share of firm; EPS = Accounting Earning per Share of firm; 
RPTfirms = Dummy variable set equal to one for firms with RPTs disclosures, zero for otherwise; BVPS*RPTfirms = BVPS * RPTfirms; EPS*RPTfirms = EPS * 
RPTfirms; Returns = (Price of firm i in month t − Price of firm i in month t−1)/Price of firm i in month t−1. Returns are accumulated during the 12-month period 
covering trading months, preceding March 31st of each year; NetIncome = Net earnings for firm i in year t /Market value of equity in t−1; ChngNetIncome = (Net 
earnings for firm i in year t − Net earnings for firm i in year t −1) / Market value of equity in t−1; NetIncome*RPTFirms = NetIncome * RPTfirms and 





Table 7.2 Continued 
 Panel B (Pre-MFRS correlation in the lower diagonal and Post-MFRS correlation in the upper diagonal) 











MVPS  0.3842*** 0.5069*** 0.3402*** 0.5982*** 0.1798*** -0.0920*** 0.0066 -0.0072 -0.0159  0.0016 
BVPS 0.4407***  0.2550*** 0.7203*** 0.3438*** 0.2267*** -0.1153*** 0.0452 -0.0146 0.0258 0.0196 
EPS 0.7875*** 0.5442***  0.1860*** 0.4374*** 0.0824*** -0.0167 0.1347*** 0.0969*** -0.0338 0.1069*** 
BVPS*RPTfirms 0.3883*** 0.7010*** 0.4445***  0.4964*** 0.5893*** -0.059** 0.016 -0.0028 0.0122 0.0221 
EPS*RPTfirms 0.5455*** 0.5165*** 0.6683*** 0.7237***  0.3381*** 0.0021 0.047 0.0333 -0.0538* 0.2313*** 
RPTfirms 0.1601*** 0.2064*** 0.1566*** 0.5898*** 0.3980***  0.0183 -0.0004 -0.0105 0.1211*** 0.001 
Return -0.0663** -0.0910*** 0.0156 -0.0153 0.0133 0.018  0.1215*** 0.1151*** -0.0544* 0.1296*** 
NetIncome 0.0231 0.0979*** 0.3686*** 0.0449 0.1294*** -0.0352 0.0960***  0.8225*** -0.1279*** 0.1432*** 
ChngNetIncome -0.0264 -0.0379 0.1966*** -0.0225 0.0332 -0.0165 0.1601*** 0.5454***  -0.1059*** 0.1598*** 
NetIncome*RPTFirms -0.0147 -0.0355 -0.065** -0.0121 -0.0761 0.0781*** -0.0021 -0.5326*** -0.2538***  -0.6550*** 
ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms -0.0057 -0.0115 0.0657** 0.0065 0.1011*** 0.0543 0.1044*** 0.2134*** 0.4974*** -0.5011***  
MVPS = Market Value per Share of firm 3 months after the financial year-end; BVPS = Book Value per Share of firm; EPS = Accounting Earning per Share of firm; 
RPTfirms = Dummy variable set equal to one for firms with RPTs disclosures, zero for otherwise; BVPS*RPTfirms = BVPS * RPTfirms; EPS*RPTfirms = EPS * 
RPTfirms; Returns = (Price of firm i in month t − Price of firm i in month t−1)/Price of firm i in month t−1. Returns are accumulated during the 12-month period 
covering trading months, preceding March 31st of each year; NetIncome = Net earnings for firm i in year t /Market value of equity in t−1; ChngNetIncome = (Net 
earnings for firm i in year t − Net earnings for firm i in year t −1) / Market value of equity in t−1; NetIncome*RPTFirms = NetIncome * RPTfirms and 




On the association of the NetIncom*RPTfirms and ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms with 
the return of that firm, the univariate analysis reveals the absence of a significant 
correlation with respect to NetIncom*RPTfirms. That is to say, the 
NetIncom*RPTfirms has little association the stock return. 
ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms was found to have a significant positive correlation with 
the stock return. However, these relationships are subject to validation in the 
multivariate and additional analyses. 
Panel B of Table 7.2 presents the coefficients of the Pearson correlation for the pre-
MFRS adoption (lower diagonal) and post-MFRS adoption (upper diagonal) periods. 
When the sample size was partitioned into pre and post-MFRS adoption period, the 
highest correlation between MVPS and other variables in the pre-adoption era was 
0.7875 between MVPS and EPS while the lowest correlation was 0.3883 between 
MVPS and BVPS*RPTfirms. This provides an initial signal that even during the pre-
adoption regime, the BVPS*RPTfirms has the weakest explanatory power on the stock 
price.  
During post-adoption, the lowest correlation between MVPS and other variables was 
0.3402 between MVPS and BVPS*RPTfirms while the highest correlation was 0.5982 
between MVPS and EPS*RPTfirms. The lowest correlation can be seen as a sign of 
diminishing role of BVPS*RPTfirms while highest denotes the incremental power of 
the EPS*RPTfirms in explaining the stock price variability in the post-adoption 
period. Hence, the incremental value-relevance of EPS*RPTfirms recorded in the 
combined period was due to the increased value-relevance of EPS*RPTfirms achieved 
in the post-MFRS adoption period. 
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The univariate analyses of the return model variables reveal that the relationships 
among the variables in the pre-MFRS adoption period were similar to those reported 
for the combined period. That is to say, there are significant positive relationships at 
1% level of significance between stock return and three other variables viz and 
NetIncome, ChngNetIncome and ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms. As reported earlier the 
relationship between return and NetIncom_RPTfirms was negative though not 
statistically significant.  
The correlation among the variables in the post-MFRS adoption period was similar to 
pre-MFRS adoption period. The major exception was that the coefficient of the 
NetIncom*RPTfirms is significant in the former. This highlights that, even if the 
negative correlations between the variables in the pre-adoption and combined periods 
are not clear because of the noise in the relationships, the situation is clear in the post-
adoption period that the NetIncom*RPTfirms has a negative correlation with the stock 
return. From this one can deduce that under return model stock market places more 
emphasis on the change in net income. This may be connected to fact that stock return 
was based on the changes in the stock price. Therefore, changes in the 
NetIncom*RPTfirms may not influence the variation in the return more than what 
ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms does. Yet, the results from the multivariate analyses may 




7.1.3 Multivariate Regression 
As mentioned earlier in chapter five, this study uses the Ohlson (1995) price model 
and Easton and Harris (1991) return model to measure the value-relevance of RPTs 
disclosure and assess the changes in the value-relevance of such disclosures after the 
mandatory adoption of MFRS 124. 
7.1.3.1 Price Model Regression 
Table 7.3 presents the coefficients of the regressions for the value-relevance of MFRS 
124 disclosure using the price model. The first and second models cover the whole 
period under review. The first model (RPT model) was used to test the value-relevance 
of the RPTs disclosure while the second model was used to test the value-relevance of 
the BVPS*RPTfirms and EPS*RPTfirms. The subsequent models namely third model 
and fourth model are used for the pre-MFRS adoption and post-MFRS adoption 
periods respectively. The models are employed to test the value-relevance of the 
BVPS*RPTfirms and EPS*RPTfirms in the pre and post-MFRS adoption periods. 
In the first model, the coefficients of the model basic variables (BVPS and EPS) are 
positive and significant at 1%. Similarly, the coefficient of RPTFirms, the variable of 
interest in the model was positive (0.7711) and significant at 1%. This indicates that 
RPTs disclosure is value-relevant during the period under review. This is consistent 
with the previous studies on the value-relevance of individual accounting information. 
Wang and Hussainey (2013), Bepari et al. (2013) and Badenhorst et al. (2015) in their 
respective studies find that disclosure of forward-looking statement, cash flow from 




Table 7.3  
Price Model Regression Result 
  Model 1 RPTs Model 2 Combined period Model 3 Pre-MFRS period Model 4 Post-MFRS period 
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant -0.039 -0.36 0.2032 1.98** 0.2243 2.14*** 0.1695 0.83 
BVPS 0.717 12.5*** 0.6765 8.71*** -0.0487 -0.62 0.8545 7.01*** 
EPS  5.565 27.46*** 3.8454 18.18*** 10.3658 28.16*** 2.9182 10.69*** 
RPTfirms 0.771 3.98*** 0.1877 0.81 0.1128 0.56 0.2972 0.74 
BVPS*RPTfirms  -0.4260 -3.86*** 0.1594 1.34 -0.4731 -2.81*** 
EPS*RPTfirms  8.4570 17.99*** -0.1794 -0.29 10.5534 16.03*** 
R2 0.3799  0.4615  0.6223  0.4615  
F-stat (P-value) 451.30(0.000) 473.24(0.000) 362.86(0.000)  188.72(0.000) 
Observation 2214   2214   1107   1107   
Variables as defined above. Model 1 (RPT, 2009-2015) MVPS = α + β1BVPS + β2EPS + β3RPTfirmsit + ε; Model 2 (combined period, 2009-2015) MVPS = α + β1BVPS + β2EPS + 
β3BVPS*RPTfirms+ β4EPS*RPTfirms + ε; Model 3 (pre-IFRS, 2009-2011) MVPS = α + β1BVPS + β2EPS + β3BVPS*RPTfirms+ β4EPS*RPTfirms + ε; Model 4 (post-IFRS, 2013-2015) MVPS 
= α + β1BVPS + β2EPS + β3BVPS*RPTfirms+ β4EPS*RPTfirms + ε. ***, **significance at 1% and 5% respectively. 
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The second model provides further analysis on the value-relevance of the 
BVPS*RPTfirms and EPS*RPTfirms for the combined period. Like the previous 
model, the coefficients of the model basic variables are positive and significant at 1%. 
The coefficient of the BVPS*RPTfirms was negative (-0.4260) and significant at 1%. 
The magnitude of the coefficient implies that investors place less attention of the 
historical value of the assets of RPT firms. In other words, the result indicates that 
BVPS*RPTfirms are less value-relevant.  Conversely, the coefficient of the 
EPS*RPTfirms was positive (8.4570) and significant at 1%. Comparing the coefficient 
of the BVPS*RPTfirms and EPS*RPTfirms (-0.4260 and 8.4570) it is evident that the 
EPS*RPTfirms are more influential and relevant than the BVPS*RPTfirms in 
explaining the variation in the stock price of those firms.  
Furthermore, the study period was partitioned into pre and post-MFRS adoption 
periods. The results presented in third and fourth models in table 7.3 are for the pre 
and post-MFRS adoption periods respectively. During the pre-MFRS adoption period, 
the coefficient of basic BVPS was negative but not significant. However, the 
coefficient of the basic EPS was positive and significant.  On the coefficients of the 
variables of interest in the model, neither the coefficient of BVPS*RPTfirms nor that 
of EPS*RPTfirms was significant during the period. This indicates that both BVPS 
and EPS of RPTFirms are not value-relevant in the pre-MFRS adoption period. 
The analysis of the fourth model (post adoption) reveals that the coefficients of the 
model basic variables are positive and significant at 1%. The coefficient of the first 
variable of interest in the model BVPS*RPTfirms was negative (-0.4731) and 
significant at 1%. Interestingly, the coefficient of the second variable of interest 
EPS*RPTfirms was positive (10.5534) and significant at 1%. This implies that after 
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the mandatory adoption of MFRS 124, the EPS*RPTfirms become more informative 
and satisfied the information needs of the users of financial reports. Hence, the positive 
(negative) sign of the EPS*RPTfirms (BVPS*RPTfirms) indicates the incremental 
(decreased) value-relevance of the variables during the post-MFRS 124 adoption 
period. This is consistent with the Devalle et al. (2010) that with adoption of IFRS the 
influence of EPS increased in Germany, France and the UK (out of the Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy and the UK), while the influence of BVPS decreased in all the 
countries with exception of the UK. Ge et al. (2010) find that the value relevance of 
EPS of the firm with related party sales of goods and related party sales of assets has 
increased after the implementation of the improved RPTs disclosure regulations in 
China. 
In summary, the results from the Ohlson price model reveal that RPTs disclosure is 
value-relevant throughout the period under review. Second, for the combined period, 
the EPS of the RPTFirms is value-relevant. Third, during the pre-MFRS 124 adoption 
period, both BVPS and EPS of RPTFirms are not value-relevant. Last, during the post-
MFRS 124 adoption period, the EPS of RPTFirms is value-relevant. 
7.1.3.2 Return Model Regression 
Table 7.4 presents the coefficients of the regressions for the value-relevance of MFRS 
124 disclosure using the return model. The first model (Model 1) was used to test the 
value-relevance of the net income of RPT firms. NetIncome*RPTFirms is the variable 
of interest in the Model 1. Subsequent models (Model 2 and Model 3) are for the pre 
and post-MFRS adoption periods. 
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In the Model 1, the coefficient of NetIncome was positive and significant at 1%. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the NetIncome*RPTFirms was (0.1115) positive and 
significant at 10%. This indicates that the net income of the RPT firms is value-
relevant for the combined period. Moreover, when the sample period was partitioned 
into pre and post-MFRS adoption periods, the coefficients of the regression for the 
pre-adoption era was presented in the fourth column of table 7.4. In this model, the 
coefficient of the NetIncome was positive and significant at 5%. As expected, the 
coefficient of NetIncome*RPTFirms was positive but not significant. This signals that 
prior to mandatory adoption of MFRS 124 the net income of RPT firms was not value-
relevant. 
Table 7.4  
Return Model Regression Result 
  
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Combined period Pre-MFRS period Post-MFRS period 
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.2351 16.02*** 0.3027 12.19*** 0.1667 10.85*** 
NetIncome 0.0823 3.64*** 0.1145 2.3** 0.0675 3.37*** 
RPTFirms 0.0243 0.81 0.0345 0.69 0.0011 0.04 
NetIncome*RPTFirms 0.1115 1.93* 0.0431 0.51 0.4152 3.68*** 
R2 0.0122  0.0099  0.027  
F-stat (P-value) 9.06(0.000) 3.68(0.005) 10.21(0.000) 
Observation 2214   1107   1107   
Variables as defined above. Model 1 (combined period 2009 - 2015) Return = α + β1 NetIncome + β2 
NetIncome*RPTFirms + ε; Model 2 (pre-IFRS, 2009-2011); Return = α + β1 NetIncome + β2 
NetIncome*RPTFirms + ε; Model 3 (post-IFRS, 2013-2015) Return = α + β1 NetIncome + β2 
NetIncome*RPTFirms + ε; ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The coefficients of the regressions for the post-MFRS 124 adoption period were 
presented in the sixth column of table 7.4. In the sixth column, the coefficient of 
NetIncome was positive and significant at 1%. Equally, the coefficient of the 
NetIncome*RPTFirms was positive (0.4152) and significant at 1%. This indicates that 
the net income of the RPT firm for the post-adoption period is value-relevant. This 
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finding is consistent with the  Kim (2013) and Ismail et al. (2013) that net income 
reported under IFRS is more value-relevant. 
Collectively, the results from the Easton return model reveal that for the combined 
period, the net income of RPTFirms is value-relevant. Second, during the pre-MFRS 
124 adoption period, the net income of RPTFirms is not value-relevant. Last, during 
the post-MFRS 124 adoption period, the net income of RPTFirms is value-relevant. 
7.1.4 Additional Analyses 
Some additional tests are conducted to ensure that the results presented in the main 
analyses are not sensitive to alternative sample size or measurement. To robust the 
results of the price model, all loss-making firms were removed from the initial sample 
of the study. This is based on Darrough and Ye (2007) and Jiang and Stark (2013) that 
loss-making firms have some distinctive features. Thus, their value-relevance cannot 
be measured with the simple BVPS and EPS models. The results of the tests conducted 
on profit firms as presented in table 7.5 were similar to the initial results from the full 
sample across all the four models. In the first model, the signs of the coefficients and 
level of significance of all the three variables remain positive at 1%, as reported in the 
initial results. Similarly, the signs of the coefficients and level of significance of all 
the five variables in the second model remain similar to those of the main analysis. 
The only exception is that while the coefficient of RPTFirms was positive and 
insignificant in the initial analyses, the variable becomes negative and significant at 
1% in the additional analysis. The differences recorded in the third model are with 
respect to BVPS and EPS*RPTFirms which are significant in the additional analyses. 
There was no any identifiable difference noticed in the fourth models of the main and 
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additional analyses in terms of the sign of the coefficients and level of significance 
with exception of the coefficient of RPTFirms that was positive and insignificant in 




Table 7.5  
Results of the Additional Analyses (Price Model) 
  Model 1 RPTs Model 2 Combined period Model 3 Pre-MFRS period Model 4 Post-MFRS period 
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant -0.19597 -1.36 0.0977 0.7 -0.1267 -1.1 0.1722 0.74 
BVPS 0.653535 9.56*** 0.6706 8.09*** -0.2225 -2.81*** 0.8517 6.77*** 
EPS  6.266984 26.08*** 3.9759 18.58*** 12.6128 33*** 2.9542 11.29*** 
RPTfirms 0.790531 3.29*** -0.7300 -2.74*** -0.0131 -0.06 -1.1381 -2.61*** 
BVPS*RPTfirms  -1.0927 -9.18*** -0.1893 -1.57 -1.1539 -6.64*** 
EPS*RPTfirms  15.9596 28.24*** 2.4851 3.67*** 19.6894 25.38*** 
R2 0.3932  0.5882  0.7398  0.6255  
F-stat (P-value) 368.50(0.000) 486.78(0.000) 487.27(0.000) 280.96(0.000) 
Observation 1710   1710   863   1107   
All variables and models are as defined above. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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The next tests are conducted to check the sensitivity of the results in the return model. 
In these tests, the study employed the change in net income (ChngNetIncome) as an 
alternative measure to the net income method presented in the main analyses. Easton 
and Harris (1991) state that the stock return can be influenced by the level of income 
or change in income. Therefore, the second approach was used in this section to 
validate the initial findings.  
Table 7.6  
Results of the Additional Analyses (Return Model) 
  
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Combined period Pre-MFRS period Post-MFRS period 
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.2353 16.15*** 0.2986 12.14*** 0.1687 10.98*** 
ChngNetIncome 0.0997 5.01*** 0.1718 4.22*** 0.0589 3.23*** 
RPTfirms 0.0240 0.81 0.0311 0.63 0.0203 0.65 
ChngNetIncome*RPTfirms 0.1857 3.16*** 0.0744 0.91 0.4333 3.79*** 
R2 0.0232  0.0268  0.0263  
F-stat (P-value)  17.50(0.000) 10.12(0.005)  9.94(0.000) 
Observation 2214   1107   1107   
All variables and models as defined above. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimates are 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The results of the regressions are substantially similar to those reported in the main 
analyses. The signs of the coefficients are the same across all the variables and across 
all the models. The slight difference recorded was in the level of significance of the 
ChngNetIncome*RPTFirms which was at 1% in the additional test of Model 1, instead 
of the 10% significant level reported in the net income approach. Similarly, the level 
of significance of the ChngNetIncome was 1% significant level in the additional test 




7.2 Real Earnings Management. 
This section presents the analyses and interpretations of findings of the tests conducted 
to find out whether disclosed RPTs are associated with REM. It also deals with the 
relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value and the mitigating effect of 
compliance with disclosure requirement on the relationship between REM in RPTs 
and firm value. 
7.2.1 Descriptive Analyses 
7.2.1.1 Estimation Models 
Table 7.7 reports the coefficients of the estimation models that are used to determine 
the normal and abnormal levels of activities. The equations are estimated for each 
industry throughout the study period (2009 to 2015) using the whole sampled firm-
years. The reported values are the mean of the coefficients and R2 across the industries. 
Most of the coefficients in the models are statistically significant with the predicted 
values. To determine the t-value of each variable in the model, the means of the 
coefficients were divided by their respective means of standard errors. The high rate 
of the adjusted R2 across the models indicates the explanatory power of the model 
variables in defining the variability of the dependent variables. The production costs 
model has the highest mean of adjusted R2 of 87.38% among the models, followed by 
55.31% for CFO model. The mean of adjusted R2 of the discretionary expenditure 
model was 45.90% for the sake of comparison, the coefficients accrual were computed 
and the average R2 of the accrual model was 39.36%. The pattern of the mean of 




Table 7.7  
Estimation Models 
  CFO/TA-1 Production/TA-1 DISC /TA-1 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Contant 0.0175 1.40 -0.0736 -4.94*** 0.0163 2.47** 
1/TA-1 1157 3.16*** -1408 -2.35** 5485 1.91** 
Sales/TA-1 0.1161 7.15*** 0.7707 31.87*** 0.080 11.06*** 
Δsales/TA-1 0.0379 0.96 0.0250 0.29   
Δsales-1/TA-1   0.0141 0.15   
R2 0.5531  0.8738  0.4590  
N 5131  5131  5131  
CFO is the cash flow from the operating activities. PROD = Production costs. It is determined as the 
sum of cost of goods sold and changes in inventory from year t-1 to year t; DISEXP = discretionary 
expenditure, defined as sum of advertising expenses, research & development and selling, general & 
administrative expenses; At-1 = total assets in year t-1; S = total sales revenue; ∆S = change in sales 
revenue from year t-1 to year t; Model 1 = CFOt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + α2(St/At-1)+ α3(∆St/At-1) 
+ εt; Model 2 = PRODt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + α2(St/At-1)+ α3(∆St/At-1)+ α4(∆SALESit-1/At-1) + 
εt; Model 3 = DISEXPt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + α2(St/At-1) + εt. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter 
estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
7.2.1.2 Summary Statistics of the Firm Characteristics 
Table 7.8 presents the summary statistics of the variables included in the REM models. 
The values presented in panel A, B and C represent the statistics for the full sample, 
RPTFirms and non-RPTFirms years respectively. A critical view on the full sample, 
RPTFirms and non-RPTFirms provides an insight on the groups’ behavior of the REM 
proxies and other characteristics. For the full sample, the summary statistics reveals a 
negative mean of abnormal CFO, positive mean of abnormal production costs and a 
negative mean of abnormal discretionary expenditure -5.50E-11, 9.91E-12 and -
1.02E-11 respectively. Based on these, one may argue that the listed firms have 
engaged in manipulative activities that lowered the CFO, increased the production 
costs and decreased discretionary expenditure. However, further investigation reveals 
that these manipulative activities are associated with the RPTFirms. This was deduced 
from the apparent positive mean of abnormal CFO, the negative mean of abnormal 
production costs and the positive mean of abnormal discretionary expenditure by the 
non- RPTFirms. Conversely, the sign of the mean of abnormal CFO, mean of 
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abnormal production costs and mean of abnormal discretionary expenditure of the 
RPTFirms was exactly in opposite direction with those reported for the non- 
RPTFirms. These provide initial insight that RPTFirms are associated with the 
activities that would lead to real earnings manipulations. 
It is evident that large firms are more involved in RPTs than the small firms' 
counterpart. This can be seen from the mean total assets of the RPTFirms RM1.82 
million, which happen to be more than RM1.60 million and RM1.56 million the mean 
total assets of the full sample and non- RPTFirms respectively. The possible 
explanation to this is that, usually, large firms are holding companies with many 
subsidiaries, associates, joint operations and many other related parties to engage with. 
Therefore, the tendencies of those firms to be in RPTs are higher compared to the 
small counterpart. Similarly, the mean of the profitability (ROA) of RPTFirms 4.50% 
and is higher than the mean of profitability of 3.30% and 3.12% for the full sample 
and the non- RPTFirms firms respectively.   
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Table 7.8  
Summary Statistics of the Earnings Management Variables 
Panel A Descriptive statistics Panel B Descriptive statistics 
(suspect    N639) 
Panel C Descriptive statistics 
(non-suspect    N4477) 
Difference in Means: 
Suspect-non Suspect  13(full sample    N5116) 
Variable Mean Median Sta. Dev. Mean Median Sta. Dev. Mean Median Sta. Dev. Diff. in Means T-stat 
Ab_CFO -5.50E-11 -0.0021 0.1445 -0.0057 -0.0067 0.0752 0.0008 -0.0013 0.152 -0.0066 -1.09 
Ab_PRO 9.91E-12 0.0096 0.196 0.0229 0.0327 0.1577 -0.0033 0.0057 0.2008 0.0262 3.20*** 
Ab_DISC -1.02E-11 -0.0057 0.113 -0.014 -0.0132 0.0864 0.002 -0.0042 0.1162 -0.016 -3.38*** 
Total Assets 1600015 282764 6281690 1845442 549120 4086289 1564986 255543 6534757 280456 1.06 
Size 12.66544 12.556 1.5939 13.2478 13.195 1.5158 12.5805 12.451 1.5873 0.6673 10.09*** 
MTB 1.334401 0.822 3.3181 1.5898 0.923 2.6196 1.2971 0.811 3.4067 0.2927 2.11** 
ROA 3.295497 3.93 21.3994 4.5039 4.27 11.2359 3.1192 3.9 22.4968 1.3846 1.54 
    Tobins' Q 1.1652 0.8710 2.6411     
    ChangeNI 0.0618 0.0038 2.3935     
    Leverage 18.8004 15.6700 18.0526     
    Divi 0.0635 0.0150 0.1120     
    Liquidity 2.9528 1.8400 4.6688     
    Audit 1562.38 194.94 28314     
    Ind_dumm 0.6663 1.0000 0.4716     
    Dscore 0.7054 0.7059 0.0893     
    DscoreT 0.8434 0.8130 0.1275     
    DscoreG 0.5821 0.5560 0.1194     
    Bind 0.4450 0.4290 0.1154     
    Aexp 0.8261 1.0000 0.2416     
    Aind 0.5642 1.0000 0.4962     
    Tunn 0.4205 0.0000 0.4940     
    Prop 0.4159 0.0000 0.4933         
 
  
                                                     
13 Fifteen firm-year observations are missing from the control variables used in the study. Hence, the firm-year observations for the full sample and suspect has reduce from the 
initial 5031 and 654 to 5116 and 639 for the full sample and suspect firm years respectively. 
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7.2.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 7.9 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in REM 
analyses. Overall, it portrays less severe problem of multicollinearity among the 
independent variables.  Abnormal CFO (Ab_CFO) was found to have a positive 
relationship with the abnormal production cost (Ab_PRO) at 1% level of significance. 
The association between Ab_CFO and abnormal discretionary expenditure 
(Ab_DISC) was positive but not significant. Similarly, the correlation between 
Ab_PRO with Ab_DISC was positive and significance at 1%.  
As expected, all market-related variables have a significant negative correlation with 
the proxies for REM. Ab_CFO was having negative relationships with Tobin’s Q (-
0.0223) and Market-to-book value (-0.1018) at 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively. Similarly, negative correlations were also recorded between Ab_PRO 
and Tobin’s Q (-0.0646) and Market-to-book value (-0.1174) at 1% level of 
significance. Ab_DISC relates negatively with Tobin’s Q (-0.0112) while the 
association between Ab_DISC and Market-to-book value was negative -0.0321) and 
significant at 5%. 
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Table 7.9  
Correlation matrix of the Real Earnings Management Variables  
Variable Ab_CFO Ab_PRO Ab_DISC Tobins' Q MTB  T A Profitability ChangeNI Leverage Divi Liquidity 
Ab_CFO 1.0000           
Ab_PRO 0.3730*** 1.0000          
Ab_DISC 0.0102 0.8812*** 1.00         
Tobins' Q -0.0223* -0.0646*** -0.0112  1.00        
MTB  -0.1018*** -0.1174*** -0.0321** 0.2340*** 1       
T A -0.0236** 0.026* 0.1042*** 0.0044 0.0299** 1.0000      
ROA -0.4613*** -0.1221*** 0.0832***  -0.3603*** 0.1513*** 0.0243* 1     
ChangeNI -0.0321** -0.01 -0.0114 0.2946*** -0.0033 -0.01 -0.3162*** 1    
Leverage 0.1199*** 0.1086*** 0.0333** -0.0232* -0.0345** 0.1412*** -0.0969*** -0.0166 1   
Divi -0.0741*** -0.0638*** 0.0004  0.0847*** 0.2201*** -0.0015 0.4458*** 0.0244* -0.0799*** 1  
Liquidity -0.0291** 0.0186 -0.0432** 0.0101 0.0003 -0.0492*** -0.0089 0.0151 -0.2839*** 0.0303** 1 
Audit -0.0042 0.0003 0.0154 0.0032 0.0041 0.1309*** -0.0011 0.0024 0.0227 -0.0027 -0.0031 
Ind_dumm -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0752*** -0.0896*** -0.1247*** 0.0523*** -0.0306** 0.0627*** -0.015 -0.0697*** 
Dscore -0.0023 0.0554 0.1247*** -0.0347 -0.01 0.2187*** -0.0443 0.0139 0.1840*** -0.0622 -0.1342*** 
DscoreT 0.0743* 0.1227*** 0.1188*** -0.2526*** -0.2267*** 0.0753* -0.1402*** 0.0457 0.2594*** -0.1866*** -0.1774*** 
DscoreG -0.0754* -0.028 0.0803** 0.1751*** 0.1826*** 0.2395*** 0.0678* -0.0274 0.0164 0.0813** -0.0176 
Bind 0.0529 0.0971** 0.0575 0.0187 0.03 -0.0346 -0.0546 -0.0026 -0.0091 0.0289 -0.0489 
ACFExp 0.0794** 0.0921** 0.0527 -0.027 -0.0053 0.0729* -0.0885** 0.041 0.0623 -0.0401 0.0353 
ACInd 0.0357 0.0781** -0.0054 -0.0183 -0.0006 0.0414 -0.0864** 0.0013 0.1204*** -0.0295 0.0249 
Tunneling -0.3757*** -0.1975*** -0.0060  0.2735*** 0.2227*** 0.1031*** 0.4407*** 0.1923*** -0.1952*** 0.1460*** 0.0614 




Table 7.9 (Continue) 
  Audit Ind_dumm Dscore DscoreT DscoreG Bind Aexp Aind Tunn Prop 
Audit 1          
Ind_dumm -0.0569*** 1         
Dscore 0.0921** 0.2033*** 1        
DscoreT 0.0315 0.0349 0.6994*** 1       
DscoreG 0.1013** 0.2467*** 0.7332*** 0.0321 1      
Bind -0.0366 -0.1904*** 0.1415*** 0.1230*** 0.0893* 1     
Aexp -0.0133 -0.0952** 0.1398*** 0.0835** 0.1255*** 0.2825*** 1    
Aind -0.0117 -0.1020*** 0.0776* 0.042 0.0817** 0.3517*** 0.8205*** 1   
Tunn 0.0508 0.0034 0.0034 -0.1703*** 0.1673*** -0.0333 0.0258 -0.0025 1  
Prop -0.0987* -0.0068 0.0023 0.1531*** -0.1456*** 0.0412 -0.0616 -0.0194 -0.7270*** 1 
***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Variable as previously defined.
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7.2.3 Multivariate Regression  
As mentioned earlier in chapter five, this study uses the Roychowdhury (2006) REM 
models to measure the REM activities in RPTs by RPTFirms. This section presents 
the results of the multiple regressions on the relationship between REM in RPTs and 
firm value. The section also covers the multiple regression results of the mitigating 
effect of compliance the disclosure requirements on RPT on the relationship between 
REM in RPTs and firm value. 
7.2.3.1 Real Earnings Management in RPTs 
Table 7.10 presents the results of the regressions conducted to investigate the REM 
activities by RPTFirms. Proxies for REM are presented in separate columns of the 
table. The result of the first proxy for REM (Ab_CFO) was presented in the second 
column of the table. The coefficient of the firm size (Size), MTV and ROA are 
positive, negative and negative respectively. As expected, the coefficient of the 
variable of interest (RPTFirms) was positive (0.0103) and significant at 10%. This 
reveals that the CFO of the RPTFirms is lower (recall that Ab_CFO and Ab_DISC are 
transformed to positive through multiplying them by -1 as stated in section 5.4.4.1) 
than what it ought to be based on average total assets of the RPTFirms. The implication 
of this is that RPTFirms have engaged in some strange activities that alter the level of 
CFO from been at par to its normal level. The finding has proved Ab_CFO for 




Table 7.10  
Regression Results for Real Earnings Management in RPTs 
  Ab_CFO   Ab_PRO   Ab_DISC   
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant -0.0046 -0.32 -0.1031 -4.68*** -0.0800 -6.25*** 
Size 0.0012 1.05 0.0088 5.08*** 0.0063 6.2*** 
MTB -0.0015 -2.69*** -0.0062 -7.51*** -0.0017 -3.53*** 
ROA -0.0031 -35.99*** -0.0011 -8.53*** 0.0004 5.12*** 
RPTFirms 0.0103 1.88* 0.0235 2.85*** 0.0117 2.45*** 
R2 0.2146  0.0322  0.0185  
F-stat (P-
value) 349.17(0.000) 42.55(0.000) 24.07(0.000) 
14Observation 5116   5116   5116   
Ab_CFO = Abnormal cash flow from operating activities; Ab_PRO = Abnormal production costs; 
Ab_DISC = Abnormal discretionary expenditure; Size = natural logarithm of total assets; MTV = 
market-to-book value; ROA = earnings before extraordinary incomes (EBXI), scaled by total assets. 
RPTFirms = Dummy variable equals to one for the RPTFirms and zero for otherwise. RPTFirmsis 
defined as a firm with RPTs of up to 20% of its revenue or the firms that engage in more than one form 
of RPTs in a given year. Coefficients were estimated using Y = α0 + β1Sizeit + β2MTVit + β3ROAit + 
β4RPTFirmsit + εtit replacing Y with one of the three proxies of REM. ***, **, * indicate that the 
parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
In the second regression, the Ab_PRO is used as dependent variable. All the variables 
in this model are significant at 1%. The coefficient of the firm size (Size), MTV and 
ROA are positive, negative and negative respectively. The coefficient of the variable 
of interest in this regression (RPTFirms) was positive (0.0235). This indicates that 
RPTFirms are characterized with over production to lower the unit production costs. 
This finding is similar to the Roychowdhury (2006) and Abad et al. (2016) that the 
RPTFirms use overproduction to manipulate reported earnings. 
The result of the regression where Ab_DISC was used as the dependent variable was 
presented in the part of table 7.10. The coefficients of the Size, MTV and ROA are 
negative, positive and negative respectively; and significant at 1%. As expected, the 
coefficient of the variable of interest in the model (RPTFirms) was positive (0.0117) 
                                                     
14 Additional fifteen (15) firm-year observations are removed from the initial sample of 5131 because 
of the lack of data for the control variables used in the subsequent regressions.  
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and significant at 5%. This result reveals that the discretionary expenditure of the 
RPTFirms was lower in commensurate to the average total assets base. This implies 
that the discretionary expenditure of the RPTFirms is lower than match non-RPTFirms 
by 1.2% (represented by the negative coefficient of RPTFirms 0.0117 in the 
discretionary model). The extent of literature has defined lower abnormal 
discretionary expenditure as an element of REM. Hence, it is established that 
RPTFirms used discretionary expenditure to manipulate reported earnings. 
In a nutshell, the results from all the three models revealed that the RPTFirms have 
the negative, positive and negative relationship with the abnormal CFO, abnormal 
production cost and abnormal discretionary expenditure respectively. As indicated by 
Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010) and Cupertino et al. (2015) these relationships 
reveal that firms perpetrate REM in RPTs. 
7.2.3.2 Real Earnings Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
Table 7.11 presents the coefficients and the results of the regressions on the 
relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. In the first regression, the 
coefficient of the variable of interest (Ab_CFO) is negative (-1.7432) and statistically 
significant at 1%.  This implies that capital market discount stock price of the firm that 
manipulates its cash flow from operations through RPTs. As expected, the coefficient 
of the Ab_PRO was negative (-2.0022) and statistically significant at 1% in the second 
regression. The implication of these results is that capital market discount stock price 
of the firm that overproduced to lower the unit production cost. In the last regression, 
Ab_DISC was used as a proxy for REM. The results are consistent with those reported 
earlier. The coefficient of the Ab_DISC was negative (-4.1973) and statically 
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significant at 1%. This implies that capital market disciplines the firms that cut-down 
its discretionary expenditure to manipulate the reported earnings. 
Table 7.11  
Results of the Real Earnings Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
  Ab_CFO   Ab_PRO   Ab_DISC   
Tobin’s Q  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.9701431 2.18** 0.3500 0.8 0.5806 1.39 
Ab_CFO -1.7432 -2.82***     
Ab_PRO   -2.0022 -7.85***   
Ab_DISC     -4.1973 -9.83*** 
Size -0.0001 -0.07 0.0388 1.34 0.0138 0.5 
ROA 0.0152 3.31*** 0.0124 2.92*** 0.0166 4.07*** 
ChangeNI -0.4582 -1.09 -0.4439 -1.1 -0.5594 -1.42 
Bind 0.1970 0.54 0.4467 1.26 0.4715 1.37 
Aexp -0.0180 -0.06 -0.0186 -0.07 0.1260 0.48 
Aind -0.0052 -0.04 -0.0029 -0.02 -0.1079 -0.82 
Tunn 0.2575 2.22** 0.2126 1.91* 0.2861 2.65*** 
Prop -0.0189 -0.16 -0.0630 -0.55 -0.0966 -0.86 
Leverage 0.0001 0.1 0.0003 0.12 0.0007 0.25 
Divi 4.2334 10.26*** 3.9335 9.88*** 3.7541 9.64*** 
Liquidity 0.0239 1.85* 0.0322 2.6** 0.0417 3.43*** 
Audit -0.0001 -0.39 0.0000 -0.53 0.0000 -0.16 
Ind_dumm -0.1645 -1.7* -0.1130 -1.21 -0.1455 -1.61 
R2 0.3016  0.3563  0.3875  
F-stat (P-value) 19.25(0.000) 24.67(0.000)  28.20(0.000) 
15Observation 639   639   639   
Coefficients are estimated using Y = α0 + β1REM proxyit + β2Sizeit + β3ROAit + β4ChangeNIit + β5Bindit 
+ β6 Aexpit + β7 Aindit + β8 Tunnit + β9 Propit + β10Leverageit + β11Dividendit + β12Liquidityit + β13Auditit 
+ β14Industryit + εtit    (10). Y= Tobins’Q: Tobin’s Q = market value of equity + book value of total 
liabilities, scaled by total assets. REM = one of the three proxies for REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and 
Ab_DISC) as determined in section 5.4.4.1. The test is repeated for each of the three proxies for REM. 
Other variables as previously defined. ***, **, * indicates that the parameter estimates are statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Collectively, the results of the regressions conducted to test the relationship between 
REM in RPTs and firm value indicate that stock market participants are aware that 
                                                     
15 Additional fifteen (15) firm-year observations are removed from the initial sample of 654 because of 
the lack of data for the control variables used in the subsequent regressions. 
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firms use RPTs for REM purposes. Similarly, the results indicate that capital markets 
discount the stock price of the firms that engage in REM in RPTs. 
7.2.3.3 Mitigating Effect of Compliance with MFRS 124 on Real Earnings 
Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
Table 7.12 presents the results of the regressions run to test the moderating effect of 
the compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs on the relationship between 
REM in RPTs and firm value. In the first part of the table, the total compliance 
(Dscore) was used as moderating variables. None of the variables of interest is 
statistically significant in this segment. The results of the first regression show that the 
coefficient of the variable of interest (Ab_CFO*Dscore) is positive (2.4005). 
However, the variable is statistically insignificant. Similarly, in the second regression, 
the coefficient of the variable of interest (Ab_PRO*Dscore) is negative (-1.1100) and 
statistically insignificant. The results of the last regression run in this segment produce 
are similar to the above-reported results. The coefficient of the variable of interest 
(Ab_DISC*Dscore) is negative (-3.1500) and statistically insignificant. The results 
reveal a lack of statistical relationship between the dependent variable with the 
variable of interest across the three models. 
 264 
Table 7.12  
Results of the Moderating Effect 
  ALL Disclosures Transaction-based Disclosure 
  Ab_CFO   Ab_PRO   Ab_DISC   Ab_CFO   Ab_PRO   Ab_DISC   
 Tobin’s Q Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.9083 1.92* 0.2939 0.63 0.2690504 0.59 2.2357 4.68*** 1.9056 4.21*** 2.4053 5.47*** 
Ab_CFO -3.4101 -0.92     -17.2428 -6.41***     
Ab_PRO   -1.2298 -0.59      -14.2782 -10.47***   
Ab_DISC     -2.0557  -0.62      -27.3387 -11.95*** 
Dscore 0.2227 0.45 0.1312 0.28 0.8355  1.77 * -1.8565 -5.62*** -1.8807 -6.24*** -1.8869 -6.38*** 
Ab_CFO*Dscore 2.4005 0.46     17.9876 5.83***     
Ab_PRO*Dscore  -1.1100 -0.37      14.8464 9.15***   
Ab_DISC*Dscore    -3.1500 -0.67      28.0282 10.32*** 
Size -0.0062 -0.2 0.0375 1.24 0.0026 0.09 0.0043 0.15 0.0224 0.83 -0.0190 -0.74 
ROA 0.0151 3.25*** 0.0126 2.94*** 0.0170 4.16*** 0.0095 2.11** 0.0064 1.59 0.0107 2.84*** 
ChangeNI -0.4448 -1.04 -0.4581 -1.13 -0.6040734 -1.53 0.1225 0.3 0.0923 0.24 -0.1204 -0.33 
Bind 0.1519 0.41 0.4290 1.19 0.3625201 1.04 0.4259 1.2 0.6103 1.84* 0.5259 1.65* 
Aexp -0.0383 -0.13 -0.0298 -0.11 0.0623391 0.23 0.1712 0.63 0.1810 0.72 0.2410 0.99 
Aind 0.0086 0.06 -0.0016 -0.01 -0.0858376 -0.65 -0.0514 -0.38 -0.0171 -0.14 -0.1272 -1.04 
Tunn 0.2576 2.22** 0.2128 1.91* 0.2784201 2.58** 0.2122 1.9* 0.1760 1.7* 0.3142 3.16*** 
Prop -0.0220 -0.18 -0.0634 -0.55 -0.1078473 -0.96 -0.0119 -0.1 -0.0588 -0.55 -0.0310 -0.3 
Leverage 0.0001 0.03 0.0004 0.13 0.0003988 0.15 0.0014 0.53 0.0003 0.13 0.0025 1.02 
Divi 4.2278 10.2*** 3.9469 9.87*** 3.77E+00 9.69*** 3.6512 9.00*** 3.0758 8.09*** 2.9230 7.98*** 
Liquidity 0.0238 1.83* 0.0323 2.61 4.23E-02 3.47*** 0.0166 1.33 0.0301 2.61*** 0.0466 4.16*** 
Audit 0.0000 -0.4 0.0000 -0.54 -4.66E-06 -0.19 0.0000 -0.3 0.0000 -0.08 0.0000 0.3 
Ind_dumm -0.1729 -1.75* -0.1189 -1.25 -0.1796102 -1.94* -0.1355 -1.45 -0.0631 -0.73 -0.1419 -1.7* 
R2 0.3022  0.3565  0.3906  0.354  0.4451  0.4849  
F-stat (P-value)  16.84(0.000)  21.54(0.000)  24.92(0.000)   21.31(0.000)   31.18(0.000)  36.60(0.000) 
Observation 639   639   639   639   639   639   
A Coefficients are estimated using Y = α0 + β1REMproxyit + β2Dscoreit + β3REMproxyit* Dscoreit + β4Sizeit + β5ROAit + β6ChangeNIit + β7Bindit + β8 Aexpit + β9 Aindit + β10 
Tunnit + β11 Propit + β12Leverageit + β13Dividendit + β14Liquidityit + β15Auditit + β16Industryit + εtit    (11). Y= Tobins’Q: Tobin’s Q = market value of equity + book value of 
total liabilities, scaled by total assets. REM = one of the three proxies for REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) as determined in section 5.4.4.1. Other variables as 
previously defined. ***, **, * indicates that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 7.12 (Continued) 
  Non-transaction-based Disclosures 
  Ab_CFO   Ab_PRO   Ab_DISC   
 Tobin’s Q Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.8734 2.02** 0.2258 0.57 0.3020 0.8 
Ab_CFO 10.5600 3.96***     
Ab_PRO   11.9043 9.23***   
Ab_DISC     15.8727 8.5*** 
Dscore 1.6163 4.52*** 1.8868 5.76*** 2.4900 7.88*** 
Ab_CFO*Dscore -21.1300 -4.7***     
Ab_PRO*Dscore  -24.1385 -10.89***   
Ab_DISC*Dscore    -34.8434 -11.05*** 
Size -0.0505 -1.66*** -0.0107 -0.38 -0.0331 -1.26 
ROA 0.0157 3.52*** 0.0101 2.59** 0.0143 3.91*** 
ChangeNI -0.5244 -1.29 -0.3408 -0.93 -0.2716 -0.77 
Bind 0.1372 0.38 0.0482 0.15 -0.0243 -0.08 
Aexp -0.1369 -0.5 -0.1012 -0.41 0.0070 0.03 
Aind -0.0119 -0.09 0.0004 0 -0.1187 -1 
Tunn 0.1967 1.74* 0.2064 2.04** 0.2316 2.38** 
Prop -0.0724 -0.62 -0.0674 -0.65 -0.0611 -0.61 
Leverage 0.0021 0.77 0.0011 0.46 0.0004 0.16 
Divi 4.0421 10.07*** 3.4145 9.37*** 3.0718 8.69*** 
Liquidity 0.0277 2.2** 0.0357 3.17*** 0.0412 3.78*** 
Audit 0.0000 -0.5* 0.0000 -0.16 0.0000 0.33 
Ind_dumm -0.2693 -2.78*** -0.2229 -2.55** -0.3461 -4.12*** 
R2 0.3447  0.4707  0.5095  
F-stat (P-value)  20.45(0.000)  34.57(0.000) 40.38(0.000) 
Observation 639   639   639   
Coefficients are estimated using Y = α0 + β1REMproxyit + β2Dscoreit + β3REMproxyit* Dscoreit + 
β4Sizeit + β5ROAit + β6ChangeNIit + β7Bindit + β8 Aexpit + β9 Aindit + β10 Tunnit + β11 Propit + 
β12Leverageit + β13Dividendit + β14Liquidityit + β15Auditit + β16Industryit + εtit    (11). Y= Tobins’Q: 
Tobin’s Q = market value of equity + book value of total liabilities, scaled by total assets. REM = one 
of the three proxies for REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) as determined in section 5.4.4.1. 
Other variables as previously defined. ***, **, * indicates that the parameter estimates are statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
In summary, the results of the regressions portray the absent of the moderating effect 
of the compliance with disclosure requirements on RPT on the RPTs on the 
relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. The possible reason for this results 
can be connected with the low level of compliance with the disclosure requirements 
on RPTs. Recall that in the section 6.1.2 of the thesis, it was established that the mean 
compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs was just 71%. This level of 
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compliance is considered moderate most especially in sensitive accounting issues like 
RPTs. This is because, in disclosure studies, points are given to each item of disclosure 
requirement regardless of its importance to the users of financial report. Therefore, 
firm may earn pretty points by complying with some disclosure items that are not 
pressing to the users while neglecting the most pressing one. Hence, for any 
accounting standard to achieve its objectives, extensive disclosure is a must.  
The level of compliance was split into transaction-based compliance (DscoreT) and 
non-transaction-based compliance (DscoreG). As presented in section 6.1.2 the mean 
compliance of DscoreT was 84%. This level of compliance can be considered as high 
level of compliance. On the contrary, the mean compliance of the DcoreG was just 
58%. This level of compliance can be considered as low level of compliance. Hence 
this study goes further to investigate the effect of high compliance and low compliance 
with the disclosure requirements on RPTs on the relationship between REM in RPTs 
and firm value.  
Interestingly, the results of the regressions when the level of compliance was high 
(DscoreT) reveal that compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs mitigates 
the negative relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. The results of the first 
regression under the transaction-based disclosure in the table 7.12 show a positive 
relationship. The coefficient of the variable of interest (Ab_CFO*DscoreT) is positive 
(17.9876) and statistically significant at 1%. The results of the second regression in 
this category using the second proxy of REM reveal positive relationship. The 
coefficient of the variable of interest in the model (Ab_PRO*DscoreT) is positive 
(4.8464) and significant at 1% statistical level of significance.  
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Consistently, the last proxy of REM produced a similar result. The coefficient of the 
variable of interest in the last model (Ab_DISC*DscoreT) in this category is positive 
28.0282 and significant at 1% statistical level of significance. These results indicate 
that high level of compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs mitigates the 
negative relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. 
The study used the non-transaction-based compliance (DscoreG) to assess the 
moderating effect of low level of compliance with disclosure requirement on RPTs on 
the negative relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. The results as 
presented in the last segment of Table 7.12 reveal that low level of compliance with 
disclosure requirement on RPTs exacerbates the negative relationship between REM 
in RPTs and firm value. The coefficient of the first variable of interest 
(Ab_CFO*DscoreG) is negative (-21.1300) and statistically significant at 1%.  
Also, the results of the second regression in this category using the second proxy of 
REM reveal negative relationship. The coefficient of the second variable of interest in 
the model (Ab_PRO*DscoreG) is negative (-24.1385) and significant at 1% statistical 
level of significance. Consistently, the last proxy of REM produced a similar result. 
The coefficient of the variable of interest in the last model (Ab_DISC*DscoreG) in 
this category is negative -34.8434 and significant at 1% statistical level of significance. 
These results indicate that low level of compliance with the disclosure requirements 
on RPTs worsens the negative relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. 
In a nutshell, this study makes the following findings from the results from the 
moderating effect of compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs on the 
relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. First, that high level of compliance 
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with the disclosure requirements on RPTs mitigates the negative relationship between 
REM in RPTs and firm value. Second, that low level of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs has no effect on the negative relationship between REM in 
RPTs and firm value. Last, that low level of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs worsens the negative relationship between REM in RPTs and 
firm value. 
7.2.4 Additional Analyses 
This section presents series of additional tests conducted through the use of alternative 
measures of the variables used in the main analyses. The results of the tests are 
presented and discussed in the following sub-sections. 
7.2.4.1 Real Earnings Management in RPTs 
In the robust analysis, three new proxies for REM are formed and used as additional 
tests to capture the existence REM in the RPTFirms. Consistent with the Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), Ho et al. (2015) and Zang (2012) the proxies of REM (Ab_CFO, 
Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) are combined to create three new variables that have been 
used in this section. The first measure was RM_1 and arrived at by summing the new 
Ab_DISC and Ab_PRO. 
Table 7.13  
Summary of the composition of New Variables 
  Ab_DISC Ab_CFO Ab_PRO 
RM_1 √  √ 
RM_2 √ √  
RM_3 √ √ √ 
 
 269 
The second measure RM_2 has been arrived at through summing the Ab_CFO and 
Ab_DISC. Finally, the last measure RM_3 was the product of the three proxies 
combined. As in the main analyses, the positive relationship between RPTFirms with 
the three new measures indicates the REM. 
Table 7.14  
Results of the Additional Analyses (Real Earnings Management in RPTs) 
  RM_1   RM_2   RM_3   
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant -0.1831 -6.15*** -0.0846 -4.25*** -0.1877 -5.11*** 
Size 0.0151 6.42*** 0.0075 4.76*** 0.0163 5.62*** 
MTB -0.0079 -7.08*** -0.0032 -4.24*** -0.0093 -6.81*** 
ROA -0.0007 -4.12*** -0.0027 -23.15*** -0.0038 -17.67*** 
RPTFirms 0.0352 3.16*** 0.0220 2.95*** 0.0455 3.31*** 
R2 0.0229  0.1055  0.0754  
F-stat (P-
value) 29.93(0.000) 150.72(0.000)  104.22(0.000) 
Observation 5116   5116   5116   
RM_1 = sum of Ab_DISC and Ab_PRO; RM_2 = sum of Ab_CFO and Ab_DISC; RM_3 = sum of 
Ab_CFO, Ab_DISC, and Ab_PRO; Size = natural logarithm of total assets; MTV = market-to-book 
value; ROA = earnings before extraordinary incomes (EBXI), scaled by total assets. Suspect = Dummy 
variable equals to one for the RPTFirms and zero for otherwise. RPTFirmsis defined as a firm with 
RPTs of up to 20% of its revenue or the firms that engage in more than one form of RPTs in a given 
year. Coefficients were estimated using Y = α0 + β1Sizeit + β2MTVit + β3ROAit + β4RPTFirmsit + εtit 
replacing Y with one of the three proxies of REM. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimates are 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Table 7.12 presents the result of the additional analyses for the REM measures. The 
regressions of the new measures produced results that are substantially similar to those 
reported for the main analyses. In the first measure (RM_1) the coefficients of the 
Size, MTV and ROA are positive, negative and negative respectively; and significant 
at 1%. The sign of the variable of interest was positive (0.0352) as expected, and the 
variable is statistically significant at 1%. 
Moving to the second measure (RM_2), the coefficients of the Size, MTV and ROA 
are positive, negative and negative respectively; and significant at 1%. The sign of the 
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variable of interest was positive (0.0220) and significant at 1%. This emphasizes the 
relationship between Ab_DISC with the Ab_CFO as highlighted by (Roychowdhury, 
2006). The coefficients of the Size, MTV and ROA are positive, negative and negative 
respectively; and significant at 1%. The coefficient of the variable of interest in the 
model was positive (0.0455) and significant at 1%. This measure produced the highest 
coefficients among the three measures reviewed. This was the result of the combine 
proxies for REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_DISC and Ab_PRO). The results indicate that 
RPTFirms exhibit a combined real activities manipulations to increase the reported 
earnings by 4.6% (represented by the positive coefficient of suspect 0.0455in the 
RM_3 model). 
Overall, the result presented is robust to all alternative proxies on whether firms listed 
on Bursa Malaysia manipulate the reported earnings by means of real activity 
manipulations through RPTs. It is evident that the levels of the CFO of the RPTFirms 
are not at par with the normal level of activities. Similarly, the RPTFirms are 
associated with the low level of discretionary expenditure. Lastly, it was evident that 
RPTFirms engage into over production to lower unit production cost, cut down 
discretionary expenditure and engage in activities that increase the current level of 
CFO. This consistent with Munir et al., (2013) that RPTs by Malaysian firms with 
significant family ownership appears to affect the quality of their reported earnings 
negatively.  
7.2.4.2 Real Earnings Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
To robust the initial findings on the market valuation of the firms that engage in 
earnings management, the study uses an alternative measure of the firm value. 
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Following Fama and French (1998) and Lei and Song (2011), this study proxy the firm 
value as the market value of the firm scaled by book value of the firm (MTB). Thus, 
Tobin’s Q in equation 10 was substituted with the new proxy for the firm value (MTB). 
The results of the additional tests are similar to those reported in the main analysis. 
The coefficients of the variable of interest (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) are 
negative and statistically significant across the three models. The major noticeable 
difference is that the coefficient of the Ab_CFO is statistically significant at 5% in the 
additional analyses as against the 1% recorded in the main analyses. 
Table 7.15  
Results of the Additional Analyses (REM in RPTs and Firm Value) 
  Ab_CFO   Ab_PRO   Ab_DISC   
 MTB Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.3361 0.31 -0.9927 -0.94 -0.5548 -0.55 
Ab_CFO -3.1677 -2.13**     
Ab_PRO   -4.2787 -6.93***   
Ab_DISC     -9.5462 -9.26*** 
Size 0.0476 0.67 0.1341 1.92* 0.0826 1.23 
ROA 0.0311 2.82*** 0.0238 2.31** 0.0323 3.29*** 
ChangeNI -1.1334 -1.12 -1.0989 -1.13 -1.3579 -1.43 
Bind 0.5720 0.65 1.1176 1.31 1.2134 1.46 
Aexp 0.1348 0.2 0.1623 0.25 0.5034 0.79 
Aind 0.0144 0.04 0.0072 0.02 -0.2365 -0.74 
Tunn 0.3049 1.09 0.1990 0.74 0.3556 1.36 
Prop -0.1468 -0.51 -0.2327 -0.84 -0.3118 -1.15 
Leverage -0.0051 -0.77 -0.0049 -0.75 -0.0040 -0.64 
Divi 8.8722 8.95*** 8.2039 8.52*** 7.7429 8.23*** 
Liquidity 0.0138 0.44 0.0303 1.01 0.0526 1.79* 
Audit 0.0000 -0.28 0.0000 -0.4 0.0000 -0.06 
Ind_dumm -0.1738 -0.75 -0.0604 -0.27 -0.1256 -0.57 
R2 0.2313  0.281  0.3192  
F-stat (P-
value)  13.41(0.000)  17.42(0.000)  20.90(0.000) 
Observation 639   639   639   
Coefficients are estimated using Y = α0 + β1REM proxyit + β2Sizeit + β3ROAit + β4ChangeNIit + β5Bindit 
+ β6 Aexpit + β7 Aindit + β8 Tunnit + β9 Propit + β10Leverageit + β11Dividendit + β12Liquidityit + β13Auditit 
+ β14Industryit + εtit    (10). Where Y = MTB: MTB = market value of the firm scaled by book value of 
the firm. REM = one of the three proxies for REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) as determined 
in section 5.4.4.1. The test is repeated for each of the three proxies for REM. Other variables as 
previously defined. ***, **, * indicates that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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7.2.4.3 Mitigating Effect of Compliance with MFRS 124 on Real Earnings 
Management in RPTs and Firm Value 
Similar to the method used above, MTB was also used as an alternative measure of 
firm value to robust the initial findings. Table 7.16 presents the results of the additional 
tests using the alternative measure of firm value. The results of the regressions using 
the alternative measure are substantially similar to those reported in the main analyses. 
Both the signs and statistical significance of the variables of interest are similar across 
the three models (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) and across the three categories 
of compliance reviewed (Full compliance (Dscore), transaction-based compliance 
(DscoreT) and non-transaction-based compliance (DscoreG)). 
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Table 7.16 
Results of the Additional Analyses (Results of the Moderating Effect) 
  ALL Disclosures Transaction-based Disclosure 
  Ab_CFO   Ab_PRO   Ab_DISC   Ab_CFO   Ab_PRO   Ab_DISC   
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.1848 0.16 -1.2451 -1.11 -1.3429 -1.22 3.1453 2.72*** 2.5863 2.35** 3.9270 3.73*** 
Ab_CFO -3.3976 -0.38     -37.5936 -5.79***     
Ab_PRO   1.9020 0.3800      -33.0643 -9.96***   
Ab_DISC     -0.7505 -0.09      -68.8213 -12.58*** 
Dscore 0.4862 0.41 0.3963 0.35 1.9132 1.68* -4.1204 -5.16*** -4.2993 -5.86*** -4.5291 -6.4*** 
Ab_CFO*Dscore 0.3972 0.03     39.9523 5.36***     
Ab_PRO*Dscore  -8.9210 -1.24      34.8113 8.82***   
Ab_DISC*Dscore    -12.7631 -1.13      71.7480 11.05*** 
Size 0.0389 0.52 0.1366 1.87* 0.0634 0.9 0.0619 0.89 0.0949 1.44 -0.0034 -0.05 
ROA 0.0313 2.81*** 0.0247 2.39** 0.0334 3.39*** 0.0184 1.69* 0.0097 0.99 0.0175 1.93* 
ChangeNI -1.1573 -1.13 -1.1750 -1.2 -1.4520 -1.53 0.1560 0.16 0.1437 0.16 -0.2749 -0.32 
Bind 0.5014 0.56 1.0697 1.23 0.9664 1.15 1.0799 1.25 1.4845 1.84* 1.3095 1.72* 
Aexp 0.0909 0.13 0.1297 0.2 0.3643 0.57 0.5548 0.84 0.6206 1.01 0.7734 1.33 
Aind 0.0335 0.1 -0.0058 -0.02 -0.1947 -0.61 -0.0880 -0.27 -0.0210 -0.07 -0.2737 -0.94 
Tunn 0.3033 1.09 0.2031 0.75 0.3326 1.27 0.2043 0.76 0.1154 0.46 0.4337 1.82* 
Prop -0.1542 -0.53 -0.2274 -0.82 -0.3355 -1.24 -0.1313 -0.47 -0.2250 -0.86 -0.1503 -0.61 
Leverage -0.0053 -0.79 -0.0044 -0.68 -0.0047 -0.75 -0.0025 -0.39 -0.0050 -0.82 0.0003 0.04 
Divi 8.8849 8.92*** 8.2899 8.58*** 7.7959 8.29*** 7.5796 7.73*** 6.2104 6.71*** 5.6589 6.46*** 
Liquidity 0.0143 0.46 0.0309 1.03 0.0529 1.8* -0.0025 -0.08 0.0257 0.91 0.0661 2.46** 
Audit 0.0000 -0.29 0.0000 -0.41 0.0000 -0.08 0.0000 -0.19 0.0000 0.04 0.0000 0.44 
Ind_dumm -0.1933 -0.81 -0.0810 -0.35 -0.2065 -0.92 -0.1094 -0.49 0.0555 0.26 -0.1190 -0.6 
R2 0.2315  0.2828  0.2719  0.2806  0.3729  0.354  
F-stat (P-value)  11.71(0.000)  15.33(0.000)  14.52(0.000) 15.16(0.000)  23.12(0.000)  21.31(0.000) 
Observation 639   639   639   639   639   639   
Coefficients are estimated using Y = α0 + β1REMproxyit + β2Dscoreit + β3REMproxyit* Dscoreit + β4Sizeit + β5ROAit + β6ChangeNIit + β7Bindit + β8 Aexpit + β9 Aindit + β10 
Tunnit + β11 Propit + β12Leverageit + β13Dividendit + β14Liquidityit + β15Auditit + β16Industryit + εtit    (11). Where Y = MTB: MTB = market value of the firm scaled by book 
value of the firm. REM = one of the three proxies for REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) as determined in section 5.4.4.1. Other variables as previously defined. ***, 
**, * indicates that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 7.16 (Continued) 
 Non-transaction-based Disclosures 
  Ab_CFO  Ab_PRO  Ab_DISC  
  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.1113 0.11 -1.3169 -1.41 -1.2753 -1.44 
Ab_CFO 28.9215 4.51***     
Ab_PRO   33.3626 10.94***   
Ab_DISC     46.0435 10.49*** 
Dscore 3.5952 4.19*** 4.4757 5.78*** 5.9010 7.94*** 
Ab_CFO*Dscore -55.1664 -5.11***     
Ab_PRO*Dscore  -65.4254 -12.47***   
Ab_DISC*Dscore    -96.3950 -13*** 
Size -0.0613 -0.84 0.0189 0.29 -0.0195 -0.32 
ROA 0.0320 2.99*** 0.0170 1.85* 0.0257 2.99*** 
ChangeNI -1.3144 -1.34 -0.8274 -0.95 -0.5737 -0.69 
Bind 0.4966 0.58 0.1264 0.16 -0.0366 -0.05 
Aexp -0.1249 -0.19 -0.0093 -0.02 0.2478 0.44 
Aind -0.0182 -0.06 0.0008 0 -0.2869 -1.03 
Tunn 0.1630 0.6 0.1980 0.83 0.2326 1.02 
Prop -0.2817 -1.01 -0.2410 -0.98 -0.2061 -0.87 
Leverage -0.0007 -0.11 -0.0030 -0.53 -0.0054 -0.97 
Divi 8.4246 8.74*** 6.8420 7.94*** 5.9485 7.16*** 
Liquidity 0.0238 0.79 0.0403 1.51 0.0514 2.01** 
Audit 0.0000 -0.37 0.0000 0.06 0.0000 0.56 
Ind_dumm -0.4071 -1.75* -0.3155 -1.53 -0.6176 -3.13*** 
R2 0.28  0.435  0.4835  
F-stat (P-value)  15.12(0.000)  29.93(0.000)  36.39(0.000) 
Observation 639   639   639   
Coefficients are estimated using Y = α0 + β1REMproxyit + β2Dscoreit + β3REMproxyit* Dscoreit + 
β4Sizeit + β5ROAit + β6ChangeNIit + β7Bindit + β8 Aexpit + β9 Aindit + β10 Tunnit + β11 Propit + 
β12Leverageit + β13Dividendit + β14Liquidityit + β15Auditit + β16Industryit + εtit    (11). Where Y = MTB: 
MTB = market value of the firm scaled by book value of the firm. REM = one of the three proxies for 
REM (Ab_CFO, Ab_PRO and Ab_DISC) as determined in section 5.4.4.1. Other variables as 
previously defined. ***, **, * indicates that the parameter estimates are statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
7.3 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter presents the findings and the interpretations of the value-relevance of the 
disclosed RPTs and REM practice in RPTs, the relationship between REM in RPTs 
and firm value. The chapter concludes with the analyses and interpretations of the 
moderating effect of compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs on the 




disclosure is value-relevant in both pre-MFRS and post-MFRS adoption periods. The 
basic EPS influences the stock price valuation across the study periods. Similarly, the 
basic BVPS influences the stock price valuation across the study periods with 
exception of pre-MFRS adoption period. The results of the analyses proved that BVPS 
of the RPTFirms is value-relevant before the mandatory adoption of MFRS 124 in 
2012. On the contrary, EPS of the RPTFirms becomes value-relevant after the 
mandatory adoption of MFRS 124. This indicates that with the adoption of MFRS 124, 
capital market participants value the EPS of the RPTFirms over the BVPS of those 
firms. The results from the return models reveal that even though the basic net income 
and changes in the net income are value-relevant across the study period, the net 
income and changes in the net income of RPTFirms are value-relevant only in the 
post-MFRS 124 adoption period. 
It is also established that firms use RPTs to perpetrate REM. This was evidenced by 
the abnormally low cash flow from operations, abnormally high production costs and 
abnormally low discretionary expenditure of the RPTFirms. The result shows that the 
cash flow from operations and discretionary expenditure of the RPTFirms are 
exceptionally low than what it ought to be under normal circumstances.  Similarly, the 
study provides evidence that the production costs of the RPT firms are exceptionally 
low compared to the non-RPTFirms counterpart. This indicates that RPTFirms 
overproduced to lower the unit costs and boost the reported income. 
It is evidenced that capital market discounts the stock price of the firms that engage in 
REM in RPTs. This can be seen from the sound negative relationships between REM 
proxies (abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs and 




compliance with disclosure requirements on RPTs moderates the relationship between 
REM in RPTs and firm value. This because high level of compliance with disclosure 
requirements on RPTs alleviates the negative relationship between REM in RPTs and 
firm value. On the contrary, low level of compliance with disclosure requirements on 
RPTs aggravates the negative relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value.  
Lastly, moderate/average compliance with disclosure requirements on RPTs has no 






SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.0 Introduction 
Related party transactions are forms of legal transactions allowed all over the world 
for its associated benefits to the transacting parties in particular and the nation in 
general. It is used to facilitate the decision-making process, improve the efficiency in 
supply chain process, minimize transaction costs, efficient resource allocation, and 
serves as an alternate source of finance in certain situations. Nonetheless, these forms 
of transactions are used for self-serving purposes and lead to the collapse of many 
giant firms across the globe. Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 2009) claims that the biggest corporate governance challenge 
facing Asian business landscape is the abusive RPTs which can take the form one- off 
material expropriations of wealth or the slow expropriation of wealth through 
continuous operational transactions.  
The rate at which RPTs are used to defraud firms or expropriate minority shareholders 
has pushed the regulators in financial reporting to increase the numbers of items 
required to be disclosed while transacting with the related entities. The need for the 
information is more pronounce in the firms with type II agency problem. In these 
firms, the controlling shareholders use their controlling power to take decisions that 
match their personal interest at the detriment of the minority shareholders in particular 
and firms in general. In view of this international accounting standard board has 
dedicated a complete standard to guide the preparers of financial reports on what 




needs of users regarding RPTs. However, studies on the extent of compliance and the 
effect of such disclosures are lacking.  
This study has filled-up these gaps by providing empirical evidence on the extent of 
and determinants of compliance with the disclosure requirement of the accounting 
standard on RPTs in a country characterized by the dominance of the concentrated and 
family ownership. Also, this study has proved that RPTs disclosures are valued by the 
capital market participants. Moreover, the study provides evidence that many firms 
used RPTs to perpetrate REM. Similarly, it is documented that capital market 
disciplines the firms that engage in REM in RPTs, and that compliance with disclosure 
requirements on RPTs moderates the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm 
value. 
8.1 Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis contains the empirical findings on the five major issues on the RPTs 
disclosure. These issues are categorized into i) the extent of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements on RPTs. ii) determinants of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs. iii) the value relevance of RPT disclosure. iv) the relationship 
between REM in RPTs and firm value and v) the moderating effect of compliance 
with the disclosure requirements on RPTs on the relationship between REM in RPTs 
and firm value. Chapter One of the thesis discusses the issues in RPTs and RPTs 
disclosure across the world in general and Malaysia in particular under the background 
of the study. The Chapter also highlights the theoretical problems regarding RPTs in 
the problem statement and explains the research questions, objectives of the study, 




global laws and regulations governing the conduct and disclosure of RPTs. Chapter 
Three reviews the literature on the concept of, the extent and determinants of RPT 
disclosure. Chapter four dwells on the literature on value relevance and REM in RPTs. 
Chapter Five describes the methodology adopted in this study and presents the 
hypotheses development and frameworks.  
Chapter Six of this thesis presents the findings on the extent of compliance and 
determinants of compliance with the accounting standard on RPTs. Chapter Seven 
discusses the finding of the study regarding the value relevance of RPTs disclosure, 
REM in the RPTs, the relationship between the relationship between REM in RPTs 
and firm value and the moderating effect on compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs on such relationship. The last chapter presents the overview of 
the thesis, summary of the findings, the contribution of the study, limitations of the 
study and suggestions for future studies. 
8.2 Summary of the findings 
There are five main objectives of this study. First, to examine the level of compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs by companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia. Second, to find out factors that determine the level of 
compliance with the RPTs disclosure requirement by the companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. Third, to measure the value-relevance of the disclosed RPT information in 
the financial reports of the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for both pre and post 
mandatory adoption periods. Fourth,  to assess the relationship between REM in RPTs 




the disclosure requirements of MFRS 124 on the relationship between REM in RPTs 
and firm value. 
8.2.1 Findings on the Extent of Compliance with RPTs Disclosure 
The first finding relates to the extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements 
on RPT. The study finds a moderate level of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs by firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. The average level of 
compliance for the period under review was 70.5%. This level of compliance is within 
the range reported by Carlin et al. (2009), Dang-Duc (2011), Glaum et al. (2013) and 
Hodgdon et al. (2008) in some European and emerging markets. However, accounting 
standards are expected to be complied with in totality. Thus, there is a need for high 
level of compliance most especially in sensitive accounting issues such as RPTs. 
Although there has been a positive improvement as the highest level of compliance 
was achieved in 2015 for the post-MFRS adoption period, there is a need for continued 
improvement. The result suggests the need for improvement more especially on the 
non-transaction-based disclosures where the rate of compliance is very low. This 
means that financial regulators should increase the level of enforcement to achieve the 
desired benefits attributed to the corporate transparency and financial reporting quality 
across the globe. On industry basis, the results highlight low level of compliance by 
non-manufacturing firms. In terms of firm characteristics, large firms and those with 
higher audit quality are associated with the high level of compliance compared to their 
counterparts. The study does not document any evidence that firm profitability and 
post-2012 regulations improve the level of compliance with the disclosure 




8.2.2 Findings on the Determinants of Compliance with RPTs Disclosure 
The second finding relates to the determinants of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements. The determinants of compliance with the disclosure requirements are 
divided into corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial characteristics. The 
items considered under corporate governance mechanisms are board characteristics, 
audit committee characteristics, CEO characteristics and ownership structure. The 
financial characteristics contain the RPT motives and firm performance. 
On the part of the influence of board characteristics, the study partially supports the 
influence of board characteristics on the firms’ disclosure behavior with respect to 
RPTs. The variables measured under board characteristics are board independence and 
board size. The empirical evidence suggests that board independence is associated 
with the high level of RPTs disclosure. This signals that independent directors on 
corporate boards minimize agency problems and protect the interest of all 
stakeholders. They also ensure that relevant information is released to the users of the 
financial statement. On the part of board size, the result does not support the position 
that bigger boards are associated with the high level of RPTs disclosure. The results 
suggest that the smaller the board, the better in terms of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs. This reflects the effect of a large number of business owners 
and family members on corporate board. These members in most cases lack the 
necessary skills to influence the firms’ disclosure behavior or have some personal 
interests to protect rather than the overall firm transparency. 
The second item of corporate governance mechanisms for this study is the audit 
committee characteristics. The result of the analyses partially supports the influence 




RPTs. The variables considered under audit committee characteristics are audit 
committee independence and audit committee expertise. Previous studies have 
documented that audit committee independence improves the firms’ transparency and 
overall disclosure behavior. However, empirical result from this study documents a 
contrary position. The possible explanation for this contradictory finding is the 
independent director's industry or financial expertise. Most of the audit committee of 
the firms listed on Bursa Malaysia contains independent member(s) that lack the 
financial or industry expertise. Basically, the major roles of audit committee include 
to scrutinize the quality of the content of financial statements and ensure that relevant 
laws and regulations are adhered to. A member who falls short of the requisite 
expertise required to perform these roles cannot add value to the committee. Thus, 
lack of financial and industry expertise may explain why the audit committee 
independence fails to support its positive influence on compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs.  
Previous studies have shown that audit committee financial expertise improves the 
quality of financial information and restraint the financial excesses by management 
(Davidson III et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2007). The empirical result of the audit 
committee financial expertise supports the hypothesized positive relationship between 
audit committee financial expertise and compliance with the disclosure requirements 
on RPTs. This finding demonstrates that audit committee financial expertise is 
instrumental in the prevention and detection of fraudulent manipulation of accounting 
numbers. Hence, improves the financial reporting quality. 
The third element of corporate governance mechanisms used in this study is the CEO 




variables are CEO financial expertise, CEO family lineage and CEO ownership. On 
the CEO financial expertise, Custódio and Metzger, (2013a) provide evidence that 
CEOs with financial expertise are financially sophisticated and more likely to manage 
actively firm's financial policies. Conversely, the result of the regression does not 
provide statistical support that CEO financial expertise improves the level of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs. The possible explanation for 
this finding can be related to the concentrated ownership structure of the firms in 
Malaysia. Therefore, many financially expert CEOs may prefer to serve their own 
interest or the interest of the family when the disclosure is capable of exposing their 
internal dealings.  
This study provides evidence that the family lineage of CEO influences the level of 
compliance with the RPTs disclosure requirements negatively. Consistent with the 
literature, when the CEO is a family member (s)he does whatever possible to conceal 
vital information on RPTs to avoid market reaction or sanctions from the regulatory 
authorities. This finding supports the previous result on the CEO's financial expertise 
that CEOs in concentrated firms prefer to align with the interest of the family rather 
than professional etiquette. Related to this, this study documents that CEO ownership 
(generally be it in the family or non-family firm) decreases the extent of compliance 
with the disclosure requirements on RPTs. CEO firms are associated with the low 
transparency to prevent information leakages of proprietary information and rent-
seeking activities (Fan & Wong, 2002; Gul & Lai, 2002). 
The last element of corporate governance characteristics tested in this study is the 
ownership structure. In this category, the study considers family ownership, 




study provides empirical evidence that family ownership is positively associated with 
RPTs disclosure. Similarly, the study documents positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and the level of compliance with the RPTs disclosure 
requirements. The possible reason for these two findings is the presence of 
concentrated ownership in Malaysia. This might have made these firms to disclose 
more information, especially on RPT to minimize the type II agency problem and 
alleviate the fear of internal dealings. Another possible reason for this positive 
relationship can be seen from alignment effect. When the level of ownership is high, 
managers act in the best interest of the firm as any decrease in the firm value is more 
detrimental to the controlling owners than any other party. Al-Dubai et al. (2015) 
document that as the family ownership increases, the behavior of family members 
changes from expropriation to monitoring role. 
One important thing to note is that the findings of the last two items of corporate 
governance are associated with the CEO position not the level of ownership. Hence, 
the CEO position (regardless of the pattern of ownership) affects the extent of 
compliance with the disclosure requirement on RPTs negatively. On the other hand, 
family ownership and managerial ownership improve the extent of compliance with 
the disclosure requirements on RPTs. This study has shown that foreign ownership is 
associated with the less compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs.  The 
negative relationship can be associated with the level of foreign ownership as 
discussed in chapter six. Another possible reason for the negative relationship can be 
attributed to distance and cultural differences. Consistent with Du et al. (2017) that the 
place of living or physical distance affects the information disadvantage and effective 




On the part of firm financial characteristics, this study finds no evidence that RPTs 
motives affect the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standard on RPTs. The variables measured in RPT motives are tunneling 
and propping. None of the variables under RPTs motives is significant. The possible 
reason for this can be associated with the measurement issues. The extent of literature 
has not reached consensus or provide a clear-cut measure of tunneling. Most of the 
existing measures have been attacked by many studies for the lack of precision in 
capturing the tunneling motives (see for example Chen et al., 2014; Jiang, Rao, & Yue, 
2015; Peng, Wei, & Yang, 2011). In most cases, the information disclosed in the 
financial statements or circulars does not allow for the understanding of the real 
motives behind the transactions. This makes it difficult for researchers to identify the 
tunneling transactions among the disclosed RPTs. A similar result has been 
documented with respect to propping. In short, these results stress the need for 
extended disclosure of information in order to distinguish the motive behind the RPTs 
The last set of variables considered in this study is related to the firm performance. 
These variables consist of profitability, firm growth and dividend payment. This study 
documents that profitable firms are associated with less compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. This suggests that in 
most cases, firms manipulate RPTs to achieve impressive results. Hence, prefer to 
provide sketchy information on the RPTs to cover the underground dealings. Another 
possible reason for this can be seen from the overall goal of rational investors. Hence, 
once the profit is made, many investors may not be interested in the detail information 
on the process and source of that profit. Therefore, profitable firms have less pressure 
on the volume of information required to satisfy the information needs of the users of 




The study also documents that high growth firms are associated with the high level of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements on RPTs. This is because firms with the 
high stock price growth have to provide detail information on their activities to justify 
the growth in the share price and lower the information asymmetric. Another possible 
reason is that high growth firms have ample business opportunities, therefore, they 
may wish to request for additional funds to finance their growth. Thus, they have to 
provide detail information on the current status to lower the future finance costs. This 
study does not support the dividend payment as a determinant of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of accounting standards on RPTs. The possible reason for is 
the concentrated ownership nature of Malaysian firm. In these firms, the ownership 
and control lay with the same party. This makes the dividend policy irrelevant to the 
firm disclosure behavior. Because, any dividend policy adopted be it cash payment, 
share buyback or retained to finance future expansion will impose no additional 
agency problem to the firm. 
8.2.3 Findings on Value Relevance of RPT Disclosure and MFRS 124 Adoption 
The study documents that disclosure of RPTs is value-relevant throughout the period 
of study. The study provides empirical evidence that prior to the mandatory adoption 
of MFRS 124, neither the BVPS nor the EPS of the RPTFirms was value-relevant. 
However, with the adoption of the MFRS 124, the EPS of the RPTFirms becomes 
value-relevant. This indicates that mandatory adoption of MFRS 124 has increased the 
informativeness of the EPS of RPTFirms. Hence, investors have now shifted attention 




Moreover, the study documents that both the level of the net income and changes in 
the net income of RPTFirms are not value-relevant before the mandatory adoption of 
MFRS 124. However, the adoption of MFRS 124 has made both the level of net 
income and changes in the net income of RPTFirms to be among the explanatory 
variables of the stock return. These findings support the stream of literature that 
documents the supremacy of IFRS over local GAAPs (Barth et al., 2008; 
Dimitropoulos et al., 2013; Maigoshi, 2014).  
8.2.4 Findings on Relationship between Real Earnings Management in RPTs 
and Firm Value 
Previous studies have established the existence of accrual earnings management in 
RPTs (see for example Aharony et al., 2010; Beuselinck & Deloof, 2014). On the other 
hand, this study provides evidence for the abnormal CFO in RPT firms which is an 
indication of REM. Similarly, the study identifies RPTFirms with abnormal 
production costs. This indicates that firms overproduce to lower the unit production 
cost which is one of the three techniques of REM identified by (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
The extent of literature has defined lower abnormal discretionary expenditure as an 
element of REM. This study provides evidence that firms use RPTs to manipulate the 
discretionary expenditure. Overall, it is established that RPTs firms use abnormal 
CFO, abnormal discretionary expenditure and abnormal production cost to 
manipulated reported earnings. 
On the issue of the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value, this study 
provides sufficient evidence that capital market discounts the stock price of firms that 
engage in REM in RPTs. firms engage in PRTs to manipulate the reported earnings. 




production costs and abnormal low discretionary expenditures. It is documented that 
capital market disciplines the firms with abnormally low cash flow from operations, 
abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenditures. 
Hence, it can be said that the stock of the firms that engage in REM in RPTs are traded 
at discount. These findings are consistent with Gordon et al. (2004) Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew (2010), and Lei and Song (2011) that capital market discounts the stock price 
of firms that engage in REM in RPTs. 
8.2.5 Findings on the Moderating Effect of Compliance with RPT Disclosures 
This study finds that different level of compliance with the disclosure requirements on 
RPTs has a different effect on the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. 
It is documented that high level of compliance with the disclosure requirements on 
RPTs mitigates the negative relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. On 
the contrary, the study provides evidence that low compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs worsens the negative relationship between REM in RPTs and 
firm value. It is worthy to note that low level of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements on RPTs has no effect on the negative relationship between REM in 
RPTs and firm value. 
8.3 Contributions of the Study 





8.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
This study extends the understanding of existing theories. The study contributes to the 
agency theory by identifying the factors that can be used to mitigate agency costs. In 
an organizational setting that presents an opportunity for insiders to expropriate the 
wealth of the firm at the expense of outsiders, the findings of the study show that board 
independence, audit committee financial expertise and dominance ownership can be 
used to minimize the agency costs. It is also proved that CEO characteristics cannot 
be relied on to mitigate the agency problem in the countries with the concentrated 
ownership. Furthermore, the study extends the understanding of the techniques to 
expropriate the firm. Hence, the disclosure of RPTs in financial statements can be used 
for the detection of misleading financial information which ultimately minimizes the 
agency conflict.  
Moreover, this study contributes to the resource dependency theory. Though the study 
does not document the influence of board size on the firms RPTs disclosure, it provides 
empirical evidence that audit committee financial expertise influences the extent of 
compliance with disclosure requirements of the RPTs. This stresses the need for firms 
to source directors with requisite experience and expertise for counseling and advising 
roles. 
Also, this study contributes to the capital market research in accounting by testing the 
market valuation of the information released in the financial statement. Value-
relevance is a process that uses the statistical tools to test how the line items or other 
items of information in the financial statements affect the stock valuation or return in 
the capital market. This study provides evidence on the value relevance of the RPTs 




also documents how the level and change in the net income affect the stock return in 
the capital market. 
Further, the study discovers that capital market is aware and discounts the stock price 
of the firms that manipulate reported earnings in RPTs. studies such as Cupertino et 
al. (2015) and Kothari et al. (2015) document that capital markets fail to identify the 
earnings management conducted through real activities manipulations. However, this 
study discovers that the situation is not the same with the real activity manipulations 
in RPT. This finding contributes to the existing literature by documenting that capital 
market is aware with REM perpetrated through some activities such as RPTs. 
Moreover, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first of its kind 
that documents the moderating effect of compliance with RPTs disclosure 
requirements on the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm value. Previous 
studies such Gordon et al. (2004) Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010), and Lei and Song 
(2011) document the negative effect of abusive RPTs on the firm value. However, 
studies on how to mitigate such negative effect are grossly scarce. The present study 
has contributed to the existing literature on the moderating role of compliance with 
RPTs disclosure requirements on the relationship between REM in RPTs and firm 
value. 
8.3.2 Methodological Contributions 
This study contributes to the existing literature on the earnings management. Most of 
the previous studies on earnings management in RPTs have concentrated on the 
accrual earnings management. This study extends the level of understanding the 




study provides empirical evidence that firms employ the RPTs to perpetrate REM. 
This contribution is timely because of the changes in regulations in Malaysian 
reporting environment might have made some firms to shift attention from the 
traditional accrual earnings management to the REM. Hence, identifying the tricks 
that could be adopted to perpetrate the REM is paramount.  
Traditionally, most of the REM studies identify firms with specific characteristics or 
during certain event/activities and classify them as suspect firms. These characteristics 
or activities include small positive profit, meeting analysts forecast, on the eve of 
initial public offering /seasoned equity offering, meet previous year’s earnings and 
alike. This study identifies (RPTFirm) and uniquely measures (Through 
Roychowdowry model) the RPTFirms for REM. Thus, the study extends the list of 
firms that could be the target firms for subsequent REM studies. 
8.4 Implications of the Study 
This study has some theoretical implications and practical implications as follows. 
8.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study has made a number of theoretical implications in the following ways. First, 
as mentioned earlier, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there was no any 
previous study that documented the extent of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of accounting standard on RPTs. Thus, this study is the first of its kind 
that fills in this literature gap by documenting the level of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of accounting standard on RPTs. Moreover, this study reveals 




provides evidence that firms recorded high level of compliance with the transaction-
based disclosure requirements, while the level of compliance with the non-transaction-
based disclosure requirements was very low. 
Second, previous studies have concentrated on the determinants of firm transparency 
and general disclosure behavior (see for example Ali et al., 2007; Daske and Gebhardt, 
2006; Urquiza et al., 2009). Recently, little efforts have been put in place to identify 
the factors that influence compliance with certain disclosure requirements (see for 
example Wan-Hussin, 2009; Zango et al., 2016). This study has contributed to this 
recent trend in disclosure studies by identifying the factors that determine the level of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements related to RPTs. Malaysian economic 
setting provides a unique environment for RPT disclosure studies and the results from 
these studies can apply to several economic settings for the following reasons. First, 
the dominance of concentrated ownership and business groups which induce firms to 
frequent and heavy RPTs. Second, the reporting environment has been subjected to a 
number of regulations and regulatory changes. These two factors have paved a way 
for this study to contribute to the existing body of knowledge by documenting these 
interesting findings: 
(a) Audit committee financial expertise: audit committee members’ financial 
expertise is more commanding than independence in terms of RPT disclosure. This is 
because of the technicalities involved in the RPTs which requires special expertise to 
identify the motive and any other hidden interest attached to it. An independent 
member with objective mind may not be able to scrutinize and discover some 
irregularities in RPTs without the requisite financial knowledge to do so. Hence, 




(b) CEO characteristics: CEO position is associated with less compliance with the 
RPTs disclosure requirements. None of the CEO’s attributes been it financial 
expertise, family lineage or ownership influences the level of compliance positively. 
The results from the CEO family lineage and ownership are in line with the existing 
literature. Though, previous studies have established that CEO’s financial expertise 
improves the transparency and financial decision. On the contrary, this study 
documents no evidence that CEO’s financial expertise improves the RPTs disclosure.  
(c) Ownership structure: Several studies document that family ownership and 
managerial ownership are associated with the less information disclosure. They find 
that family and managerial firms provide less information to conceal their internal 
dealings and extract private benefits of control. On the contrary, this study documents 
that these forms of ownerships are associated with high RPT disclosure. As mentioned 
earlier, the alignment effect might have been the reason for high RPT disclosure in the 
firms with the concentrated ownership structure.  
(d) RPT motives: This study finds no evidence that RPT motives influence the 
level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on 
RPTs. Studies like Cheung et al. (2006) and Peng et al. (2011) found that PRT motives 
influence the level of RPT disclosure. They find that tunneling RPTs are associated 
with less information disclosure. On the other hand, propping RPTs are associated 
with detail information disclosure. Nevertheless, this study finds no empirical 
evidence that neither of the motives influences the level of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements on RPTs. The issue of measurement might be the possible 
factor responsible for the above findings. It seems that firms do not release the 




RPTs objectively. This makes it difficult for researchers to develop appropriate 
measures for the tunneling and propping RPTs. 
(e) Firm performance: In the countries with the disperse ownership structure, 
profitable firms disclose more information to portray the performance of the 
management. On the contrary, this study documents a negative relationship between 
the extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standard 
on RPTs and the firm profitability in a concentrated ownership setting. This indicates 
less type I agency problem in this organizational setting. This is because firms with 
concentrated ownership structure are characterized with absent of owners-manager 
(type I) agency conflict because both ownership and control lay within the same party. 
This position has been supported by the absence of a significant relationship between 
the extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements of accounting standard on 
RPTs and dividend payments. 
Third, this study extends the existing literature on earnings quality and value relevance 
by documenting the market valuation pattern of the RPT firms. The study provides 
empirical evidence that capital market values the disclosure of the RPTs. It is also 
evident that BVPS and EPS of RPTFirms exhibit varying valuation pattern based on 
the quality of information attached to them. That is to say where there is sufficient 
information on EPS, the market values the EPS of the RPTFirms over the BVPS of 
the RPTFirms. Besides, the study extends the understanding on the importance of the 
reporting standard to the market participants. It is documented that with the adoption 





8.4.2 Practical Implication 
The findings of this study highlight a number of practical issues with many practical 
implications. These issues need improvement to increase the current level of 
compliance with the accounting standard and accounting quality. First, the study 
highlights that with the adoption of MFRS, the financial health of the firms listed on 
Bursa Malaysia has been improved. This is based on the increased value relevance of 
BVPS and EPS after the mandatory adoption of MFRS across the market. Moreover, 
the mandatory adoption of MFRS standards has made the EPS of the RPT firms more 
relevant in the valuation process than what it does before the adoption. This implies 
an improvement in the earnings informativeness of the RPT firms.  
Notwithstanding, the study identifies low compliance with some aspects of the 
disclosure requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs. Therefore, there is a need 
for the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board to increase the level of enforcement in 
these areas to achieve full compliance.  Doing so will result to increased transparency 
of financial reporting and investor protection. These in turn, will enable the Malaysian 
economy to enjoy the benefits derivable from the high quality of the reporting 
environment. These benefits include increased market liquidity, low cost of capital, 
the inflow of foreign investment and many other economic benefits. 
Second, the findings of the study exposed some weaknesses in the Malaysian code of 
corporate governance. It is apparent that the code places more emphasis on the 
independence of the audit committee than the level of members’ financial expertise. 
However, the findings of the study highlight the importance of financial expertise 
more especially in the areas with financial technicalities that requires deep financial 




this, this study recommends that Suruhanjaya Sekuriti (Security Commission of 
Malaysia) should in the forthcoming code redefine the financial expert as (a) a person 
with a minimum of bachelor degree or professional qualification in accountancy or 
other finance related fields. (b) a person with at least 5 years’ experience in the finance-
related position or industry. The commission should also increase the required number 
of persons with the professional qualification in the audit committee to at least two 
persons. This is to allow the professionals to have a thorough review of the firms’ 
financial activities and enjoy the benefit of shared responsibility. It is also 
recommended that the commission should train and retrain its staff so as to easily 
identify any breach in compliance with ease and take appropriate sanction against the 
perpetrators. 
Third, this study reveals that the disclosures of the real motives behind the RPTs are 
not clear. Neither the circular to the shareholders nor the annual report contains clear 
information that enables the identification of the tunneling or propping transactions. 
Therefore, this study recommends Malaysian accounting standard board and Bursa 
Malaysia to initiate requirements that can force the management to disclose the actual 
or estimated/provision profit or loss (Net Present Value) derivable from transactions 
with the related parties. Where the transaction falls within the ordinary business of the 
firm, the reporting entity should be made to disclose any deviation from the normal 
price or terms of the transaction. This will help in curbing the instances of transfer of 
profits from one party to another and checkmates the occurrence of REM in RPTs. 
Finally, this study has a significant impact on the investors, analysts and academics 
that need to broaden their level of understanding on the extent of and the factors that 




also investigates the value relevance of the RPT disclosure and accounting numbers 
and changes in the value relevance of accounting numbers as a result of the change of 
the accounting regime. The study covers also the issues pertaining REM activities 
through the RPTs and its market valuation. All these are some of the areas of interest 
in which investors, regulatory bodies and future researchers can benefit from this 
study. 
8.5 Limitations 
The findings of this thesis can be fairly interpreted with a better understanding of these 
research limitations. First, although necessary steps have been adopted, measuring the 
level of compliance with the disclosure is always attached with some degree of 
subjectivity. This can affects the replicability of the findings of the thesis by different 
researchers using the same index. Another item of concern is that MFRS 124 provides 
for compliance with other relevant standards (such as MFRS 2, MFRS 101, MFRS 
119, MFRS 127, and MFRS 128). Hence some items such as employee compensation, 
investment in associates, operating segment might have been complied with based on 
those standards with different nomenclature and are not scored based on MFRS 124 
which may affect non-transaction based compliance.  
Second, this study uses only two variables from the board composition and audit 
committee characteristics and three variables from the CEO characteristics and 
ownership structure. It is possible that other corporate governance mechanisms such 
as gender diversity, ethnic diversity, board tenure, internal audit function, internal 
audit source that are not considered in this study contribute to the compliance with the 




governance mechanisms, other factors such as cross-listing, international footage and 
affiliations may have explanatory power on the level of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the accounting standard on RPTs are also omitted from this study. 
Finally, this limitation is associated with the measurement of the tunneling and 
propping motives. This study uses the firm performance to predict the tunneling or 
propping intention which may not give a clear reflection of the actual intention of the 
transaction. The motives can be better measured through the interview or survey 
method.  
8.6 Suggestion for future studies. 
The findings of this study provide an avenue for future researchers to explore the 
following areas. First, this thesis suggests that future studies may consider the 
replication of this study in the countries with the disperse ownership structure. 
Concentrated ownership has played important role in shaping some of the findings of 
this study. So it will be interesting to document findings from different organizational 
setting. Another area of interest is the issue of direct and indirect ownerships. Future 
studies should explore the effect of direct and indirect ownerships on the level 
compliance with disclosure requirement on RPTs. future studies should also explore 
the effect of the magnitude of RPTs (that is extreme RPTs vs little RPTs) on REM in 
RPTs. 
Second, this thesis presents the results of some selected corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm characteristics used in this study. The study can be extended by 




findings will provide additional information on the factors that influence the firm’s 
disclosure behavior. 
Third, qualitative research approach could be used to complement the findings of this 
thesis, especially related to the tunneling or propping motives and value relevance of 
accounting numbers. Discussion with the managers, investors and other stakeholders 
through interview or case study could provide more useful insight on their perception 
regarding the RPTs. 
Finally, having established that firms engaged in REM practices in RPTs and the 
valuation effect of such practices with compliance with disclosure requirement as 
moderator. It is important to investigate the moderating effect of other firms 
monitoring mechanisms such as foreign directors, audit quality on the relationship 
between real earning management in RPTs and firm value. 
8.7 Concluding Remark 
Related party transactions disclosure can be used to minimize the agency conflict and 
improve the firm value. The disclosure of RPTs is mandatory on all listed firms, 
however, the extent of the compliance with the disclosure requirements depends on 
the firm’s internal governance mechanisms and other financial characteristics. Hence, 
regulators are urged to increase the level of enforcement of the compliance with the 
laid-down disclosure requirements.  
Listed firms have a lot to benefit by providing detail information on the transactions 
with the related parties. The disclosures alleviate fears of the market players on the 




ownership. It is equally important for investors to scrutinize the reported earnings and 
check whether such profits are the products of ‘arranged transactions’ to avoid the 
possible mistake of investing in bad eggs. This is because many firms use RPTs to 
perpetrates REM in such a way that it cannot be easily traced by the auditors and 
sophisticated investors. Finally, it is hoped that this study will be a bedrock for further 
studies on RPTs, compliance with the disclosure requirements of other accounting 
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Related Party Transactions Disclosure (MFRS 124) Checklist  
Paragraph Sub- 
paragraph 
MFRS 124 Related Party Disclosures  
13  Relationships between a parent and its subsidiaries 
shall be disclosed irrespective of whether there have 
been transactions between them. An entity shall 
disclose the name of its parent and, if different, the 
ultimate controlling party. If neither the entity’s parent 
nor the ultimate controlling party produces 
consolidated financial statements available for public 
use, the name of the next most senior parent that does 
so shall also be disclosed. 
√ 
14  To enable users of financial statements to form a view 
about the effects of related party relationships on an 
entity, it is appropriate to disclose the related party 
relationship when control exists, irrespective of 
whether there have been transactions between the 
related parties. 
 
 (a) Percentage of ownership √ 
17  An entity shall disclose key management personnel 
compensation in total and for each of the following 
categories: 
 
 (a) Short-term employee benefits; √ 
 (b) Post-employment benefits; √ 
 (c) Other long-term benefits; √ 
 (d) Termination benefits; and √ 
 (e) Share-based payment. √ 
18  If an entity has had related party transactions during 
the periods covered by the financial statements, it shall 
disclose the nature of the related party relationship as 
well as information about those transactions and 
outstanding balances, including commitments, 
necessary for users to understand the potential effect 
of the relationship on the financial statements. These 
disclosure requirements are in addition to those in 
paragraph 17. At a minimum, disclosures shall 
include: 
 
 (a) The amount of the transactions; √ 
 (b) The amount of outstanding balances; √ 
 (c) Their terms and conditions; √ 
 (d) Whether they are secured; √ 
 (e) Details of any guarantees given or received; √ 
 (f) Provisions for doubtful debts related to the amount of 
outstanding balances; 
√ 
 (g) The expense recognised during the period in respect of 




19  The disclosures required by paragraph 18 shall be 
made separately for each of the following categories: 
√ 
 (a) The parent;  
 (b) Entities with joint control or significant influence over 
the entity; 
 
 (c) Subsidiaries;  
 (d) Associates;  
 (e) Joint ventures in which the entity is a venturer;  
 (f) Key management personnel of the entity or its parent; 
and 
 
 (g) Other related parties.  
20  The classification of amounts payable to, and 
receivable from, related parties in the different 
categories as required in paragraph 19 
√ 
23  Disclosures that related party transactions were made 
on terms equivalent to those that prevail in arm’s 
length transactions are made only if such terms can be 
substantiated. 
√ 
 
 
